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Chapter 1
Introduction
It generally bothers us if we are not motivated by the motives that we want
to be motivated by or if we cannot conceive of ourselves as the source of our
actions or thoughts. And it characteristically matters to us if we are
confronted with fragments of our life which we cannot piece together in a
self-narrative, or if we, due to some of our actions, cannot justifiably
conceive of ourselves anymore as the kind of person that we thought we were
and still want to be. In the last two situations, creatures like us may even feel
dissatisfied or deeply unhappy with themselves.
Some people may deny that all this matters to them. They may believe that
they do not care whether they act rationally, whether their life unfolds as a
narrative, or what kind of person they are. They may even claim to admire
irrationality and an incoherent way of life. Such people cannot but entertain
a different notion of rational action than I do – probably equating rational
action with well-considered action or with action void of passion and
emotion. They may moreover think that such ‘mattering-relations’ (as I will
call them) only obtain when people have well-defined life-plans and
regularly engage in critical self-evaluation. However, apart from exceptional
(sometimes pathological) cases, people’s self-regarding reactive attitudes, the
structure of their reflections on their actions and motives for actions, and
their explanations of their behaviour, goals and plans testify to the existence
of these mattering-relations to themselves qua self. 
These mattering-relations seem to be inextricably bound up with
particular capabilities that are characteristic of persons and which we
continually exercise – at least if these capabilities are not diminished by say
extensive alcohol consumption, or temporarily or permanently lost due to
brain damage. However, if those latter conditions obtain, a person lacks ways
of thinking and feeling about herself that are characteristic of fully developed
persons.
One of the capabilities characteristic of persons, namely the capability to
conceive of oneself as oneself, is a prerequisite for all kinds of self-regarding
thoughts and feelings that a person (qua person) may entertain and
experience. My account therefore relies on a view of personhood which takes
the capability to conceive of oneself as oneself as the defining characteristic
of all persons. And it is this concept of person which forms the starting point
of my analysis of our relations to ourselves qua self. My strategy, however,
does not imply that I restrict myself to the analysis of highly reflective
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:16  Pagina 11
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phenomena of self-awareness. Rather, it will turn out that reflective acts of
self-awareness are not intelligible without presupposing a pre-reflective
sense of selfhood.
My book touches areas that are well known to philosophers of, for
example, action or mind. But by consistently taking the first-person
perspective as the thread running through my analysis, I hope to contribute
to the philosophical discussion on personhood in a unique way.
In this introductory chapter, I first provide a distinction between
reflective self-self relations – the main emphasis of this book – and other
kinds of self-relations. I then clarify my approach to the subject and (in the
third section) list those ‘building blocks’ of my account the inspiration for
which I owe to other philosophers. Finally, I provide an overview of the rest
of the chapters.
1 About self-relations in a broad sense
We are creatures that are capable of standing in various self-relations: we can
reflect on our motives for our actions, entertain self-images, and form
judgements regarding our actions or personality; we can experience negative
or positive feelings regarding ourselves, find ourselves in various self-
regarding attitudes of mind, exhibit reactive attitudes towards ourselves, and
have self-regarding concerns. Some of these self-relations are highly
reflective; they are established by ourselves, so to speak. Others are
experienced as given and seem to be outside our direct control. Both
categories of self-relations have in common, however, that we are reflectively
aware of taking or experiencing a particular self-regarding position: whether
we evaluate our former actions and, say, regard them as irrational, whether
we engage in self-evaluation and come to realize that we care about things
that are not worth caring about, or whether we feel sad or disappointed
about ourselves, or even feel desperate about ourselves. 
Actively taking a certain position towards oneself as well as (consciously)
experiencing feelings or moods about oneself obviously requires self-
conception, namely conception of oneself as oneself. Conception of oneself
as oneself is in itself a self-relation. It is the fundamental relation of reflective
self-awareness, since all other acts of reflective self-awareness presuppose
that fundamental reflective self-relation. After all, if we did not conceive of
ourselves as ourselves, we could not think about the kind of life we want to
live or ask ourselves what kind of person we really are, and we could not
blame ourselves for what we have done or feel dissatisfied with what we have
accomplished. This book is concerned with these kinds of self-relations, that
is to say, with self-relations that require self-conception. More precisely, this
book is devoted to self-relations that we qua self-comprehending creatures
entertain with ourselves qua self. I label them reflective self-self relations.
The self is generally taken to be an ambiguous notion, which some
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philosophers may even want to get rid of.1 So, what do I mean by relations
to ourselves qua self? Well, roughly speaking, I take those ‘things’ that we –
when establishing, entertaining or experiencing a certain self-relation – do
not attribute to parts of our body while still attributing them to ourselves to
be aspects of ourselves qua self. For example, when regarding our actions as
wrong or mistaken, we do not attribute those actions to our hands, muscles,
or brain states, but we attribute them to ourselves qua person. The same
holds when we, for instance, regard our goals or plans as mistaken, or our
motives as wrong; we do not attribute those goals, plans and motives to
certain brain states, but we attribute them to ourselves in our entirety, so to
speak. Take, as a last example, our promises. When we feel sad or
disappointed about ourselves because we recurrently do not keep our
promises, we do not attribute our promises to whatever part of our organism
might be appropriate, but we still attribute our promises to ourselves. By
contrast, when someone is dissatisfied with, for instance, the shape of her
ears or the colour of her hair, that person, although she conceives of her ears
as her ears and of her hair as her hair, attributes the shape of her ears or the
colour of her hair not to herself qua person in her entirety but to herself qua
body. Therefore, according to my classification, being dissatisfied with the
shape of one’s ears or the colour of one’s hair are self-relations that that
person qua self-comprehending creature entertains with herself qua body.2
And these kinds of self-relations are not my concern here. My emphasis is on
our relations to aspects of ourselves qua self – in the sense described above.
The more general question about the notion of the self, which I introduced
at the beginning of this paragraph, is obviously not answered by my
1 See, for example, Eric T. Olson’s essay ‘There is no problem of the self’ (Olson 1999).
2 One reader objected that I seem to confuse the body-mind distinction with the part-whole
distinction. In case another reader might fall prey to the same misreading (the rest of the readers
may skip this note), I want to clarify that point and provide some background theory. My
distinction is none of the two aforementioned distinctions, but the body-person distinction. That
distinction has its basis in Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view of persons (Baker 2000).
According to that view, living human organisms (in short, bodies) that have the capability of a
first-person perspective constitute persons. A person and her body (that is, the living human
organism that constitutes that person) are one ‘thing’, although they are not identical. A person
has certain properties owing to the fact that she is a person, others owing to the fact that she is
constituted by a particular body. When attributing properties to oneself, one can either attribute
them to oneself qua person or to oneself qua body – depending on whether one has those
properties owing to one’s personhood or owing to one’s body. When we attribute certain ‘things’
to ourselves qua body, we typically distinguish between our body in its entirety (for example,
feeling tired or full of energy) and a certain part of it (for example, toothache or colour-
blindness). However, when attributing ‘things’ to ourselves qua person (for example,
spontaneity, sensitivity to the feelings of others, a certain ambition, or belief in God), we always
attribute them to ourselves in our entirety. Let me now turn to the body-mind distinction. I take
the mind to be the set of one’s psychological states. The notion of the mind is hence different
from the notion of a person; after all, the person is the whole embodied thing, not just the set
of her psychological states. To sum up, the body-person distinction is neither a body-mind nor
a part-whole distinction. 
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explications so far. I will anyhow not discuss the numerous competing
accounts of the concept of the self. My view on the self will emerge in due
course. 
I made clear that not all self-relations that we establish, entertain or
experience are relations to ourselves qua self, but I have not yet clearly
separated reflective self-self relations from all other types of self-relations.
Reflective self-self relations, to recapitulate, are relations of oneself qua self-
comprehending creature to (aspects of) oneself qua self – in contrast to oneself
qua body. This statement gives rise to the question whether we can stand in
self-relations that are not maintained by ourselves qua self-comprehending
creature. I believe that we indeed (can) have positive or negative attitudes
towards ourselves that we are not reflectively aware of (as Sigmund Freud
famously argued). We may, for example, have repressed feelings about
ourselves. Such feelings can reveal themselves in our actions, reactions to
certain situations or interactions with others. And we might become aware of
them by observing and reflecting on our own behaviour, or by means of
psychotherapy or psychoanalysis. Having positive or negative attitudes towards
oneself, say, feelings due to an inferiority complex, presupposes that a person
is a self-comprehending creature, even if she is not aware of those beliefs and
feelings. Only a self-comprehending creature – that is, a creature that has the
capability to conceive of itself as itself – can form and entertain beliefs about
itself, whether those self-regarding beliefs are readily available to that creature
or not. I call self-relations that we are not reflectively aware of but which
nonetheless require our ability of self-comprehension pre-reflective self-
relations. A further distinction between pre-reflective relations to oneself qua
self and to oneself qua body (a distinction that I made regarding reflective self-
relations) does not make sense. After all, only if a pre-reflective self-relation
became reflective – in other words, only if the person became reflectively aware
of the (for example, repressed) beliefs and feelings about (aspects of) herself –
could she attribute the involved aspect(s) of herself either to herself qua self or
to herself qua body. We might therefore label that category of self-relations pre-
reflective ‘self-self or self-body’ relations.
The three categories of self-relations discussed so far – reflective self-self
relations, reflective self-body relations, and pre-reflective ‘self-self or self-body’
relations – are established, maintained or experienced by creatures that are self-
comprehending (that is to say, that have the capability to conceive of
themselves as themselves), although they may not be reflectively aware of those
self-relations (at that moment). Not all self-relations, however, require a
creature’s capability of reflective self-awareness. We might also talk about self-
relatedness on the level of the body, that is to say, on the level of the living
human organism.3 More specifically, some kinds of self-relatedness are not only
not established or maintained by the human being qua self-comprehending
creature but do not even require that the creature should have the capability of
3 By the way, not only human organisms establish or entertain such self-relatedness. 
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reflective awareness. Think, for example, of a creature’s natural instinct to save
its own life, of our body’s compensatory movements if the body threatens to get
out of balance4, or of an organism’s activation of its recuperative powers if
harmful substances penetrated into that organism. Let us label that type of self-
relations body-body relations.
Table 1.1 gives an overview of the various types of self-relations and
provides an indication regarding their discussion in the context of this book.
Table 1.1:  Overview of the various types of self-relations 
Reflective self-self relation
Characterization: Relation of oneself qua self-comprehending creature to
(aspects of) oneself qua self:
- Person establishes, entertains, or experiences a self-relation – for example,
she thinks or feels about (an aspect of) herself in a certain way – and she is
reflectively aware of that attitude towards (that aspect of) herself. 
- The person attributes the aspect of herself which her thinking or feeling
relates to, to herself qua person in her entirety.
Discussion in this book: Main emphasis of this book.
Reflective self-body relation
Characterization: Relation of oneself qua self-comprehending creature to
(aspects of) oneself qua body:
- Person establishes, entertains, or experiences a self-relation – for example,
she thinks or feels about (an aspect of) herself in a certain way – and she is 
reflectively aware of that attitude towards (that aspect of) herself.
- The person attributes the aspect of herself which her thinking or feeling
relates to, to herself qua body or organism.
Discussion in this book: Outside the scope of this book.
Pre-reflective ‘self-self or self-body’ relation
Characterization: Relation of oneself qua self-experiencing creature to (aspects
of) oneself:
- Person entertains a certain self-relation – for example, she has certain self-
regarding feelings or beliefs – but she is not reflectively aware of the in-
volved self-regarding feelings or beliefs. 
Discussion in this book: Chapters 5 and 6 touch on this topic.
Body-body relation 
Characterization: Relation of oneself qua organism to oneself:
- Human organism entertains or experiences a self-relation. 
Discussion in this book: Outside the scope of this book.
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2 How to investigate self-self relations
2.1  Analytical, structural, descriptive – not historical or empirical 
The approach I take in trying to understand self-self relations – the relations
of a person qua self-comprehending creature to herself qua self – is to
consider the structure of those relations and the dispositions and desires that
contribute to those relations. Understanding what those relations are differs
from understanding how people came to be that way, either as an entity or
as an individual. So, my considerations are primarily analytical and
structural rather than historical.5
To explore self-self relations, I typically dig into the subject by considering
commonly held pre-philosophical notions and by analysing phenomena that
are our shared experience and all of which exhibit a self-self relation. To
name some of those notions and phenomena: our regarding ourselves qua
self as changeable, our conception of ourselves qua self as something
constant, our regarding ourselves as irrational or wrong in certain situations,
our confusion if we do not know why we are doing what we are doing, or
our distancing ourselves from certain of our desires or actions. I then try to
come to grips with the phenomenon or pre-philosophical notion in question
by a thorough analysis that takes the concept of person that I favour as a
starting point and applies that concept and its implications.6 Not only does
this approach illuminate certain phenomena and pre-philosophical notions
that exhibit various kinds of self-self relations, it also reveals the structures
and dispositions that constitute those self-self relations. At the same time,
the considerations I put forward on these matters contribute to a deeper
understanding of the concept of personhood.
My explorations are often descriptive without being empirical. I am not
asking what kind of self-self relations people at large have. That question is
an empirical question which I as a philosopher have no special competence
to answer. My point is conceptual: people have certain self-self relations
owing to capabilities by virtue of which they count as (fully developed7)
persons. The structures and dispositions that constitute the various self-self
relations are inextricably bound up with those capabilities. 
4 “Humans [but not only humans – C.S.] have a “sixth sense” called proprioception, which is
the sensory feedback they constantly receive from their muscles, joints, and skin, signalling the
position of their bodies and limbs. Without knowing it, we [qua human creature – C.S.]
constantly monitor this feedback and make adjustments to our bodies; for example, when we lift
our left arm, we subtly shift some weight to the right side of our bodies to maintain our balance.
If we didn’t, we would list dangerously to one side.” (Wilson 2002, p. 19)
5 Hence, I am not exploring the developmental stages of personhood – neither from an
evolutionary nor from a psychological perspective. 
6 For my view on personhood, see especially Chapter 2 (The relation of oneself to one’s self).
7 Some capabilities are characteristic of fully developed persons although not being strictly
required for a person to count as a person; see Chapter 2 (The relation of oneself to one’s self).
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I should furthermore emphasize that I am not concerned with the ethical
question of what kind of self-self relations people ought to have or what
about themselves qua self ought to matter to them. My concern is the self-
self relations that people cannot but have, given particular characteristic
capabilities.
2.2  Taking the first-person perspective seriously
My analysis of our self-self relations will take the first-person perspective
seriously, for I believe that we can illuminate and reveal the structures and
dispositions inherent to our self-self relations by analysing the various ways
in which we conceive of, for instance, our actions, purposes, goals, motives,
intentions, beliefs, values, character traits, life, or biography. We feel, for
example, slightly confused if we find ourselves doing something without
knowing why we are doing what we are doing. This phenomenon will, for
instance, turn out to be evidence of our disposition to comprehend ourselves
as rational agents, that is to say, as agents that act based on reasons.8
By taking the first-person perspective seriously I neither ignore nor deny
people’s capability to take an objectifying view on themselves. An
objectifying view is not in conflict with the notion of a first-person
perspective that I adhere to.9 Having a first-person perspective is not just
having a perspective but being reflectively aware of having one’s own
perspective and of the fact that one’s own perspective differs from the
perspective of others. It is therefore characteristic of creatures that have the
capability of a first-person perspective – and it is necessarily entailed by that
capability – that such creatures can take a detached stance towards
themselves and reflect on, for example, their motives for action or their
personality. And taking an objectifying view on oneself is, after all, nothing
more than that: taking a detached stance towards oneself, reflecting on a
certain aspect of oneself, thereby taking certain standards or the perspective
of others into account, and eventually taking a position towards that aspect
of oneself. In short, an objectifying view on oneself still is a self-conception,
and every self-conception is evidence of the capability of a first-person
perspective. 
Some readers may feel inclined to raise a general objection to the project of
this book, namely that our relation to ourselves qua self cannot be analysed in
8 See Chapter 6 (Self-conception and the limits to dissociation).
9 Having a first-person perspective, in this sense, is synonymous with conceiving of oneself as
oneself. “To be able to conceive of oneself as oneself is to be able to conceive of oneself independently
of a name, or description, or third-person demonstrative. It is to be able to conceptualize the
distinction between itself and everything else there is. It is not just to have thoughts expressible by
means of ‘I’, but also to conceive of oneself as the bearer of those thoughts. […] [M]erely having a
perspective, or a subjective point of view, is not enough […]. One must also be able to conceive of
oneself as having a perspective, or a subjective point of view.” (Baker 2000, p. 64)
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isolation from our relation to others and to the world. They may argue that the
physical, emotional, and cognitive interaction with others plays a major role in
the development of the self10 and that, even in a mature stage, our self and the
ways we think and feel about ourselves are still shaped by the feedback of our
colleagues, friends and loved ones. I will not challenge that view. My concern
with our self-self relations does not imply that I propose a solipsistic view on
personhood. We could, for example, not blame ourselves for not keeping
certain promises or for not being sensitive to the feelings of others if we had
never had interactions with our fellow human beings. In that case, how could
we know the concepts of promise and sensitivity? And I could never entertain
the thought “I wonder if this book will ever be published” if I had never had
interactions with the ‘outside’ world; for I would lack the concepts of book and
publishing.11 I thus do not propose a view that diminishes the importance of
other- and world-relatedness and that ignores the connections and
dependencies between self-relatedness, other-relatedness, and world-
relatedness. Yet, to analyse the structure, dispositions and desires that are
inextricably bound up with our self-self relations, I have to place these relations
in the foreground and analyse the corresponding phenomena.
2.3  The quest to find an adequate account of personhood
Persons, obviously, think and feel in different ways about themselves qua self.
I will argue that the ways in which we think and feel are not merely
contingent; that is to say, they not only depend on, for example, our actions
and experiences, our character and biography, or the reaction of others to our
own behaviour. Our self-regarding thinking and feeling also has certain a
priori structures and involves particular self-regarding dispositions,
inclinations or desires. Here are two examples. Firstly, we cannot but think of
ourselves as generally acting based on reasons. We are confused if we find
ourselves doing something without knowing why we are doing what we are
doing. Secondly, we cannot but think that we (qua person) – not forces in us,
so to speak – generally decide what we are doing. It would bother us if we
regularly or frequently did not want to be motivated by a certain desire to act
in a certain way and precisely performed that action. 
If I am right, certain things concerning our self characteristically matter to
us. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not thinking of the fact that we have self-
interested concerns – for example, the self-interested concern to survive. The
concerns that I have in mind are more concealed, so to speak. They exhibit
themselves in ‘models’ of conceiving of ourselves which, for instance, become
explicit in regarding certain of our actions as non-rational or irrational, or as
10 See, for example, Butterworth 1999 and Butterworth 2000.
11 Lynne Rudder Baker uses a similar argumentation to defend her theory against the objection
that her account is Cartesian. See Baker 2004, p. 133.
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not in tune with our character. An adequate theory of personhood should
therefore not only show which capabilities are characteristic of personhood
but also account for the self-regarding dispositions, desires, etcetera that
persons characteristically have and which constitute particular mattering-
relations to themselves qua self.
3 Other philosophers’ views
3.1  The areas concerned are well-known to philosophers 
My investigations of self-self relations bear upon a diversity of areas that are
familiar to philosophers with various specializations – whether they are
concerned with personhood, the self, personal identity, or rationality, whether
they are specialized in the philosophy of action, mind, psychology, or
psychiatry, or whether they are ethicists. My approach, however, illuminates
connections that otherwise threaten to be overlooked or underemphasized. 
The phenomenon of dissociation, for instance, which is primarily discussed
in the philosophy of psychiatry12, turns out to have non-pathological forms
that are our shared experience. Think of the phenomenon of distancing oneself
from certain of one’s desires or actions, and think of one’s lack of first-person
access to one’s perceptions and actions when driving on autopilot. By analysing
dissociation in the light of a general account of self-conceptions – instead of,
for example, in the context of a theory about multiple selves or in the context
of an account of free action – specific questions appear in the spot-lights.
Answering these questions can illuminate our relation to ourselves qua self:
Which aspects of herself can be subject to a person’s dissociation? Which
dissociative phenomena can count as dissociative acts of a person qua person?
Can a person dissociate herself from herself qua self?13
Take as a second example the different ways in which we sometimes judge
our actions – for instance, as rational, irrational, non-rational, or wrong – and
the different feelings that can precede, accompany or follow, and inform our
judgements – like satisfaction, dissatisfaction, regret, confusion, or contrition.
Proceeding from the concept of person and the various ways in which people
may regard their actions raises other questions than does discussing these
phenomena in the context of theories of action. Think of the following
‘mattering-questions’: Why does acting irrationally bother us? Why does acting
non-rationally bother us? Why does acting wrongly bother us? Being able to
answer these questions is indispensable for an account of our relation to
ourselves qua self.14
12 See, for example, Braude 2004, Radden 1999, or Stephens and Graham 2000.
13 See Chapter 6 (Self-conception and the limits to dissociation).
14 See Chapter 3 (Practical irrationality from a self-related perspective) and Chapter 4 (Wrong-
ness from a self-related perspective).
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I should mention that, although not being a psychiatrist, I sometimes refer
to pathological cases of, for example, Manic Depressive Illness or Dissociative
Identity Disorder. But I am not interested in the mental illness qua illness, I am
interested in what it reveals about the structure, processes, dispositions and
desires that are bound up with our relation to ourselves qua self. 
3.2  Inspiration drawn from other philosophers’ views
Questions concerning our relation to ourselves necessarily take the concept of
person as starting point. After all, we are persons. How could one ever propose
an account of our relation to ourselves without clarifying the concept of person
or presupposing a view on the kind of entities persons are? The concept of
person, however, is subject to unremitting philosophical debate. Different
contemporary philosophers have ended up with rival theories.15 
The theories differ, for instance, in identifying ‘person’ with either ‘body’,
‘human being’, or ‘self’. And they also differ (partly because of their diverging
answers to the preceding question) on subsequent questions, for example:
firstly, whether personal identity over time consists in physical or psychological
continuity, or whether it has to be thought of in terms of characterization
instead of re-identification; secondly, which capabilities are characteristic of
personhood; or, thirdly, whether selfhood requires reflective self-awareness.
Furthermore, there are debates in other areas of philosophy – for instance,
regarding rational agency, values, self-knowledge, or self-consciousness – that
intertwine with a clarification of the concept of person.
My project is not to compare and categorize rival theories of the concepts of
person and self, or to defend one or some against the others. None of the
existing theories of personhood or selfhood, if I am right, cover the scope of
my project of a person’s relation to herself qua self and consistently take the
first-person perspective as the thread running through the analysis. I will
therefore unfold my account of personhood and self-self relations. That
account draws its inspiration from theories of various contemporary
philosophers of person, mind or action, from works of philosophers of
psychiatry, and from works of some psychologists and psychiatrists.16 In some
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15 There are exceptions. For example, Eric T. Olson argues that such a debate is unnecessary:
“The word ‘person’ is well enough understood for there to be philosophical problems about
people.” See Olson 1999, p. 53.
16 I mean the following philosophers of person, mind, or action: Lynne Rudder Baker, Michael
E. Bratman, Owen J. Flanagan, Manfred Frank, Harry Frankfurt, Shaun Gallagher, Christine M.
Korsgaard, Raymond Martin, Thomas Nagel, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Eric T. Olson, Derek Parfit,
Philip Pettit, Paul Ricoeur, T. M. Scanlon, Sydney Shoemaker, Charles Taylor, Marya
Schechtman, Michael Smith, Galen Strawson, Ernst Tugendhat, J. David Velleman and Dan
Zahavi; the following philosophers of psychiatry: Owen J. Flanagan, George Graham, Jennifer
Radden and G. Lynn Stephens; the psychologists John Barresi, George Butterworth and Timothy
D. Wilson; and the psychiatrists Peter D. Kramer and Kay Redfield Jamison.
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cases, my account owes the inspiration for certain key notions or ‘building
blocks’ to those philosophers. By explicitly mentioning those items and their
source (in Table 1.2), I aim to give readers who are familiar with those areas of
philosophy a first impression of the shape of my account. 
Table 1.2 shows a list of those ‘building blocks’ of my account the
inspiration for which is drawn from the views of other philosophers; it refers
to the main source of each of those ‘building blocks’ and lists the chapters in
which those ‘building blocks’ appear.
Table 1.2:  Building blocks of my account
First-person perspective as defining characteristic of persons
Main source: Lynne Rudder Baker’s theory of persons (Baker 2000)
Chapters in this book: All chapters, especially Chapter 2
Distinction between weak and strong evaluation
Main source: Charles Taylor’s view on persons as strong evaluators (Taylor 1985)
Chapters in this book: Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5
Narrative self-conception
Main source: Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view (Schechtman
1996)
Chapters in this book: Chapters 2, 3, and 5
Notion of caring (caring about being a certain kind of person, caring about
one’s values)
Main source: Harry Frankfurt’s view on caring as being not under a person’s
immediate voluntary control (Frankfurt 1982)
Chapters in this book: Chapters 4 and 5
Distinction between agency and rational agency
Main source: Lynne Rudder Baker’s view on (rational) agency (Baker 2000)
Chapters in this book: Chapters 2, 3, and 4
Rational agency; rational action (taken as acting based on reasons)
Main source: Primarily Lynne Rudder Baker’s, secondarily J. David Velleman’s
view on rational action (Baker 2000, Velleman 1992)
Chapters in this book: Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
Notion of structural reasoning
Main source: Julian Nida-Rümelin’s distinction between punctual optimalization
and structural rationality (Nida-Rümelin 2001)
Chapters in this book: Chapter 3
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Notion of commitment to one’s purposes and values
Main source: Christine M. Korsgaard’s view on committing oneself to take the
means to one’s ends (Korsgaard 1997)
Chapters in this book: Chapters 3 and 4
Pre-reflective self-awareness
Main source: Dan Zahavi and Josef Parnas’s view on the ‘givenness’ of the
(experiential) self (Zahavi and Parnas 1999)
Chapters in this book: Chapters 5 and 6
Pre-reflective sense of identity
Main source: Manfred Frank’s reference to the notion of ‘Gefühl von Identität’
(Frank 2002)
Chapters in this book: Chapter 5
Pre-reflective sense of (continued) selfhood
Main source: Shaun Gallagher and Anthony J. Marcel’s view on ecological self-
awareness (Gallagher and Marcel 1999)
Chapters in this book: Chapters 5 and 6
Distinction between first-person and third-person self-conceptions
Main source: Ernst Tugendhat’s view on unmediated and mediated self-
knowledge (Tugendhat 1979)
Chapters in this book: Chapter 6
Distinction between experiencing oneself as subject and as source of, for
instance, one’s thoughts
Main source: G. Lynn Stephen and George Graham’s, and Jennifer Radden’s view
on ego-alien experiences (Stephens and Graham 2000, Radden 1999) 
Chapters in this book: Chapter 6
I refrain here from presenting a second table listing all other key notions that
make up my account. That would merely serve matters of completeness
without being informative for the reader, as those notions require
explanation and argumentation.
4 Overview of the following chapters
4.1  Developmental stages of the presented account 
My ideas concerning an adequate view of person- and selfhood – that is to
say, a view that accounts for our relation to ourselves qua self and reveals its
structures and concealed dispositions, inclinations or desires – have
22 • Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations
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developed gradually. Retrospectively, I can distinguish five stages in the
development of my account. These developmental stages are still
recognizable in the structure of this book and knowledge of them might help
readers to orientate themselves within the presented framework of concepts
and distinctions.
I first develop a view on the structure of person- and selfhood, addressing
the reflective aspects of person- and selfhood. This account of person- and
selfhood identifies three properties that are constitutive of fully developed
person- and selfhood: the property of a first-person perspective and the (non-
fundamental) properties of a narrative self-conception and of making
qualitative distinctions and applying them as self-regarding standards. The
three properties turn out to be the basis of characteristic self-self relations. As
the self-regarding reactive attitudes in question are more or less directly
connected to our actions, I, in a second stage, provide an analysis of our
feelings and thoughts concerning our actions. The resulting account
describes the different functions of purposes and values in our evaluative
reasoning, and identifies a set of characteristic attitudes concerning our
actions and ourselves. Some of those self-regarding attitudes belong to the
scope of the property of a first-person perspective; others also require the
(non-fundamental) properties of a narrative self-conception or of applying
self-regarding qualitative standards. 
After having investigated the reflective aspects of person- and selfhood in
considerable depth, it becomes clear that the account developed so far does
not account for the ‘givenness’ of the self. I therefore then examine the notion
of a pre-reflective sense of selfhood. The proposed account distinguishes
between fundamental self-awareness and a pre-reflective sense of
(continued) selfhood. The concept of a pre-reflective sense of (continued)
selfhood turns out not only to account for the ‘givenness’ of the self, but
probably to provide the ultimate ground for a person’s implicit desire for
unity of her self, which expresses itself in the various self-regarding reactive
attitudes. The results of this third developmental stage of my account
reinforce my thesis that a person cannot but conceive of herself as herself.
That leads to an investigation of the limits to a person’s dissociation from
herself qua self. My account of person- and selfhood, which by now covers
reflective as well as pre-reflective components, now deals with pathological
self-conceptions and experiences, like the conception of being a ‘multiple’ or
of having alters (alternate selves), or the experience of not being the source
of one’s actions or thoughts. The analysis of dissociations turns out to require
a distinction between first- and third-person self-conceptions.17 And it
becomes clear that there are various kinds of non-pathological dissociative
acts and experiences that are our shared experience. In the fifth and last stage
of the development of my account, I finally pull together the various
Introduction  • 23
17 Both, first- and third-person self-conceptions, are obviously (after all, they are self-conceptions),
entertained from a first-personal point of view.
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conclusions and draw further implications. 
Next to knowledge of the developmental stages of my account, it might be
helpful to know that some aspects of my account will be addressed in more
detail than others. A first example is the property of having a narrative self-
conception. It is less fully discussed than the property of applying self-
regarding qualitative standards and the typical reflexive thoughts and
feelings that belong to the domain of that property. A second example is the
constitution view of persons. That view is only briefly explained. Take as a
final example the property of a first-person perspective. The concept of a first-
person perspective – although it runs through all of the chapters – is less
thoroughly discussed than are the implications of the property of having a
first-person perspective. 
There are two main reasons for the different degrees of elaboration of the
various aspects of my account. Firstly, a particular aspect may be simply
presupposed – for example, Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view of
persons. Secondly, I may – rightly or wrongly – believe that a certain aspect
needs less elaboration, for instance, because I take it to be sufficiently
discussed by the philosopher to whom I owe the inspiration for it – for
example, Marya Schechtman’s elaboration of the notion of a narrative self-
conception. And, needless to say, an in-depth argument for all aspects of my
account of personhood, selfhood, and self-self relations would not require
one book but a whole series.
4.2  How to read this book 
This book lends itself for two reading strategies. It can, of course, be read in
its entirety, in the sequence of the chapters. Reading from cover to cover,
obviously, is the most appropriate way to get a complete overview of my
account of personhood and our relation to our ‘self’. This book can, however,
also be read selectively: one can read one or some of its chapters, in whatever
sequence one prefers. That approach is possible, since the various chapters –
with the exception of this introductory chapter and the concluding chapter
– were written as independent papers. The reader may hence discover some
redundancy. But because the context is different each time, I believe that the
redundancies will have an illuminating effect. And, of course, I hope that the
selective reader will become interested to such an extent that she will
eventually read the whole book.
24 • Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations
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4.3  The central claims and assumptions of the following chapters
Brief synopses of the subsequent chapters are given in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3:  Descriptions of the subsequent chapters
Chapter 2 The relation of oneself to one’s self
This chapter presents a structural account of the self and considers the
mattering-relation that a person has to her self. The account distinguishes
three components of that mattering-relation and identifies them as separate
regions of mattering with different structures. 
The chapter rests on the following central assumption: Three properties
jointly constitute a (mature) self: having a first-person perspective (which
is the fundamental property), having a narrative self-conception, and
making qualitative distinctions.
Chapter 3 Practical irrationality from a self-related perspective
This chapter studies two ‘mattering-phenomena’: regarding one’s action as
irrational and regarding oneself as irrational. The claim is that our own
irrationalities not only bother us because irrationality hinders the
accomplishment of our aims, but also disturb us more intrinsically.
The chapter rests on the following central assumption: Actions are self-
conceived as rational, irrational, rational-and-irrational, non-rational,
mistaken, or wrong because of how the action relates to a possible process of
evaluative reasoning.
Chapter 4 Wrongness from a self-related perspective 
This chapter studies two ‘mattering-phenomena’: regarding one’s action as
wrong and regarding oneself as wrong. The claim is that conceiving of one’s
action as wrong overrides other possible ways of conceiving of one’s action.
The chapter rests on the following central assumption: Purposes and values
– by relating to two different ways of reflecting on one’s actions – play
essentially different roles in our evaluative reasoning. 
Chapter 5 Selfhood: Unity in changeability 
This chapter considers the tension between one’s conceiving of oneself as one
and the same self over time and one’s reflective awareness of the
changeability and instability of one’s self. The claim is that certain
characteristic ways of thinking and feeling about ourselves reveal our desire
for unity of our self.
The chapter rests on the following central assumption: Personhood – by
requiring reflective self-awareness – presupposes a pre-reflective sense of
selfhood, or rather a pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood.
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Chapter 6 Self-conception and the limits to dissociation 
This chapter analyses various phenomena of dissociation in the light of an
account of self-conceptions. The claim is that a person’s dissociation from her
self is impossible on conceptual grounds.
The chapter rests on the following central assumption: We have to
distinguish between first-person and third-person self-conceptions; the
latter, in contrast to the former, require conceptualization and symbolization
of oneself qua self.
Chapter 7 Conclusion: Personhood, models of self-conception, and regions of
mattering
This chapter draws connections among the preceding chapters; it puts the
emphasis on those aspects of the proposed view of person- and selfhood that
can be expected to be most controversial. The claim is that the three
properties that are constitutive of personhood (in its fullest sense) constitute
separate regions of mattering with different structures and dispositions; in
this way they are the basis for certain self-relations that are characteristic of
persons. 
The chapter rests on the following central assumption: The three properties
that are constitutive of personhood (in its fullest sense) include certain
‘models of self-conception’. 
I do not pretend to have analysed all phenomena of self-self relations. But I
hope that my analysis uncovers structures, inclinations, dispositions or
desires that are concealed in certain characteristic ways of thinking and
feeling about ourselves. In that case, this book should contribute to a deeper
understanding of person- and selfhood. Needless to say, my account is still
open to new perspectives.
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Chapter 2
The relation of oneself to one’s self 
In everyday language, we find expressions which show that ‘our self’ matters
to us. Such expressions can, for example, be found in the autobiographical
book An Unquiet Mind, by Kay Redfield Jamison1, describing her life with
manic-depressive illness.
[…] I was confused and frightened and terribly shattered in all of my notions of
myself; […]
[…] I tend to compare my current self with the best I have been […]
After each of my violent psychotic episodes, I had to try and reconcile my notion
of myself […]
[…] I despaired of ever returning to my normal self.2
My question is whether the pretheoretically presupposed mattering-relation of
oneself to one’s self, which is expressed in utterances like the above, is
supported by a philosophical notion. And if so, how can we understand that
relation?
In my view, the mattering-relation of oneself to oneself qua self belongs
inherently to the phenomenon of ‘the self’. I will split the concept of the self
into three, and I will argue that when we understand the distinctions involved,
we recognize three self-regarding concerns: concern with3 one’s rational agency,
with one’s autobiographical narrative, and one’s values; and all three concerns
exhibit a need for unity of one’s self.
The ingredients of the account of the self presented here have their origins
in theories of Lynne Rudder Baker, Marya Schechtman and Charles Taylor, but,
if I am right, the proposed combination of certain elements of their theories
produces a notion of the self that elucidates the full structure of selfhood. By
focusing on structure and on the functional role of elements with respect to the
whole, the notion of the self loses its vagueness. My structural account makes
intelligible that one’s self necessarily matters to oneself. To avoid
misunderstanding, I should stress that such a structural account does not
1 Jamison 1997. 
2 Jamison 1997, pp. 85, 92, 121, and 146. 
3 I deliberately use the expression ‘concern with’ instead of ‘concern for’, since the three self-
regarding concerns are not – or rather, not primarily – conscious worries about one’s rational
agency, autobiographical narrative or values. The three ‘things’ simply matter to us, whether we
are explicitly concerned about them or not.
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presuppose or entail claims about the specific biological or social requirements
for the development and sustainability of (certain elements of) the self. Neither
does it presuppose or entail claims about the dependence of a particular
person’s ‘content of the self’ on physical, psychological or social factors. My
interest is strictly conceptual: I try to make explicit what is implicit in our use
of the concept of a self and in our idea that ‘our self’ matters to us. In trying to
make explicit what is implicit, I will focus on revealing the distinctions,
connections and relations that provide for conceptual structure.
My view can be summarized in the following five statements:
(S1) One’s self is jointly constituted by three properties:
- having a first-person perspective;
- having a narrative self-conception; 
- making qualitative distinctions. 
(S2) The three properties differ in their role with respect to the self: 
- a first-person perspective is fundamental for being a self; 
- a narrative self-conception and the property of making qualitative 
distinctions are not necessary for being a self, but characteristic of 
our selves. 
(S3) Each of the three properties constitutes an identity of one’s self:
- a first-person perspective constitutes one’s neutral identity;
- a narrative self-conception constitutes one’s narrative identity; 
- the property of making qualitative distinctions constitutes one’s
ethical identity.
(S4) Each of the three properties is the basis for a specific concern with one’s self: 
- a first-person perspective is the basis for concern with one’s 
rational agency; 
- a narrative self-conception is the basis for concern with one’s
autobiographical narrative; 
- the property of making qualitative distinctions is the basis for concern
with one’s values. 
(S5) The three concerns exhibit – by means of the normative criterion that 
we apply in the respective concern – our need for unity of our self: 
- our concern with our rational agency exhibits our need for 
consistency of our self; 
- our concern with our autobiographical narrative exhibits our need 
for coherence of our self; 
- our concern with our values exhibits our need for integrity of our self.
I will begin by offering a characterization of the notion of the self (Part I),
which will also lead to some reflection about the notions of agent, rational
agency, person and personal identity, and then take that characterization as
the basis for an account of the relation of oneself to oneself as a relation of
concern with one’s self (Part II).
28 • Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:16  Pagina 28
Part I – The notion of ‘the self’
INTRODUCTION
One’s self is the ‘product’ of three properties: having a first-person
perspective, having a narrative self-conception, and making qualitative
distinctions. Because of a first-person perspective we are selves; because of a
narrative self-conception we conceive of our life as a narrative and of our self
as the protagonist of that narrative; and because of the property of making
qualitative distinctions we have values and conceive of ourselves as having
these values. Our self is the product of these three properties, and at the same
time, because of these properties, we ourselves are the producers of our self.
1 A first-person perspective
– the fundamental element of one’s self
ONLY BEINGS WITH A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE ARE SELVES
To have a first-person perspective means much more than merely having a
perspective. A being with a first-person perspective not only acts from its
own perspective, but it is aware of the fact that it has its own perspective and
that this perspective differs from the perspective of others. Hence, such a
being thinks of itself as the subject of its behaviour, thoughts, feelings and
experiences; in other words, it thinks of itself as itself. And, because having
a first-person perspective means conceiving of oneself as oneself, a being
with a first-person perspective can think of itself qua self in the future and in
other circumstances. In short, beings with a first-person perspective can
conceptualize their own perspective.4
A being with a first-person perspective conceives of itself as itself; it
conceives of itself as a subject that is aware of itself. Such a being is a self for
itself. Or, in other words, such a being exists as a self for itself. Conversely,
one can say: A being that exists as a self for itself, conceives of itself as itself.
A being that conceives of itself as itself conceptualizes its own perspective.
And a being which conceptualizes its own perspective is a being with a first-
person perspective.
I call a property which the existence of something is dependent on
fundamental for the thing in question.5 And because our existence as self is
dependent on having a first-person perspective, a first-person perspective is
fundamental for being a self.
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4 I owe my notion of a first-person perspective to Lynne Rudder Baker; see Baker 2000, espec-
ially, pp. 21 and 60-64. 
5 Baker does not use the term ‘fundamental property’ but the term ‘essential property’, see Baker
2000, pp. 35-39.
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WE ARE HUMAN BEINGS WITH A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
The question is: Who are the ‘we’ we are talking about? – Biologically we are
human beings, animals of the species homo sapiens; but not all human beings
have a first-person perspective. Infants, for example, do not (yet) think of
themselves as themselves, and patients in a late stage of Alzheimer’s disease
do not conceive of themselves as themselves (anymore). – We are human
beings with a first-person perspective, and because we have a first-person
perspective, we are selves. 
Let us define beings with a first-person perspective, in other words, beings
that are selves, as persons. Using this definition we can say: we are human
persons. By the way, if there were beings of a non-human species with a first-
person perspective, then these beings would be persons, and everything that
I say about beings with a first-person perspective would apply to them as
well, at least as far as it is dependent on a first-person perspective only.
A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE CONSTITUTES AN IDENTITY OF ONE’S SELF,
WHICH IS NOTHING MORE THAN ‘I AM I’ IN THE MOST ABSTRACT SENSE
Our existence as self implies our certainty of ‘being-self’. Because of our first-
person perspective we never doubt our own existence. We cannot doubt that
we are the ones that we conceive of as ourselves. After all, we do not identify
ourselves before we conceive of ourselves as ourselves; indeed, we do not
identify (or mis-identify) ourselves at all.6 One simply is for oneself as self.
Our ‘being-self’ is a certainty for ourselves. This certainty can only disappear
together with our ‘being-self’, because ‘being-self’ implies the certainty of
‘being-self’.
Because of a first-person perspective one’s self appears to oneself as the
certainty of ‘being-self’, and by this as something constant that cannot be
specified any further. I call this identity our neutral identity7, because a notion
of the self as ‘being-self’ is the notion of a ‘content-free’ self, so to speak. 
BEINGS WITH A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE ARE CAPABLE OF
(WEAK) RATIONAL AGENCY
What are rational agents? Rational agents are first of all agents, in other
words, beings that do things. ‘Doing things’8 means that a subject has desires,
beliefs and intentions, and that certain events would not have happened if
the subject in question had not had certain desires, beliefs and intentions.
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6 See Baker 2000, pp. 136-137.
7 The term ‘neutral identity’ is derived from Charles Taylor. Taylor writes in Taylor 1989, p. 49:
“This is what I call the ‘punctual’ or ‘neutral’ self, – ‘punctual’, because the self is defined in abstrac-
tion from any constitutive concerns […] Its only constitutive property is self-awareness.”
8 This notion of ‘doing things’ is borrowed from Lynne Rudder Baker; see Baker 2000, pp. 149-150.
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What sorts of beings ‘do things’ in this sense? Beings that ‘do things’ in this
sense are beings which seem to be reasoning from their own points of view.
Think, for example, of chimpanzees or dogs which are (or seem to be)
capable of (more or less complex) means-end reasoning and to which we
attribute motives for the things they do. Having motives presupposes that the
being in question has its own perspective. But does this imply that the being
conceives of its motives as its own motives? Does it imply that the being
conceives of itself as itself? The answer is ‘no’.
Only beings with a first-person perspective conceive of themselves as
themselves, conceive of their desires, beliefs, intentions as desires, beliefs,
intentions of themselves, and of their actions as actions of themselves, and
can, through that, take a position regarding their motives for their actions.
Therefore, only beings with a first-person perspective have the capability to
reflect on their motives for their actions; and having the capability to reflect
on one’s motives for one’s actions is what rational agency means. 
We are beings with a first-person perspective, and therefore, because of
our first-person perspective, we are beings that are capable of rational agency.
Does this mean that we act rationally in every concrete situation? Of course
not. Firstly, we sometimes act without knowing the reason for our action; we
find ourselves performing a certain action, so to speak. Secondly, we often act
knowing why we do what we do, but without having reflected on our
motives for action. Thirdly, sometimes, after having reflected on our motives
for action, we are not moved by the reason we want to be motivated by. We
know why we do what we do, but we do not want to be motivated by that
reason. In none of these situations do we act rationally. In short, we are
rational agents, but we are not acting rationally in every concrete situation.
Rational agents will act rationally, in certain situations. A rational agent
has the capability to reflect on her reasons for action, which (could) motivate
her to act in a certain way. Therefore, at least in situations of conflicting
reasons, a rational agent will reflect on her reasons. A rational agent will
evaluate, for example, whether some of her conflicting desires could be
fulfilled later, whether some of her desires are less strong than others,
whether a certain desire can be fulfilled with less effort than the others,
whether she could think of an action the performance of which would fulfil
all (or some of the) conflicting desires; and she will then prefer to be
motivated by a certain reason and not by others.9 If the agent actually acts
based on the reason she wants to be motivated by, then she acts rationally in
the situation in question.10
The relation of oneself to one’s self • 31
9 Preferring to be motivated by certain (of one’s) desires and not by others is a sort of identifi-
cation with certain (of one’s) desires; therefore, this view could be called a Frankfurtian view.
10 The fact that, in situations of conflicting reasons, a rational agent will prefer to be motivated
by certain reasons and not by others, does not mean that the person in question actually will act
based on the reasons she wants to be motivated by. I will come back to such situations in Part II
of this chapter.
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Evaluating desires based on preferences and rejecting desires because of
some contingent conflict with other goals is a kind of deliberation that we
may call (with Charles Taylor) weak evaluation11. The agent in question is a
‘simple weigher of alternatives’12. Beings with a first-person perspective are,
because of a first-person perspective, capable of this kind of rational agency,
that is, they are capable of weighing alternatives in the sense of weak
evaluation. I call this kind of rational agency weak rational agency. (We have
to qualify the kind of rational agency, because, as I will argue later, there is a
stronger form of rational agency which requires, on top of a first-person
perspective, another property of the being in question.) 
A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN OUR SELF
Persons characteristically have certain properties that cannot be explained
with a first-person perspective only, for example: we make life plans; we ask
ourselves, in certain situations, what kind of person we would be if we were
to pursue a certain goal; we ask ourselves what kind of life we want to live.
Why is a first-person perspective not sufficient to explain these properties?
To make life plans requires that one think of one’s life as a unity; and this way
of conceiving of one’s experiences and actions is not an implication of a first-
person perspective, but it requires that the person in question have a
narrative self-conception.
Deliberation about the kind of person one would be if one were to pursue
a certain goal in a certain situation requires that one make value judgements;
and the capability to make value judgements is not an implication of a first-
person perspective. Making value judgements is a ‘deeper’ form of evaluation
than weighing alternatives; it requires that the person in question have the
property of making qualitative distinctions13.
To ask ourselves what kind of life we want to live even requires all three
properties: (1) a first-person perspective, which is necessary for conceiving
of oneself as oneself and thinking of oneself qua self in the future and in
other circumstances; (2) a narrative self-conception, which is necessary for
conceiving of one’s experiences and actions as interrelated within the unity
of ‘living a life’; and (3) the property of making qualitative distinctions,
which is necessary for judging that a certain kind of life is of higher value
than another.
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11 See Taylor 1985. 
12 Charles Taylor’s term, see Taylor 1985, p. 23.
13 This statement obviously calls for explanation. I elaborate on the property of making quali-
tative distinctions in the forthcoming section ‘Qualitative distinctions – the orientation-provid-
ing element of one’s self’. 
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2 A narrative self-conception
– the structuring element of one’s self
A PERSON WITH A NARRATIVE SELF-CONCEPTION CONCEIVES OF HERSELF
AS THE PROTAGONIST OF HER OWN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE
We think of our life as an autobiographical narrative.14 That means we interpret
our experiences, actions, traits, beliefs and desires, we connect them and position
them in relation with each other, and as a result of that, we ‘produce’ the
autobiographical narrative that we conceive of as our life. I call the property of a
narrative self-conception the structuring element of the self, because, owing to our
narrative self-conception, we give a certain structure to our experiences, actions,
traits, beliefs and desires. This does not mean that we (have to) remember all
incidents and episodes of our life. Narrative self-conception means that a person
sees her experiences, actions, traits, beliefs and desires through the glasses of her
life story, so to speak. Depending on the person’s self-interpretation, some
experiences, actions, traits, beliefs and desires get a central place in the
autobiographical narrative whereas others acquire peripheral positions.
Our self-interpretation is not a one-off activity, but a continuous process of
interpretation and re-interpretation. We interpret our current attitudes and
actions within the context of our autobiographical narrative, we re-interpret
past actions and attitudes in the light of present ones, and our current
interpretation of our life, which includes our plans and goals, is the one which
we will confront ourselves with in the future. 
A NARRATIVE SELF-CONCEPTION CONSTITUTES THE IDENTITY OF A SELF
AS CONTINUOUSLY EVOLVING SELF-INTERPRETATION
On the basis of the structuring element of our self, we characterize ourselves
by means of an autobiographical narrative, in which our self appears as the
protagonist. One could say that we try to answer the question ‘Who am I?’ – a
question that only beings with a first-person perspective are able to think. And
we seem to get an answer to that question, because we conceive of the
character that is the protagonist of our autobiographical narrative as our self.
But one’s answer to the question ‘Who am I?’ is the answer of a certain moment.
The answer will change with one’s continuously evolving self-interpretation.
Hence, the character that is the protagonist of our autobiographical narrative
and that we conceive of as our self will change with the development of the
narrative that we consider our life.
In short, a narrative self-conception constitutes an identity with certain
content, but this content changes with one’s self-interpretation. Therefore,
one’s narrative identity is imbued with uncertainty about one’s self.
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Schechtman, as expounded in Schechtman 1996. 
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A NARRATIVE SELF-CONCEPTION IS CHARACTERISTIC OF
BUT NOT FUNDAMENTAL FOR BEING A SELF
Although a narrative self-conception is one of our characteristics, this
property is not fundamental for being a self. In other words, there are human
persons – human creatures with a first-person perspective – that lack a
narrative self-conception. 
Firstly, the property of a narrative self-conception may not be (fully)
developed (yet). Think of young children: At a certain age, they conceive of
themselves as themselves, but, even though they already have a first-person
perspective, their world is less connected and integrated than it is for
normally developed adults. Secondly, narrative self-conception may
diminish. A patient with Alzheimer’s disease, for example, seems to lose his
life story, he seems to lose the capacity to connect current desires, beliefs,
actions and experiences to past ones; and so, with progressing disease, this
person comes to live more and more in the present only.15 Thirdly, a person’s
self-conception may be fragmented. A long-term drug user, for instance, may
have lost access to long periods of his life (story); he is no longer able to
connect actual desires, beliefs, actions and experiences to his past. 
Furthermore, the property of a narrative self-conception may be
developed to a greater or lesser degree. Think of a person who makes life
plans, but who does not try to interpret and position her attitudes and
actions in relation to her life plans. Despite making life plans, this person’s
narrative self-conception is underdeveloped, otherwise she would interpret
and position her attitudes and actions in relation to her life plans. 
In sum: The property of a narrative self-conception may not be (fully)
developed (yet) or completely or partially lost. In such cases, the person in
question completely or partially lacks the structuring element of the self.
3 Making qualitative distinctions 
– the orientation-providing element of one’s self
ONLY PERSONS THAT MAKE QUALITATIVE DISTINCTIONS HAVE VALUES
A rational agent who, in a concrete situation, makes qualitative distinctions16
does not evaluate the alternatives based on preferences (only), but she
assesses the alternatives in a ‘deeper’ way (also). That is to say, she assesses
alternatives using a language of qualitative contrast, judging, for example,
certain desires to be nobler, or certain actions to be more honourable than
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15 The human being in question, although still alive, will probably even lose the property of having
a first-person perspective. If this were to happen, the human being would not exist as self anymore. 
16 The notion of ‘qualitative distinctions’, as I use it, is derived from Charles Taylor, as set forth in
Taylor 1982a and in Taylor 1985.
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others. Such a person typically asks herself what kind of person she would
be if she were motivated by a certain desire (in the current situation), if she
strived to realize a certain goal (in the current situation), or if she performed
a certain action (in the current situation). “Motivations or desires do not
only count in virtue of the attraction of the consummations, but also in
virtue of the kind of life and kind of subject that these desires properly
belong to.”17 A rational agent who evaluates in this ‘deep’ sense ‘has things’
which truly matter to her and which she therefore wholeheartedly wants to
protect or to realize, and which she associates with the kind of person she
wants to be. Such a being has values.
Could we have values without making qualitative distinctions? The
answer is ‘no’. The property of making qualitative distinctions is constitutive
of having values.18 One cannot sensibly say one has values if one does not
make qualitative distinctions. By making qualitative distinctions, we
‘discover’ what really matters to us; and these values play a role when we
assess our options for action, in future situations. If we were not making
qualitative distinctions, we wouldn’t have values. 
STRONG RATIONAL AGENCY REQUIRES THE PROPERTY
OF MAKING QUALITATIVE DISTINCTIONS
A rational agent who, in a concrete situation, evaluates the alternatives in the
‘deep’ sense described above is a ‘strong evaluator’ (Charles Taylor’s term).
The ‘trigger’ for strong evaluation is not the contingent incompatibility of the
various alternatives (as it is for ‘weak evaluation’), but the agent’s sensitivity
to the fact that her values are at stake. The following example, which I sketch
in two scenarios, illustrates the crucial difference between weak and strong
evaluation. 
A woman who has restricted herself to a diet gives a birthday party. She
has prepared a cake, because, for her and her family, a birthday cake is part
of the celebration. Obviously, the cake does not fit into her diet and she
deliberates what to do. In the first plot, her thoughts are: My birthday is a
special day that I want to enjoy; it will not make much difference to the result
of the diet whether I eat a slice of cake or not; I can easily compensate this
deviation from my diet by reducing calories tomorrow. Eventually, she
decides to forget about her diet for this special day. In the second plot, the
woman has thoughts like this: Although I feel tempted to eat a slice of cake,
I should be able to resist that temptation; if I were to eat cake, I would not
have control over myself; I do not want to be a person with such a weak
character. So in the end she decides not to take a slice of cake. 
Let me analyse the two kinds of deliberation. In the second plot, the
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18 This view is neutral with respect to the question whether values exist. My point is that we
only have values if we make qualitative distinctions in which we ‘apply’ these values.
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woman experiences the situation as her value of ‘rational control of oneself’
being at stake. She asks herself what kind of person she would be if she were
to eat a slice of cake. In answering that question, she makes a qualitative
distinction, which belongs to the domain of the value in question, between
persons with a strong character, that is to say, those who succeed in having
rational control of themselves, and persons with a weak character, that is to say,
those who fail to achieve rational control of themselves. The woman in the first
plot, however, does not experience the situation as calling for strong
evaluation; she is weighing alternatives. On the one hand, she wants to enjoy
her birthday including the cake, on the other, she wants to lose weight, and, in
her deliberation, both motives “count in virtue of the attraction of the
consummations”19.
Strong evaluation, to recapitulate, requires that the rational agent count
“motivations or desires in virtue of the kind of life and kind of subject that
these desires properly belong to”20, thereby assessing her motivations and
alternative actions in qualitative terms, judging certain motivations and certain
alternative actions to be qualitatively ‘higher’ than others. This is not to say that
a person who has the property of making qualitative distinctions will apply
strong evaluation in every process of deliberation (the woman from the second
plot may seem somewhat over-sensitive regarding one of her values), but that
such a person is capable of strong rational agency. I call our property of making
qualitative distinctions the orientation-providing element of the self, because,
owing to this property, we have values, are sensitive to situations where our
values are at stake, and are inclined to assess our alternatives by applying
strong evaluation (instead of simply weighing alternatives), in these situations.
MAKING QUALITATIVE DISTINCTIONS CONSTITUTES AN IDENTITY OF ONESELF,
WHICH IS ONE’S ETHICAL ORIENTATION21
Our values provide orientation in two ways: they provide orientation by
making us sensitive to situations where strong evaluation would be
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19 This clause belongs to a citation that I referred to in the first paragraph of this section: “Motivations
or desires do not only count in virtue of the attraction of the consummations, but also in virtue of the
kind of life and kind of subject that these desires properly belong to.” (Taylor 1985, p. 25)
20 See the preceding note.
21 Because the substance of my notion of ‘ethical orientation’ has its origins in the view of Charles
Taylor, as expounded in Part I of Sources of the Self (see Taylor 1989), and Taylor elaborates in these
chapters on our moral thinking, I should explain why I designate the orientation (and identity) in
question as being ethical instead of moral. Taylor uses ‘moral’ in a broad sense. He identifies three axes
of moral thinking (or moral life): (1) respect for and obligations to others; (2) our understandings of
what makes a full life; and (3) dignity (our sense of ourselves as commanding respect); see pp. 14-15.
Other mainstream philosophers in the domain of ethics would probably regard Taylor’s first axis as
pertaining to moral thinking, whereas they would regard the other two axes as ethical thinking. I take
it that our qualitative distinctions, which we make when we apply strong evaluation and which con-
cern the three axes described by Taylor, exhibit an orientation to ‘the good’ – which is an ethical notion
– and that this orientation to the good is the basis for moral thinking in a narrow sense too. 
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appropriate, because our values could be at stake in these situations, and they
provide orientation when we evaluate our desires and (alternative) actions,
by functioning as standards. This orientation, which is based on our property
of making qualitative distinctions, is an ethical orientation, because it means
to “think, feel, judge […] with the sense that some action, or mode of life, or
mode of feeling is incomparably higher than the others which are made
readily available to us”22. Our ethical orientation is characteristic of who we
are, because it sketches the frameworks of the ‘ethical space’23 that we operate
in as thinking and acting beings. In short, making qualitative distinctions is
constitutive of one’s ethical orientation. And because our ethical orientation
is characteristic of who we are, we may call our ethical orientation our ethical
identity.
Could we answer our question ‘Who am I?’ by listing our values? – No.
One’s ethical identity is imbued with uncertainty about one’s self, because
one cannot be sure about one’s values. Why is that? Firstly, our ‘deepest’
values may be values that were never at stake in the concrete situations we
found ourselves in. And, because we only conceive of a certain value as a
value of ourselves when we take (or have taken) this value into account in
concrete situations of strong evaluation, we may not know that certain values
are of utmost importance to us. Secondly, our values can change during our
existence (as selves). In concrete situations of strong evaluation, it may turn
out that we do not take certain values into account anymore, and that other
values prevail. 
TO MAKE QUALITATIVE DISTINCTIONS IS CHARACTERISTIC OF
BUT NOT FUNDAMENTAL FOR BEING A SELF
When I say that it is characteristic of us to make qualitative distinctions, I do
not mean that we, in every concrete situation, assess our alternatives by
asking ourselves what kind of person we would be if we were to perform a
certain action. What it means is this: it is characteristic of ourselves to be
sensitive to situations where our values are at stake, and to be inclined to
apply strong evaluation, instead of weighing alternatives based on
preferences, in such situations. 
Although it is characteristic of us to make qualitative distinctions, this
property is not fundamental for being a self. There are human beings with a
first-person perspective that lack the property of making qualitative
distinctions. Here are two different cases. Firstly, the property of making
qualitative distinctions may not be (fully) developed (yet). Young children
that already conceive of themselves as themselves and who, because of their
first-person perspective, are already able to evaluate their desires based on
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23 The space metaphor is borrowed from Charles Taylor, see Taylor 1989, p. 25. It has to be
remarked that Taylor does not use the term ‘ethical space’ but the term ‘moral space’. 
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:16  Pagina 37
preferences, may not yet assess their (alternative) actions as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.
For example, when a young child wants to play with a certain toy, which
another child is playing with, it just tries to take it. It will take a period of
time, before the same child will (probably) reject a desire to take the toy that
another child is playing with, because it judges the action to take the toy
away from the other child to be ‘wrong’. 
Secondly, one can (temporarily) partially lose the property of making
qualitative distinctions. Eugen Kogon has written about nazi concentration
camps that prisoners, after a period of time, developed a kind of personality
of which “seelische Primitivierung” (Kogon’s term, meaning ‘degradation of
the soul’) is a characteristic feature. “The soul developed a protecting crust,
a kind of armour, preventing that every impression would come through.
[…] One became hard, many prisoners became deadened [insensitive to
harm, sorrow, compassion, dread, grief].”24 If I am right, what Kogon calls
“seelische Primitivierung” is – presumably together with other changes – the
partial loss of the property of making qualitative distinctions. Such a person
is not sensitive anymore to whether certain values, which did matter to her
long ago, are ‘sacrificed’ by acting the way she acts. She does not ask herself
what kind of person she would be if she were to perform a certain action. The
person in question has, (at least) temporarily25, partially lost the property of
making qualitative distinctions. 
WHY CAN WE NOT GET RID OF THE QUESTION ‘WHO AM I’?
Because of our first-person perspective, we are able to ask ‘Who am I?’. But
we cannot answer that question based on a first-person perspective only,
because the identity of our self, which is constituted by a first-person
perspective, is a content-free identity. It is nothing more than the certainty of
‘being-self’. Nevertheless, we want to give content to that certainty. Provided
that we have the required properties, we try to answer our question by
characterizing our self as the protagonist of our autobiographical narrative or
by sketching the ‘ethical space’ that we operate in as thinking and acting
beings. Both attempts provide answers to our question ‘Who am I?’. But these
answers do not satisfy us, because they are provisional and uncertain. 
If both options to answer our question ‘Who am I?’ are provisional and
uncertain and we therefore cannot give definite content to our certainty of
‘being-self’, why do we not just lay that question aside? I claim that we
cannot get rid of that question, because we are, each of us, concerned with
our self. 
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24 Kogon 1974, p. 369, freely translated. The explanation between square brackets is added by
me, but derived from the context of the citation.
25 Afterwards, (some of) the few survivors did (and still do) not only suffer from the incredible
terror they were exposed to, but also from things they themselves did in order to survive, the
latter showing, in my view, that the property of making qualitative distinctions has been re-
covered (and, thus, that it can recover).
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Part II – The concern with one’s self, 
as a relation of oneself to one’s self
INTRODUCTION
Because of the properties that constitute our self, persons – or rather, persons
that do not lack the two characteristic but not fundamental properties – are
concerned with their self in three specific ways. Firstly, because of a first-
person perspective, persons have a mattering-relation with their rational
agency, that is to say, it matters to them whether they can justifiably conceive
of themselves as rational agents. Secondly, because of a narrative self-
conception persons have a mattering-relation with their autobiographical
narrative, in other words, it matters to them whether they live a life that they
can conceive of as a narrative. Thirdly, because of the property of making
qualitative distinctions persons have a mattering-relation with their values,
that is to say, it matters to them whether they can justifiably conceive of
themselves as persons who have (those) values.
Taking into consideration that ‘the self’ one is concerned with is object
and subject of this concern, we can imagine that one’s concern with one’s self
has a certain ‘effect’ on oneself. The question is: What is the ‘effect’ of one’s
concern with one’s self on oneself? In my view, the ‘effect’ is threefold. Firstly,
one’s concern with one’s self is partially constitutive of one’s self. Let me
explain this statement with respect to the structuring element of the self. We
not only think of our life as a narrative, but we also strongly desire to live a
life that we can conceive of as a narrative. After all, living a life that one can
conceive of as a (coherent) narrative means to be able to conceive of one’s
self as the (well-defined) protagonist of one’s self-narrative. And, because
desires strive for fulfilment, one’s desire to live a life that one can conceive of
as a coherent narrative is partially – that is to say, together with the property
of a narrative self-conception, which is the basis for this desire – constitutive
of a self that one can conceive of as the well-defined protagonist of one’s
autobiographical narrative. So, keeping in mind that product and producer
are one, we can say: one’s concern with one’s autobiographical narrative is
partially constitutive of one’s self.
Secondly, one’s concern with one’s self motivates oneself to reflect on
oneself qua self. Let us again look at the structuring element of the self. The
desire to be able to conceive of one’s self as the well-defined protagonist of
one’s autobiographical narrative would have the greatest chance of being
fulfilled if one continuously reflected upon whether one’s actual desires and
actions fit the protagonist of one’s most recent autobiographical narrative.
That is why one’s concern with one’s autobiographical narrative motivates
oneself to reflect on oneself qua self. 
Thirdly, one’s concern with one’s self is the basis for certain emotions26
towards oneself qua self. If a person is not able to conceive of herself as the
well-defined protagonist of her autobiographical narrative anymore, because
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she lives a life that she can no longer conceive of as a (more or less) coherent
narrative, then she can feel distressed or may have emotions which she
interprets as loss of self-confidence. These emotions may result from the
person’s reflection on herself qua self, but they may also be a ‘direct’ effect –
that is to say, not mediated by conscious reflection – of her unfulfilled desire
to be able to conceive of herself as the well-defined protagonist of her
autobiographical narrative. In the last situation, her emotions may motivate
the person to reflect on herself qua self.
4 Our concern with our rational agency
– belonging to the fundamental element of one’s self 
BEINGS THAT ARE SELVES HAVE THE DESIRE TO JUSTIFIABLY CONCEIVE
OF THEMSELVES AS BEINGS THAT ARE LED BY REASONS OF THEIR OWN
Because of a first-person perspective, persons have the capability of rational
agency and conceive of themselves as rational agents. However, this way of
conceiving of ourselves is threatened if we, in concrete situations, do not act
as rational agents. This fact can explain why the capability of (weak) rational
agency, which is an implication of the property of having a first-person
perspective, is not only the basis for conceiving of ourselves as rational
agents but, by this, also for our concern with our rational agency. In short,
conceiving of oneself as a rational agent involves concern with one’s rational
agency.
Being concerned with one’s rational agency means having a strong desire
to justifiably think of oneself as a rational agent, in other words, to justifiably
think of oneself as a person who is led by reasons of her own, that is to say,
reasons she wants to be motivated by. What does ‘justifiably’ mean in this
context? When evaluating one’s actions, one does not want to have to
conclude that one acted as a ‘wanton’27, that is, without having used one’s
capability of rational agency, or that one was motivated by reasons one did
not want to be motivated by. 
A person without concern with her rational agency is not conceivable.
Such a person would be a person to whom it would not matter, in any
concrete situation, by which of her desires she were motivated. Even in
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26 Generally speaking, to have a certain emotion involves a conscious or unconscious judgement
about a situation. The emotion in question is an expression of that judgement – whether in
physiological occurrences, sensations or (voluntary or involuntary) actions. In the case of
emotions connected with one’s concern with one’s self, a person’s judgement may have its initial
expression in a sensation of (comfort or) discomfort – for instance, distress or shame – and the
person may then interpret that sensation as, for example, loss of self-respect or loss of self-esteem.
The sensation of discomfort may also be secondary; it may appear during a person’s explicit self-
reflection, in which she, for example, comes to realize that she has lost her self-esteem. 
27 I borrow the term ‘wanton’ from Harry Frankfurt, see Frankfurt 1971, p. 16.
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situations of conflicting desires, such a person would not evaluate her desires
(which could motivate her to act in a certain way). But this would be in
contradiction with the fact that a person is a being with a first-person
perspective. A being with a first-person perspective is aware of her agency,
has the ability to reflect upon her desires, and will, at least in situations with
conflicting desires, evaluate her desires (which could motivate her to act in a
certain way).28 And if a person evaluates her desires and prefers to be
motivated by a certain desire and not by others, it matters to her whether she
is motivated by the ‘chosen’ desire or by one of the others which she does not
want to be motivated by. Therefore, our concern with our rational agency
belongs to our personhood.
IN OUR CONCERN WITH OUR RATIONAL AGENCY,
WE APPLY THE NORMATIVE CRITERION OF CONSISTENCY
Most (if not all) of us know situations where we catch ourselves doing
something without knowing why we are doing what we are doing. In such
situations, we are doing things and we are aware of the fact that we are doing
things, but our actions are not intelligible to us as actions based on reasons,
let alone as actions based on reasons of our own. We also know situations
where we act based on reasons – that is to say, a certain reason is intelligible
to us as reason for our action – but these reasons are not the reasons we
want(ed) to be motivated by (in the concrete situations in question). For
example: A person feels like eating chocolate; however, she does not want to
be motivated by this desire, because she is on a diet; nevertheless, she takes
a piece of chocolate and eats it. In a case like this, there is no consistency
between the reason a person wants to be motivated by and the reason she
actually is motivated by.
If we find ourselves frequently and regularly in situations where we do not
know why we are doing what we are doing, or in situations where we know
the reasons for our actions but do not want to be motivated by those reasons,
then we do not meet the normative criterion of consistency that we (because
of our concern with our rational agency) implicitly set for ourselves. After
all, you can only justifiably think of yourself as a rational agent if there is
consistency, in concrete situations, between the reasons you want to be
motivated by and the ones you are actually motivated by.
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28 Why would a being with a first-person perspective evaluate her conflicting desires? “If one
tries to satisfy conflicting desires, the result is likely to be chaos that satisfies none of them. So,
if one has the ability to evaluate and order desires, one will attempt to do so. And a first-person
perspective entails the ability to evaluate and order desires.” (Baker 2000, pp. 158-159)
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NOT MEETING THE CRITERION OF CONSISTENCY CAN LEAD
TO NEGATIVE EMOTIONS TOWARDS ONESELF
If we have to conclude that we are frequently and regularly motivated by
reasons that we do not want to be motivated by, then we can be overcome by
distress or shame, because we do not meet our criterion of consistency. Not
meeting the criterion of consistency may even result in situations of mental
crises. Think of a person who cannot become master of her food addiction;
the person does not succeed in abandoning her desires to eat high-calorie
food, and she suffers from the fact that she acts based on these desires. 
If we realize (and this may be even more threatening than the
aforementioned situation, although in another way) that we frequently and
regularly perform actions without knowing why we are doing what we are
doing, then we feel confused, because our actions are not even intelligible to
us as actions based on reasons. Having frequently and regularly realized that
the things we do just happen to us, we may become afraid for our future. We
might be afraid to face a future in which we will not be conscious of our
agency anymore. And, because being conscious of one’s agency belongs to
personhood, we in fact might be afraid to face a future in which we will not
exist as self anymore, although the human organism that now constitutes us
as a person will still be alive.29
Although I gave emphasis to negative emotions, it should be mentioned
that the concern with one’s rational agency does also become ‘visible’ in
positive emotions towards oneself. We can, for example, feel proud of
ourselves or feel satisfied with ourselves if we succeed in abandoning desires
that we do not want to be motivated by.
5 Our concern with our autobiographical narrative
– belonging to the structuring element of one’s self
MOST BUT NOT ALL PERSONS HAVE A DESIRE TO LIVE A LIFE
THAT THEY CAN CONCEIVE OF AS A NARRATIVE
Because of a narrative self-conception, persons conceive of their life as a
narrative and of themselves qua self as the protagonist of their autobiographical
narrative. But this way of conceiving of oneself is threatened if a person does
not actually live a life that she can conceive of as a narrative. This fact can
explain why a narrative self-conception is not only the basis for conceiving of
one’s life as a narrative (and of one’s self as the protagonist of that narrative)
but, by this, also for one’s concern with one’s autobiographical narrative. In
short, conceiving of one’s life as a narrative (and of one’s self as the protagonist
of that narrative) involves concern with one’s autobiographical narrative. 
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Being concerned with one’s autobiographical narrative means having a
strong desire to live a life that one can conceive of as a narrative and, by this,
to be able to conceive of one’s self as the well-defined protagonist of that
autobiographical narrative. We do not want to have to conclude that our
current goals and actions are by no means intelligible to us as evolving from
our earlier beliefs, goals, traits, actions and experiences. Thus, our
autobiographical narrative is an object of our concern with our self.
Does this mean that all persons have this concern with their self (in the
same way)? The answer is ‘no’. Why is that? Firstly, because a narrative self-
conception is not fundamental to being a person; there are persons who do
not have the desire to live a life that, for themselves, is conceivable as a
narrative. In the case of these persons, the property of a narrative self-
conception is either not developed (yet) or lost; and persons who lack the
property of a narrative self-conception also lack the corresponding concern
with their self. Secondly, because the property of a narrative self-conception
is not an all-or-nothing property, but a property that comes in degrees, it
may be developed to a large extent or to a limited extent, or it may be
partially lost. And to the various possible degrees of narrative self-
conception correspond various degrees of concern with one’s auto-
biographical narrative. Therefore, persons can have a strong or a less strong
desire to live a life that, for themselves, is conceivable as a narrative.
IN OUR CONCERN WITH OUR AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE,
WE APPLY THE NORMATIVE CRITERION OF COHERENCE
The criterion of our concern with our autobiographical narrative is
coherence30, that is to say, we want to be able to conceive of our self as the
well-defined protagonist of the unfolding story of our life. Most of us have
experienced situations of (radical) changes in their goals, plans and
practical beliefs. In such situations we characteristically reinterpret our past
to achieve some coherence in our self-narrative; in other words, we
reinterpret our past to be able to conceive of the changes in our goals, plans
and practical beliefs as developments of our self. And we can probably
imagine that we would feel very disconcerted if the changes in our goals,
plans and practical beliefs were by no means intelligible to us as
developments of our self. 
By saying that we want to achieve some coherence, I want to point to two
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30 In my view, the coherence criterion is the criterion of our concern with our self-narrative. One
could object that we are also concerned with the correctness of our self-narrative. I claim,
although I will here not argue for this point, that a criterion of correctness (for example,
Schechtman’s ‘reality constraint’, Schechtman 1996, pp. 119-130) is primarily a criterion for the
interlocutors of the person in question and only secondarily for the person herself. Although a
person, confronted with (minor) factual or interpretative inaccuracies, may be willing to revise
her self-narrative, she then, because of conceiving of her self as the protagonist of her self-nar-
rative, will be concerned with the coherence of that narrative. 
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things. Firstly, a narrative can be coherent in different ways; it has not
necessarily to be linear. Secondly, because persons (depending on the degree
of their narrative self-conception) can have a stronger or a weaker desire to
live a life that, for themselves, is conceivable as a narrative, different persons
can be satisfied with different degrees of coherence.
NOT MEETING THE CRITERION OF COHERENCE
CAN LEAD TO NEGATIVE EMOTIONS TOWARDS ONESELF
If, to be able to relate current goals, plans, practical beliefs and actions to
goals, plans, actions, practical beliefs, traits and experiences in former
periods of our life, we (often) have to reinterpret our life (and thereby our
self) dramatically, then we can be overcome by distress or by emotions that
we interpret as a sense of inferiority, as a loss of self-respect or of self-
confidence. On the other hand, we can feel satisfied or have emotions that
we interpret as self-confidence if we succeed in living a life that unfolds as a
coherent narrative.
Whether a certain person has the just mentioned emotions towards herself
in the described situations depends on the strength of her desire for
coherence. If a person (because of a high degree of narrative self-conception)
has a strong desire to live a life that she can conceive of as a coherent
narrative, and that person does not succeed in conceiving of herself as the
well-defined protagonist of her self-narrative, she may suffer from her own
fragmented self and may even end up in a mental crisis.
6 Our concern with our values – belonging to 
the orientation-providing element of one’s self
MOST BUT NOT ALL PERSONS HAVE A DESIRE
TO JUSTIFIABLY CONCEIVE OF THEMSELVES AS PERSONS WHO HAVE VALUES
Because of the property of making qualitative distinctions, persons have
values and conceive of themselves as having values. But this way of
conceiving of oneself is threatened if a person does not actually act as a
strong rational agent, that is to say, if a person, in concrete situations, when
certain values of that person are at stake, does not assess the alternatives by
applying strong evaluation. That person cannot justifiably think of herself
as a person who has values. This fact can explain why the property of
making qualitative distinctions is not only the basis for conceiving of
ourselves as having values but, by this, also for our concern with our values.
In short, conceiving of oneself as having values involves concern with one’s
values.
Being concerned with one’s values means having a strong desire to
justifiably conceive of oneself as a person who has values. Persons
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characteristically have this desire. We do not want to have to conclude, in
retrospect, that we ‘sacrificed’ our values by acting as we did. 
Does this mean that all persons have this concern with their self (in the
same way)? The answer is ‘no’. Why is that? Firstly, because the property of
making qualitative distinctions is not fundamental to being a person, there
are persons who do not have the desire to justifiably conceive of themselves
as persons who have values. The property of making qualitative distinctions
may either not be developed (yet) or lost; and persons who lack the property
of making qualitative distinctions also lack the corresponding concern with
their self. Secondly, because the property of making qualitative distinctions
is not an all-or-nothing property, but a property that comes in degrees, it
may be developed to a large extent or to a limited extent, or it may be
partially lost. And to the various possible degrees of that property
correspond various degrees of concern with one’s values. Therefore, persons
can have a strong or a less strong desire to justifiably conceive of themselves
as persons who have values. 
What does it mean to say that persons may be concerned with their
values to a greater or lesser extent? Think of a person who makes qualitative
distinctions in a certain situation, but who, in another situation, is not
sensitive to the fact that just these values are at stake. By making a
qualitative distinction in the first situation, the person has certain values. By,
in the second situation, not being sensitive to the fact that just these values
are at stake and therefore not applying strong evaluation, the person fails to
reinforce her values. If this scenario is not just an incident for the person in
question and that person in no way suffers from ‘sacrificing’ her values, then
we can say that she has limited concern with her values. 
IN OUR CONCERN WITH OUR VALUES,
WE APPLY THE NORMATIVE CRITERION OF INTEGRITY
The criterion of our concern with our values is integrity, that is to say, we
want our actions ‘to be in line with’ (that is, to be not in conflict with, to
protect or to exemplify) our values. If we were sensitive to every situation
where our values are at stake, and if we applied strong evaluation in each
such situation (and if the situation in question is not an ethical dilemma),
and if we, based on our strong evaluation, in each such situation, were
motivated by the reason we want to be motivated by, then we ‘automatically’
would meet the criterion of integrity. But, because we are not perfect (and
can be confronted with an ethical dilemma), this is not what happens in
reality. 
Sometimes, when retrospectively reflecting on our actions, we must
conclude that we actually acted in conflict with our values. Firstly, one may
have acted as a wanton, without any reflection. Secondly, because of not
being sensitive to the fact that one’s values were at stake in a certain situation,
one may have evaluated the alternatives by ‘just’ weighing them with respect
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to their being conducive to the achievement of a certain goal. Thirdly, one
may have been sensitive to the fact that one’s values were at stake in a certain
situation and, therefore, may have started deliberating about one’s
alternatives by applying strong evaluation, but then one may have switched
to weak evaluation by weighing the alternatives with respect to a certain goal,
and, given the strength of the desire to achieve that goal, one finally may have
preferred to be motivated by that desire. Fourthly, one may have reflected on
one’s alternatives by applying strong evaluation, without, when performing
the action, being motivated by the reason one wanted to be motivated by. 
There are also situations that are experienced as ethical dilemmas. In such
situations, according to a person’s judgement, all her alternatives are in
conflict with her ‘deepest’ values, and whatever she will do, she will fail to
meet her own criterion of integrity. Although the person in question will
probably (continue to) apply strong evaluation and perform the action she
finally decides to do, the person does not really want to perform that action
and may suffer from having acted in conflict with certain of her ‘deepest’
values. 
When a person experiences or concludes that she actually acts or acted in
conflict with her values, then she, characteristically, will be dissatisfied with
herself, because she does not meet the criterion of integrity, which she
applies to herself because of her concern with her values.
NOT MEETING THE CRITERION OF INTEGRITY
CAN LEAD TO NEGATIVE EMOTIONS TOWARDS ONESELF
Depending on the degree of one’s concern with one’s values, a person who
experiences or concludes that she acted in conflict with her values can be
overcome by regret, remorse or emotions that she interprets as loss of self-
esteem. Think of the person from the third example above, who neglected her
initial value judgement. In retrospect, this person may be dissatisfied with
herself and feel regret about the fact that she sacrificed (one or some of) her
values to achieve a certain goal. The negative emotions towards herself may
be more or less strong; these differences can be explained by the fact that not
all persons have the same strong desire for integrity. 
If a person (because of the property of making qualitative distinctions
being developed to a high degree) has a strong desire for integrity – in other
words, a high degree of concern with her values – and if that person knows
that she acted in conflict with her ‘deepest’ values, then she may suffer from
not having been loyal to her own values. We might, for example, think of the
person who found herself in an ethical dilemma and could not do otherwise
than perform an action that was in radical conflict with her ‘deepest’ values.
This person may not be able to conceive of herself as a person who has values
anymore. She may be afraid that she never will gain back her self-esteem. Such
a person may even end up in a mental crisis.
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7 The need for unity of one’s self
OUR CONCERN WITH OUR SELF EXHIBITS A NEED FOR UNITY
All three concerns with one’s self exhibit a need for unity. Firstly, we are
concerned with our rational agency, and this concern, belonging to the funda-
mental element of one’s self, exhibits a need for consistency of one’s self. We
want to justifiably conceive of ourselves as rational agents (that is, agents who
act based on reasons of their own); and that desire will only be satisfied if
there is consistency between the reasons we want to be motivated by and the
actual reasons for our actions31. This soundness of the will is the specific unity
that one’s concern with one’s rational agency aims at. 
Secondly, we are concerned with our autobiographical narrative, and this
concern, belonging to the structuring element of one’s self, exhibits a need for
coherence of one’s self. We want our self to be the well-defined protagonist of
our autobiographical narrative; we do not want to appear as a fragmented self
or as a number of protagonists. This well-defined character is the specific unity
that one’s concern with one’s autobiographical narrative aims at. 
Thirdly, we are concerned with our values, and this concern, belonging to
the orientation-providing element of one’s self, exhibits a need for integrity of
one’s self. We want to justifiably conceive of ourselves as persons who have
values; and that desire will only be satisfied if our actions are conceivable for
ourselves as guided by our values and, in retrospect, as protecting or
exemplifying our values. This loyalty to oneself is the specific unity that one’s
concern with one’s values aims at. 
THE UNITY OF ONE’S SELF IS THREATENED
BY INCONSISTENCY, INCOHERENCE AND NON-INTEGRITY
As a result of self-reflection or because we have been overcome by certain
negative emotions towards ourselves, we may be confronted with
fragmentation of our self, and with divergence and conflict in our self. Firstly,
if we are confronted with divergence between the reasons that we were
motivated by and the reasons we want to be motivated by, the unity of our self
is threatened by inconsistency. Secondly, if we are confronted with a
fragmented self as the protagonist of our autobiographical narrative, the unity
of our self is threatened by incoherence. Thirdly, if we are confronted with
conflict between our actions and our values, the unity of our self is threatened
by non-integrity. 
Frustration of one’s need for unity of one’s self can lead to negative
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31 The actual reasons for our actions are the ones that we think of as being the motivating rea-
sons for our actions, and these reasons need not necessarily be identical with the reasons we
want to be motivated by. This leaves aside that a person may be mistaken about the actual moti-
vating reasons for her action.
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emotions towards oneself and sometimes even to situations of mental crises.32
Whether and to what degree one suffers from inconsistency, incoherence and
non-integrity of one’s self depends on the strength of one’s desire for
consistency, coherence and integrity. This strength of the respective desires
depends on the degree of the concern in question, and the degree of the
concern in question depends on the degree to which the corresponding
property is developed. In short, different persons may be satisfied with
different levels of unity.
8 Conclusion
ONE’S CONCERN WITH ONE’S SELF CONTRIBUTES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
A SELF THAT IS CONCEIVABLE (FOR ONESELF) AS A UNITY
Keeping in mind
(a) that the degree of one’s concern with one’s rational agency, auto-
biographical narrative and values may differ from person to person, 
(b) and that there may be persons who do not (yet) have the property of a
narrative self-conception or the property of making qualitative
distinctions, respectively, or who do not have (one of) these properties
anymore, and who, due to these circumstances, do not have the concern
that the property in question is constitutive of,
we can state that one’s concern with one’s self, which can be distinguished in: 
(1) one’s concern with one’s rational agency, which is a desire to justifiably
conceive of oneself as an agent who acts based on reasons of her own,
and, through this, exhibits a need for consistency of one’s self,
(2) one’s concern with one’s autobiographical narrative, which is a desire to
live a life that one can conceive of as a narrative, and that, through this,
exhibits a need for coherence of one’s self, and
(3) one’s concern with one’s values, which is a desire to be a person that one
can justifiably conceive of as a person who has values, and, through this,
exhibits a need for integrity of one’s self, 
contributes to the constitution of a self that is conceivable (for oneself) as a
unity. 
48 • Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations
32 Probably our need for unity of our self may also be the motivation to overcome such a situ-
ation. (This statement is not based on empirical facts but is purely based on theory.)
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Chapter 3
Practical irrationality 
from a self-related perspective
In certain situations, persons conceive of their actions as irrational. This
phenomenon calls for further explanation, because questions like the
following arise: When do persons conceive of their actions as irrational?
What standards do persons apply (whether consciously or not) when
conceiving of their actions as irrational? Does it matter to us whether we act
irrationally, and if so, why? Before we submit the notion of conceiving of
one’s own action as irrational to conceptual analysis, let me illustrate the
phenomenon with an example: When I want to lose weight and therefore put
myself on a diet, it may happen that I feel like eating chocolate and that,
violating the behavioural rules I have set for myself, I take a piece of
chocolate and eat it. I am not involuntarily eating the piece of chocolate (for
instance, because it is hidden within other food) or unconscious of violating
my diet (for instance, because I do not know that chocolate is high-calorie
food); rather, the reverse is true. After deliberation, I decide to eat chocolate
and, before, during and after eating the piece of chocolate, I am conscious of
violating my diet. On the one hand, I know that I myself decided to eat
chocolate; on the other hand, I nevertheless conceive of my action of eating
chocolate as an irrational action. After all, what I am doing is contrary to my
own behavioural rules and hinders the achievement of the purpose behind
these rules, which is to lose weight. What obviously bothers me is the fact
that, by acting this way, it will take longer to lose weight, if I will succeed at
all. However, my contention is that what bothers me too is the brute fact of
my acting irrationally. 
My claim is: Conceiving of our actions as irrational matters to us, even
apart from the specific purpose the achievement of which is threatened by
acting the way we do (or did). Before arguing for this claim (Part II), I first
will elucidate the notion of first-personal practical irrationality, which in turn
will also lead to some reflection about the notions of agent and person, action
and action structure, and reasoning and decision (Part I). The notion of first-
personal practical irrationality, as I take it, is an ‘umbrella notion’ covering
two separate notions: conceiving of one’s own actions as irrational and
conceiving of oneself as irrational. My primary concern is with the notion of
conceiving of one’s own actions as irrational, because, firstly, that notion is
presupposed by the notion of conceiving of oneself as irrational, and
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secondly, all persons know the phenomenon of conceiving of an action of
oneself as irrational, whereas some may not know the phenomenon of
conceiving of oneself as irrational.
It will emerge in due course that, in my view, the phenomenon of
conceiving of one’s actions as irrational has to be distinguished from the
phenomena of conceiving of one’s actions as mistaken, non-rational, or
wrong.1 Although those other phenomena stand in need of thorough analysis
too, they will only be discussed as far as clarification is needed for the benefit
of the notion of first-personal practical irrationality as I see it. Especially the
‘mattering-question’ (Why does it matter to us whether we act …?) will not
be asked with regard to actions that we conceive of as mistaken, non-rational
or wrong.
Part I – Conceiving of one’s own actions (or of oneself) 
as irrational
There are situations where we know that we deliberated about an action and
decided to do what we do (or did), and at the same time conceive of that
action as irrational. Thus, conceiving of our own action as irrational does not
(necessarily) mean that we conceive of the action as not resulting from our
evaluative reasoning. When a person conceives of an action as irrational, she
knows her motive for her action and she knows that she decided (whether
consciously or not) to perform that action, yet she in a certain way
disapproves of her motive for her action. This preliminary claim (directly or
indirectly) involves various concepts, like the concept of person, action, and
reasoning. And we will have to clarify them in order to shed light on the
concept of first-personal practical irrationality.
1 Agents and persons
A being that does things is an agent. Agents do things2 in the sense that
certain things would not have happened if the being in question had not had
certain desires, beliefs, intentions, or in other words, if its actions cannot be
explained by assigning desires, beliefs, and intentions to the being in
question. Agents experience the world from their own point of view. They do
things from their own perspective and for their own purposes; and to achieve
those purposes, agents must be capable of more or less complex instrumental
reasoning. Acting based on one’s own purposes using instrumental reasoning
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1 These classifications do not necessarily exclude each other; for instance, a person may conceive of
an action as non-rational and wrong. See also Chapter 4 (Wrongness from a self-related perspective),
Section 6 (The overriding nature of the self-related conception of wrongness of action).
2 Regarding the notion of ‘doing things’, see note 8 in Chapter 2 (The relation of oneself to one’s self).
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does not imply that the being in question knows that it acts, what action it
performs at a certain moment, or the purpose of that action; neither does it
imply that the being thinks of itself as a subject that is capable of
instrumental reasoning. In short, acting based on one’s own purposes using
instrumental reasoning does not require that the being is conscious of its
agency or of its reasoning.
To be conscious of one’s agency requires a first-person perspective, that is
to say, it requires that the being in question is aware of the fact that it has its
own perspective and that this perspective differs from the perspective of
others. A being that fulfils this characterization is a self-conscious being. But
to be called a person requires even more. A person is able to conceptualize
her own perspective and, because of this, to think of herself as a self. A
person thinks of herself as the subject of her behaviour, thoughts, feelings
and experiences. She thinks of herself as an agent, that is to say, as a being
who wants to achieve her own purposes (by acting the way she does), has her
own motives, and decides on her own actions by reasoning. These ways of
thinking of oneself require a highly developed form of self-consciousness, or
in other words, of the property of having a first-person perspective.3 From
now on, when I talk about a first-person perspective, I mean this highly
developed form of a first-person perspective, which is fundamental for being
a person.
Persons have cognitive and practical abilities that are based on a first-
person perspective, for example4: (a) persons can think of themselves in the
future and in other circumstances, and this means that they can imagine
alternatives for their own futures; (b) persons are able to take a position
regarding their motives for their actions and to reflect on these motives, and
this means that they are capable of rational agency; and (c) persons can think
of longer-term purposes and have the capability to think of (more or less
complex) behavioural rules or guidelines that they may set for themselves,
while pursuing a certain purpose, and this means that they are capable of a
special form of reasoning which I label structural reasoning5.
Structural reasoning is a highly developed form of instrumental reasoning,
which only persons are capable of. Why is that? Firstly, it is a form of
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3 Self-consciousness, that is, the property of having a first-person perspective, may come in
degrees, that is to say, non-human beings, like chimpanzees, may presumably have a certain form
of a first-person perspective, but only beings that are able to conceptualize their own perspective
and through this exist for themselves as selves are persons.
4 It will emerge that the three mentioned abilities are crucial for a first-personal conception of
practical irrationality. Regarding the first two examples, see also Baker 2000, p. 159. By the way,
ability (c) is not independent of abilities (a) and (b); but I will not elaborate on that dependency
here.
5 Because the labels might look similar at first sight, I should mention that my notion of structural
reasoning is not identical with Nida-Rümelin’s notion of structural rationality as expounded in
Nida-Rümelin 2001. Whereas structural reasoning, as I take it, is a highly developed form of
instrumental reasoning, Nida-Rümelin’s ‘structural rationality’ is a specific way of evaluating one’s
motivations and alternative actions, which he distinguishes from punctual optimalization.
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instrumental reasoning, because the behavioural rules or guidelines, which the
person sets for herself, are meant to achieve a certain purpose and are meant
for the duration of the pursuit of that purpose;6 and secondly, only beings that
are persons are capable of structural reasoning, because setting behavioural
rules or guidelines for oneself requires that the being in question (a) thinks of
herself as a being who wants to achieve her own purposes and who decides on
her own actions by reasoning; and (b) thinks of herself in the future. 
On top of the property of having a first-person perspective, which is
fundamental for being a person, most persons, or rather most human persons,
have two other properties which are characteristic of (human) persons, namely
the property of having a narrative self-conception and of making qualitative
distinctions. A person with a narrative self-conception thinks of her life as an
autobiographical narrative, that is to say, she interprets her experiences, traits,
actions, practical beliefs and desires, connects them and positions them in
relation to each other, and as a result of that, ‘produces’ the autobiographical
narrative that she conceives of as her life. In short, a person with a narrative
self-conception conceives of herself as the (developing) protagonist of her
(developing) self-narrative. Such a person is able to think of long-term
purposes for herself, or, in other words, of life projects or plans for herself,
since thinking of life projects or plans for oneself requires that a person
conceives of her life as a unity and as a developing entity. Furthermore,
adopting long-term purposes requires complex structural reasoning, because
the person has to think of behavioural rules which are meant to guide herself
during a relatively long period of her life. Depending on the circumstances, she
may have to adjust the behavioural guidelines she set for herself, but, as long
as she wants to actualize those long-term purposes, they are meant to be taken
into account in her reasoning.
The second property that I mentioned as being characteristic of (human)
persons is the property of making qualitative distinctions. A person who makes
qualitative distinctions uses a language of qualitative contrast, thinking of
certain actions, purposes, kinds of persons, or kinds of life in terms of, for
example, honourable and dishonourable, noble and despicable, brave and
cowardly, self-disciplined and impulsive, caring and selfish, or merciful and
merciless. Such a person conceives of herself as a person who has certain
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6 The capability for structural reasoning is not only required when initially thinking of a certain
longer-term purpose the required actions for which can, at that moment, not be thought through
in detail (for instance, due to the complexity of the required action structure, the expectation of
various possible influencing conditions, or the need to acquire more information or knowledge),
but also during the various stages of the pursuit of that purpose. After all, when a person initially
has set behavioural rules for herself to support the achievement of a certain longer-term purpose,
she has to take those behavioural rules into account when she, at various points in time, during
her instrumental reasoning about appropriate actions for the benefit of that (longer-term)
purpose, thinks and decides about concrete actions; it might also become clear then that certain
behavioural rules are not appropriate (anymore) and therefore have to be adjusted or
abandoned, or that new behavioural rules or guidelines are required (at that stage of the pursuit
of the purpose in question). I refer also to Section 4 (Our evaluative agenda).
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values, and, in general, she will be sensitive to situations where those values
are at stake. To protect or realize her values, she may also set certain
behavioural guidelines for herself. She knows that the values in question will
only be values of herself as long as she lives up to these values. In other words,
she will have to continuously re-affirm her values in actual situations of action,
by the qualitative distinctions which she then makes and which she applies as
qualitative standards to herself in her reasoning about the action in question.7
In a certain way values seem to be like long-term purposes, because, from
both of them, we may derive behavioural rules or guidelines, which we set for
ourselves and which are meant to be taken into account in our reasoning; but
in another way they are different: purposes can be achieved whereas values
cannot. For example, if a person has the ambition to become a surgeon, she
will conceive of herself as having achieved this purpose as soon as she has
received the required medical degrees, obtained the required practice as
assistant physician, and, finally, found a job as a surgeon. In contrast, if the
same person wants to be the kind of person who is honest to others, she will
never conceive of her value of honesty as being finally realized. In actual
situations, she may conceive of herself as acting or having acted in accordance
with her value, but she will have to take her value into account throughout her
life, at least as long as she still conceives of herself as the kind of person who
cherishes this value. In short, purposes can be achieved, whereas values have
to be re-affirmed, by acting the way we do.
Although I used the notion of reasoning in various contexts, namely
evaluative reasoning, instrumental reasoning, structural reasoning, and taking
something into account in one’s reasoning, I did not thoroughly explain my
view of reasoning. The next three sections will be dedicated to the subject of
reasoning broadly construed.
2 Two sorts of evaluative reasoning 
In my view, there are two basic sorts of reasoning: non-evaluative reasoning
and evaluative reasoning. Non-evaluative reasoning is (more or less complex)
instrumental reasoning taking a certain motivating reason, that is, a certain
purpose8, as given; in other words, it is a process of deciding how to achieve
a given purpose. Evaluative reasoning, even though it involves instrumental
reasoning too, is concerned with the question which purpose to pursue and,
in case of alternatives to actualize that purpose, which method of realization
to choose. This process of deciding what to do and how to do it is (more or
less) iterative, because we do not only evaluate the motivating reason (to act)
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but also the results of our instrumental or structural reasoning (that is to say,
the corresponding action structures and, if appropriate, the behavioural rules
we are considering), which in turn may lead to a re-evaluation of the
motivating reason, further instrumental or structural reasoning, or both.
While all agents, whether they are conscious of their reasoning or not, are
capable of (more or less complex) non-evaluative reasoning, only persons are
capable of evaluative reasoning and of applying structural reasoning during
such processes. After all, all agents are capable of (more or less complex)
instrumental reasoning, but only persons have the ability (a) to think of
themselves as beings which decide on their actions by their own reasoning,
(b) to take a position regarding their purposes and alternative actions, and to
reflect on them, and (c) to think of themselves in the future; and these three
abilities are required to evaluate one’s own purposes and alternative actions,
and to set behavioural rules or guidelines for oneself (the latter being
characteristic of structural reasoning).
Persons may apply either weak or strong evaluation when evaluating their
purposes or the results of their instrumental or structural reasoning. When
applying weak evaluation “motivations or desires count in virtue of the
attraction of the consummations”9, that is to say, when confronted with
conflicting motivations, a person’s decision to reject or postpone the other
motivations for action in favour of one of them is based on her preference for
the achievement of the corresponding purpose. When applying strong
evaluation, however, “[m]otivations or desires do not only count in virtue of
the attraction of the consummations, but also in virtue of the kind of life and
kind of subject that these desires properly belong to”10; that is to say, a
person’s decision to reject a certain desire may be based on the fact that she
does not want to be the kind of person who is moved by that desire; she
might, for example, think of such a person as being selfish, whereas she
wants to be the kind of person who cares for others.
Are all persons capable of both weak and strong evaluation? No. All
persons are capable of weak evaluation because, owing to a first-person
perspective, they are capable of reflecting on their motivating reasons for
action (that is to say, their probable action purposes) and of rejecting certain
purposes in favour of others, which they, weighing the alternatives, prefer to
actualize. And because all persons can think of themselves in the future and
in other circumstances, a person may even give more weight to certain
longer-term purposes at the cost of the probable consummations of a number
of short-term desires. In short, all persons are capable of weak evaluation,
because it belongs to their capability of (weak) rational agency. But only
persons that have the property of making qualitative distinctions are capable
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10 Taylor 1985, p. 25.
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of strong evaluation, because to ask oneself the question ‘What kind of
person would I be if I were moved by this motivation to act in a certain way?’
requires that the person in question assesses motivating reasons and kinds of
life in terms of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’. Such a person may reject a certain desire
or possible action, not only because it is contingently incompatible with
another one which this person gives more weight to – as is the case with
weak evaluation – but because she judges that being moved by that desire or
performing that action would mean sacrificing (some of) her values.
In general, the decision to pursue a certain purpose may involve all
mentioned sorts of reasoning: instrumental and structural reasoning, weak
and strong evaluation. This does not mean that persons always apply the sort
of reasoning which would be most applicable for them in their actual
situation. For example, depending on the internal (like mood or physical
conditions) and external circumstances (like interfering actions of other
persons), a person might not apply strong evaluation even if her values are
at stake. And a person may not apply structural reasoning even if the
long(er)-term purpose she aims to achieve required her to do so. 
To understand evaluation processes in their full complexity, we have to
focus on the concept of action in more detail.
3 Actions and action structures
To achieve a certain purpose, we have to think of and perform appropriate
actions. Normally, when we decide what to do, that is, to pursue a certain
purpose, we also decide (more or less precisely) how to do it, that is, which
action structure we will perform to actualize our purpose. The term action
structure is more appropriate here than the term action, because what we
generally call actions are in fact (more or less complex) action structures.
When a person is engaged in the performance of a certain action structure
(for the achievement of a certain purpose), she applies (whether consciously
or not) instrumental reasoning to ‘construct’ that action structure11. If the
person non-consciously decided on how she is doing what she is doing, then,
for her, that action structure must be a well-known action building block. By
contrast, action structures that are complex or new for the person in question
are derived from the purpose in question by conscious instrumental
reasoning. The person will stop that process of instrumental reasoning as
soon as she, when breaking down the purpose into its constituent purposes,
arrives at well-known action building blocks or thinks that she can fill in the
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on a certain condition. 
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details of the action structure at a later stage. Furthermore, when a person
decides to pursue a certain purpose by performing a certain action
structure, this does not mean that she starts executing the action structure
immediately. Action structures may be scheduled to be executed at a
certain moment, or the execution may be made dependent on certain
internal (for example, the existence of other purposes that would also be
supported by that action structure) or external conditions (for example,
the availability of required resources, or supporting actions of other
persons). In short, the result of a process of instrumental reasoning is a
more or less detailed action structure, which the person, after or without
further evaluation of the action building blocks involved, plans to perform
at a certain moment or under certain conditions. 
The performance of a certain action structure has a certain purpose,
which is the motivating reason of the person in question to perform that
action structure. The action building blocks that are part of that high-level
action structure also have their own purposes, but these are derived
purposes, that is to say, they result from breaking down a certain ‘final
purpose’ into its constituent purposes, and only become purposes of the
person because their actualization is required to achieve the purpose of
the high-level action structure.12 In other words, a derived purpose
functions as an ‘auxiliary purpose’ with respect to a certain ‘final purpose’.
And a person who uses her capabilities for evaluative reasoning to the full
will not only evaluate her non-derived purposes but also her derived
purposes, which in turn may lead to a re-evaluation of the original
motivating reason. 
Sometimes persons think of purposes the realization of which cannot be
thought of and planned in detail by the construction of appropriate action
structures. Those purposes are long(er)-term purposes and require that
the person in question sets certain behavioural rules or guidelines for
herself for the duration of the pursuit of those purposes. 
As I have argued, persons can think of complex action structures,
which they plan to perform to achieve a certain purpose. They may even
schedule the execution of those action structures (or parts of it) at a
certain moment or make the execution dependent on certain conditions.
Furthermore, they may think of and set behavioural rules or guidelines for
themselves to support the achievement of their long(er)-term purposes.
The question arises: How do persons take all their planned action
structures and behavioural rules or guidelines into account when deciding
on alternative actions? The next section will be concerned with that
question.
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4 Our evaluative agenda 
When a person, as a result of her (conscious) evaluative reasoning, decides
to pursue a certain purpose, she puts that purpose on her evaluative agenda13,
so to speak, because she may have to take this purpose into account in other
situations where she again applies evaluative reasoning. The purpose in
question will stay on her evaluative agenda until it is achieved or until,
during a further process of evaluative reasoning, she decides to abandon or
adjust that purpose, or to remove it from her evaluative agenda. Besides her
purposes, a person’s evaluative agenda also consists of the action structures
the person has thought of to achieve her purposes, the behavioural rules or
guidelines she may have set for herself to actualize her long(er)-term
purposes, and the behavioural guidelines she may have adopted to protect
her values. The action structures and the purpose-related behavioural rules
or guidelines will stay there until the corresponding purposes are achieved,
abandoned, or adjusted, or until the person adjusts the action structures or
behavioural guidelines. The value-related behavioural guidelines will stay
there until those values are not her values anymore. 
Why do persons sometimes abandon or adjust the purposes or action
structures, or modify the behavioural guidelines (or rules), which they
decided on during earlier processes of evaluative reasoning? Here is a series
of examples. (1) A person may abandon or adjust a certain purpose because,
in her current process of weak evaluative reasoning, she gives more weight
to another purpose, the achievement of which would be made impossible or
hindered by pursuing the first one. (2) A person may abandon or adjust a
particular purpose because she thinks that the pursuit of that purpose would
prevent her from actualizing another purpose, which she, in her current
process of strong evaluative reasoning, regards as fitting the kind of person
that she judges to be qualitatively ‘higher’ than the one that might continue
to pursue the first purpose. (3) A person may abandon a certain purpose
because she recognizes that she is not able to execute the corresponding
action structure or to act according to the corresponding behavioural rules
(anymore). (4) A person may abandon or adjust a certain purpose because,
during performance of its action structure, she recognizes that she ‘sacrifices’
her values by acting as she does. (5) A person may adjust the action structure
or behavioural guidelines which belong to a certain purpose because she
recognizes that the action structure or behavioural guidelines are not
appropriate (anymore) to support the actualization of the purpose they were
initially meant for. (6) A person may adjust the schedule for the execution of
a certain action structure because the execution of that action structure
would conflict with that of another, the corresponding purpose of which she
has decided to achieve first, in her current process of evaluative reasoning.
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(7) A person may adjust the external conditions for the execution of a certain
action structure because she recognizes, for example, that additional resources
are needed for the execution of that action structure. (8) A person may adjust
the internal conditions for the execution of a certain action structure because
she recognizes, for example, that a certain bodily condition is required for the
execution of that action structure, and this in turn may lead to new or adjusted
behavioural rules or guidelines which the person sets for herself. (9) A person
may remove certain value-related behavioural guidelines from her evaluative
agenda because she recognizes that the value which these guidelines stand for
does no longer count in her actual processes of strong evaluative reasoning. 
Analysing the examples given, we discover that, in some of the mentioned
examples, the update of the person’s evaluative agenda takes place when the
person decides to pursue a new purpose the pursuit of which would, in one
way or other, be hindered by the pursuit of purposes that are on her current
evaluative agenda, whereas, in other examples, the update is not triggered by a
new purpose, but takes place, for example, because the person becomes more
knowledgeable about a certain subject or her own capabilities, or because she
recognizes that the action structure she chose conflicts with her values. This
observation, together with the already mentioned facts that persons put new
purposes they have decided to achieve on their evaluative agenda and remove
certain purposes (together with the corresponding action structures, and
behavioural rules or guidelines) from their evaluative agenda when the
purposes in question have been achieved, shows that a person’s evaluative
agenda is a planning and monitoring medium for the purposes we decide or have
decided to actualize. Therefore our evaluative agenda is subject to our
continuous more or less radical adjustment (whether consciously or not).
But our evaluative agenda is not only the planning and monitoring medium
for the purposes we have decided to pursue, it also functions as a reference base
when we reflect upon our motivations and deliberate about our options for
action, in a concrete situation. Why is that? When we have to decide how to
act and, by conceiving of the situation in this way, are engaged in a process of
evaluative reasoning, we assess our current desires or motivations, which could
move us to act in a certain way, by applying weak or strong evaluation. In the
first case (that is, when applying weak evaluation), our current desires or
motivations (and the required action structures to achieve the respective
purposes), besides being weighed against each other, are also weighed against
our earlier adopted purposes (and the corresponding action structures, or
behavioural rules or guidelines), for putting a certain purpose on one’s
evaluative agenda is a commitment to oneself14 to pursue that purpose. We
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may conclude that the new purpose under consideration (1) does not conflict
with purposes that are on our evaluative agenda already, and therefore could be
added to it; or (2) conflicts with one or more purposes that are on our
evaluative agenda already, and therefore could only be added to it if we
removed, abandoned or adjusted one or more of the already adopted ones; or
(3) conflicts with action structures or behavioural rules or guidelines that
belong to certain purposes which are on our evaluative agenda already, and
therefore could only be added to it if we were to remove, abandon or adjust one
or more of those purposes, or if we, for one or more of those purposes, could
determine alternative action structures that do not conflict with our new
purpose. 
In the second case, that is, when applying strong evaluation, we may
equally use our evaluative agenda as a reference base, but in another and
more limited way. We assess our current motivations and alternative actions
either (a) by asking whether they conflict with our values, more specifically,
by asking ourselves whether we want to be the kind of person that is moved
by these motivations or that acts in the ways we are considering; or (b) by
asking whether they conflict with the value-related behavioural guidelines
which we adopted and which are therefore on our evaluative agenda, more
specifically, by asking ourselves whether the motivations and alternative
actions under assessment would fit the kind of person that lives in
accordance with the behavioural guidelines in question; or (c) by a
combination of both methods. We may conclude that the motivations and/or
actions which are under assessment: (1) do not conflict with the value-
related behavioural guidelines that are on our evaluative agenda, and that
therefore the purpose in question could be added to our evaluative agenda;
or (2) conflict with the value-related behavioural rules that are on our
evaluative agenda, and therefore have to be rejected; or (3) conflict with our
values, because we do not want to be the kind of person that is moved by this
motivation, or that acts in the way we are considering, and that therefore the
motivation and/or action under assessment has to be rejected, even though it
does not conflict with the value-related behavioural guidelines that are on
our evaluative agenda; this judgement may mean that our values have
changed and might therefore lead to a reflection on and adjustment of certain
behavioural guidelines which are meant to stand for our values; or (4) do not
conflict with our values, because being moved by the motivation in question
and acting in the way we are considering accord with the kind of person we
(now) want to be, and that therefore the purpose in question could be added
to our evaluative agenda, although the motivation under assessment conflicts
with certain value-related behavioural guidelines that are on our evaluative
agenda; this judgement may mean that our values have changed and
therefore might lead to a reflection on and adjustment of certain value-related
behavioural guidelines on our evaluative agenda. 
In conclusion, when we are engaged in processes of evaluative reasoning,
whether we apply weak or strong evaluation, our evaluative agenda functions
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as a reference base. In the case of weak evaluation, we take our adopted
purposes, their action structures, and the behavioural rules or guidelines
which are meant to support the achievement of our long(er)-term purposes
into account by weighing the motivations and alternative actions which are
under consideration against them. In the case of strong evaluation, we take
our values into account in one (or both) of the following ways. We may take
them into account indirectly (that is to say, via behavioural guidelines that we
have derived from our values and which are on our evaluative agenda) by
asking ourselves whether the motivations and alternative actions under
assessment fit the kind of person that lives in accordance with certain value-
related behavioural guidelines that we have set for ourselves, or we may take
them into account directly (that is to say, without referring to value-related
behavioural guidelines that may be on our evaluative agenda) by asking
ourselves whether we want to be the kind of person that is moved by the
motivations under consideration or that acts in the ways we are considering. 
Processes of evaluative reasoning may be simple or complex. The process
is simple, for example, if a certain possible motivation for action (and the
required action structure) is ‘put to the test’ once and, as a result, is adopted
or rejected. Such a process of evaluative reasoning may take place non-
consciously. A process of evaluative reasoning is extremely complex, and will
take place consciously, if a number of iterations is needed before a person can
decide what to do and how to do it; the person may, for example, have to
adjust action structures for the achievement of some adopted longer-term
purposes, to abandon an already adopted long-term purpose, and to set
behavioural rules for herself to support the achievement of the new purpose
she wants to actualize. 
After having elaborated extensively on evaluative reasoning and, as part of
that, having argued my view on the involved notions of agent and person,
instrumental and structural reasoning, weak and strong evaluation, and
action and action structure, and having introduced the concept of one’s
evaluative agenda, I will now deal with the notion of ‘practical irrationality
from a self-related perspective’. 
5 Different ways of conceiving of one’s own actions, 
regarding aspects of rational agency
The phenomenon of conceiving of one’s actions as irrational has to be
distinguished from the phenomena of conceiving of one’s actions as
mistaken, non-rational, or wrong, and, obviously, from the phenomenon of
conceiving of them as rational. In the introduction of this chapter, I sketched
a person who has put herself on a diet, and who, at a certain moment, eats
chocolate. Let me use this example as a framework which, without claiming
to be complete, can serve to illustrate and distinguish different ways in which
persons may conceive of their actions (regarding aspects of rational agency).
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For each case, I will first present the ‘example-person’ (EP) conceiving of her
action of eating chocolate in a specific way, and then, abstracting from the
example, describe that way of conceiving of one’s action in general terms. By
the way, I do not claim that that (general) description covers all variants of
conceiving of one’s action in the way under discussion.
Case 1: Persons may conceive of their actions as rational.
Example: EP may conceive of her action as rational, because she knows that
she deliberated whether she should let herself be moved by her desire to eat
chocolate and that she finally decided to eat chocolate.
Generally: A person may conceive of her action as rational if she was engaged
in a process of evaluative reasoning about that action and acts (or acted) in
accordance with her decision.
Case 2: Persons may conceive of their actions as irrational.
Example: EP may conceive of her action as irrational, because she knows that
she decided (and still wants) to lose weight and therefore has put herself on
a diet, and she is aware of the fact that she violates her diet by eating
chocolate. 
Generally: A person may conceive of her action as irrational if the action
hinders or prevents the achievement of an adopted purpose that she, during
her evaluative reasoning about the action in question, would rather have
given more weight to (for example, a longer-term purpose, which she had
adopted and had defined behavioural rules for).
Case 3: Persons may conceive of their actions as rational as well as irrational.
Example: EP may conceive of her action as rational as well as irrational,
because she knows that she deliberated whether to eat chocolate or not and
that she decided to do so, and, at the same time, she knows that she violates
the objective she has set for herself to lose weight, which is a goal that she
really wants to actualize.
Generally: A person may conceive of her action as rational as well as
irrational if she, on the one hand, was engaged in a process of evaluative
reasoning about that action and acts (or acted) in accordance with her
decision, and, on the other hand, knows that her action hinders or prevents
the achievement of an adopted purpose that she, during her evaluative
reasoning about the action in question, would rather have given more weight
to (for example, a longer-term purpose which she had adopted and had
defined behavioural rules for).
Case 4: Persons may conceive of their actions as non-rational.
Example: EP may conceive of her action as non-rational, because she, having
woken up at night and having got out of bed half-asleep, ‘finds herself’ eating
chocolate.
Generally: A person may conceive of her action as non-rational if she (thinks
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that she) was not engaged in a process of evaluative reasoning about that
action, in other words, if (she thinks that) the action happens (or happened)
to her, so to speak.
Case 5: Persons may conceive of their actions as mistaken.
Example: EP may conceive of her action as mistaken, because, when
deliberating about eating chocolate, although she had decided to follow a
special fat-free diet, she reasoned that she could compensate for eating the
piece of chocolate by taking the calories of the piece of chocolate into
account when having her next meal. After having eaten the chocolate,
however, she recognizes that she made a mistake in her reasoning, which
would have been appropriate for a low-calorie diet, but not for a fat-free one.
Generally: A person may conceive of her action as mistaken if she recognizes
that she made mistakes in her instrumental reasoning (and more or less
knows the mistakes), in other words, if she recognizes that the action
structure she decided on in order to achieve her purpose or to adhere to the
behavioural rules she had defined for herself to achieve a certain long(er)-
term purpose is not appropriate (and if she more or less knows the mistakes
in her reasoning).
Case 6: Persons may conceive of their actions as wrong.
Example: EP may conceive of her action as wrong, because she has eaten all
the chocolate, whereas it was meant for this afternoon’s birthday party of her
little daughter. The fact that, by eating the chocolate, she hindered the
achievement of her goal to lose weight is incomparably less important to her
than the fact that, by acting the way she did, she cannot conceive of herself
as a loving mother.
Generally: A person may conceive of her action as wrong if she does not want
to be the kind of person who acts as she does (or did), in other words, if she
recognizes that she ‘sacrifices’ (or ‘sacrificed’) her values; and this in turn
means that she recognizes that she should have engaged in strong evaluation,
because (one or some of) her values were at stake. Conceiving of an action
as wrong seems to ‘override’ other possible ways of conceiving of that action,
because, when conceiving of an action as wrong, it seems that it does not
matter to us anymore whether this action, for example, hinders one of our
longer-term purposes.
Summarizing the presented ways of conceiving of one’s own actions, we may
say: (1) To conceive of a certain action of oneself as rational or irrational
means, firstly, that we conceive of the action as resulting from our evaluative
reasoning, and, secondly, that we regard that action as respectively
supporting or hindering the achievement of a certain purpose. (2) Because
we can have decided on an action the purpose of which hinders or prevents
the achievement of an adopted purpose that we (now) would rather have
given more weight to, we may conceive of a certain action as rational as well
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as irrational. (3) To conceive of a certain action of oneself as non-rational
means that we (think that we) did not engage in (conscious) evaluative
reasoning about that action. (4) To conceive of a certain action of oneself as
mistaken means that we know that we made mistakes in our instrumental
reasoning about that action. (5) To conceive of a certain action of oneself as
wrong means that we do not want to be the kind of person who acts as we
did (or do). Conceiving of one’s action as wrong seems to ‘override’ the other
possible ways of conceiving of the action in question.15
Having classified the various ways in which persons may conceive of their
own actions (regarding aspects of rational agency) and, by way of that
analysis, having narrowed down the possible interpretations of conceiving of
one’s own action as irrational, I will, from now on, only be concerned with
the notions of acting irrationally and (later on) of being irrational.
6 Acting irrationally from a self-related perspective
At this stage of the analysis, our thesis about the notion of ‘acting irrationally
from a self-related perspective’ may be as follows: 
(T1) Conceiving of one’s own action as irrational means (1) that we conceive
of the action as resulting from our (conscious) evaluative reasoning, and
(2) that we regard that action as hindering or preventing the
achievement of a certain adopted purpose which we would rather have
given more weight to (than the one we decided on) during our
evaluative reasoning about the action in question.
The first condition implies that actions which are not conceived of as resulting
from one’s evaluative reasoning will, first-personally, not be conceived of as
irrational. The second condition makes clear that conceiving of one’s actions
as irrational is an assessment in which we refer to specific adopted purposes,
which function as standards, so to speak. Let me elucidate the (scope of the)
thesis further by discussing a number of possible questions. I will first be
concerned with the thesis’s first condition, and then, in questions 4 to 8, with
its second one.
Question 1: Why exactly is the first condition necessary? If we conceive of
certain of our actions as not resulting from our evaluative reasoning, then we
conceive of those actions neither as rational nor as irrational. To avoid
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misinterpretation: conceiving of an action as resulting from one’s evaluative
reasoning does not imply that we were conscious of our evaluative reasoning
before or during the performance of the action, but it means that we conceive
of the action as one that we do or did deliberately, as opposed to an action that
we conceive of as just happening to us. As examples of the latter, think of
‘playing’ with your ballpoint or your glasses while listening to a lecture. 
Question 2: How can we know that we were non-consciously engaged in a
process of evaluative reasoning about a certain action if we did not
consciously deliberate about that action and its possible alternatives? The
point is not that we, in such a situation, have to know for sure that we were
non-consciously engaged in a process of evaluative reasoning about a certain
action in order to assess that action in terms of rational or irrational, but that
we conceive of the action as one that we did deliberately, as opposed to an
action that we conceive of as just happening to us. In other words, if we
conceived of that action as just happening to us, without our capability of
evaluative reasoning being involved, then we would neither conceive of that
action as irrational nor as rational. 
Question 3: Do we assess an action of ourselves in terms of irrational or
rational if someone put pressure on us to perform that action? Probably yes.
If we conceived of that situation as still offering certain alternatives, then we
in fact were engaged in evaluative reasoning and might assess our behaviour
in terms of rational or irrational. Otherwise, that is, if we conceived of the
situation as not offering any alternatives, for example, because we were
violently forced to do what we did, then we would not assess our action in
terms of rational or irrational.16
Question 4: At what moment, compared with the moment or period of
performing an action, do we conceive of that action as irrational? A person
may conceive of her action as irrational at three occasions: in retrospect,
during the performance of her action, and right from the beginning of her
action. She may conceive of her action as irrational in retrospect if she, after
having achieved the purpose of that action, realizes that she would rather have
decided otherwise. She may conceive of her action as irrational during the
performance of that action if she, while busy executing that action structure,
realizes that she would rather have decided otherwise. Depending on the
situation, she may decide to abandon the performance of her current action
structure for the benefit of the adopted purpose, the achievement of which
would otherwise be hindered or prevented. She may conceive of her action as
irrational right from the beginning of the performance of that action structure
if she, during her process of evaluative reasoning, realizes that she in fact gives
most weight to a purpose the decision for which (and thereby its
corresponding action structure) she, at the same time, judges to be irrational.
I believe that most of our actions which we conceive of as irrational belong to
this category. In such cases we, on the one hand, deliberately decide to pursue
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a certain purpose and act accordingly, and, on the other hand, know that
deciding and acting as we do is irrational. 
Question 5: Is the purpose we have given more weight to necessarily a new
purpose? Although that purpose may often be based on a strong spontaneous
desire and so not be on our evaluative agenda already, this is not necessarily
the case. The purpose we have decided to pursue may have been (together
with the required action structure) on our evaluative agenda already, but we,
for example, originally planned to pursue that purpose only in situations
where the achievement of a certain adopted long-term purpose would not be
hindered. 
Question 6: Can the purpose that we, when we judge our action to be
irrational, are referring to as the one that we would rather have given more
weight to (than to the one we decided on) be a new purpose, that is, a purpose
that was not on our evaluative agenda already? No, this is impossible. The
purpose which we are referring to when we assess our action as irrational has
to be an adopted purpose, and all our adopted purposes are part of our
evaluative agenda. This does not exclude the possibility that a person in retro-
spect would rather have given more weight to another of the (contingently)
conflicting new possible purposes (and alternative actions) that she took into
account during her evaluative reasoning. But because that purpose was not
already adopted as a result of a former process of evaluative reasoning and
therefore not part of the person’s evaluative agenda, it cannot function as a
‘standard’ during, what we might call, an irrationality assessment. 
Question 7: Do we conceive of all actions which hinder or obstruct one of
our adopted purposes and which we conceive of as resulting from our
evaluative reasoning as irrational? No. To conceive of an action as irrational
not only implies that we view an action as hindering or preventing the
achievement of a certain adopted purpose, and as resulting from our
evaluative reasoning, but it also implies that we would rather have given more
weight to that adopted purpose during our evaluative reasoning about the
action in question. When we, for example, decided to perform an action that
hinders one of our adopted purposes, because we did (and do) not want to be
the kind of person that, in the situation in question, pursues that earlier
adopted purpose, then we do not conceive of our action as irrational, since we
do not want to have decided otherwise. 
Question 8: What does our action exactly mean for the adopted purpose the
achievement of which we hinder(ed) or prevent(ed) with that action? It means
that we have to adjust the adopted purpose in question, adjust the action
structure that we planned to perform to achieve that purpose, adjust its
schedule conditions, adjust or remove other adopted purposes the action
structures of which could interfere with the adjusted purpose in question, or
even remove that purpose from our evaluative agenda. But why should we?
Because otherwise we will end up with an incoherent evaluative agenda, and
this, in turn, might mean that we not only conceive of our action(s) as
irrational, but that we, in the end, conceive of ourselves as irrational. This
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statement obviously calls for further explanation; it will be discussed in the
next section and in Section 9. 
In conclusion, we can fine-tune our thesis about the notion of ‘acting
irrationally from a self-related perspective’, and we may state: 
(T2) Conceiving of one’s own action as irrational means (1) that we conceive
of the action as resulting from our (conscious) evaluative reasoning, and
(2) that we (retrospectively, during the performance of the action, or
right from the beginning) view that action as hindering or preventing the
achievement of a certain adopted purpose which we would rather have
given more weight to than to the (new) one we decided on (or are going
to decide on) during our evaluative reasoning about the action in
question. 
7 Being irrational from a self-related perspective
Conceiving of one’s own action as irrational involves conceiving of the
corresponding decision to perform the action as irrational. After all, the
decision to pursue the purpose in question (and to perform the corresponding
action structure) conflicted with a purpose (its corresponding action structure
and/or behavioural rules) which we had adopted in a former process of
evaluative reasoning and which therefore was on our evaluative agenda when
we made the decision in question, and which we would rather have given
more weight to than to the (new) one we decided on during our evaluative
reasoning about the action in question. As for situations where a person
conceives of her action as irrational, a person may conceive of a decision (to
act in a certain way) as irrational after performing the action she has decided
on, during the performance of that action, or right from the beginning (that is,
she already views the decision as irrational during her process of evaluative
reasoning). In conclusion, we can legitimately say:
(T3) Conceiving of one’s own action as irrational involves conceiving of the
corresponding decision to perform that action as irrational. 
If a person conceives of one of her decisions as irrational, she might also
conceive of herself as irrational. Why is that? Because we think of ourselves as
the subject of our decisions, and of our decisions as being part of our own
evaluative reasoning, and because, in our self-conception, we cannot separate
our own evaluative reasoning from ourselves, nor can we, in our self-
conception, separate our decisions from ourselves. Therefore, we can state:
(T4) If a person conceives of one of her decisions as irrational, she might also
conceive of herself as irrational, because, in our self-conception, we
cannot separate our decisions from ourselves.
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The course of my argument for this thesis may require an explanation. As I
argued in Section 1 (Agents and persons), persons are beings that have a first-
person perspective and that thereby conceive of themselves as themselves and
exist for themselves as selves. Conversely, all beings that exist for themselves
as selves and hence conceive of themselves as themselves, have a first-person
perspective and are, therefore, persons. The capacity of persons to take a
position towards their motives for action and to reflect on them, in other
words, the capacity for evaluative reasoning, is based on the property of having
a first-person perspective. Thus, only persons have the property of evaluative
reasoning. And because the capacity for evaluative reasoning is based on that
property which is fundamental for conceiving of oneself as a self, we can, in
our self-conception, not separate our evaluative reasoning from ourselves.
Does this imply that, in our self-conception, we can separate certain other
capacities from ourselves? Yes, indeed. In our self-conception, we can separate
all those capacities from ourselves which are not based on our property of
having a first-person perspective, because we will not cease to exist (as a self)
if we lost (some or all of) them. This is not to say that we do not conceive of
those capabilities as our own capabilities, but they do not directly belong to
our personhood. For example, our capacities to walk, make noise, hear, or
taste are not based on our property of having a first-person perspective;
therefore, if we lost (some or all of) these capacities, we would still exist as
selves. But if the organism that now constitutes a person lost the capacity for
evaluative reasoning, because it lost the property of a first-person perspective,
then that organism would not constitute a person anymore.17 Therefore, in our
self-conception, we cannot separate our capacity for evaluative reasoning from
ourselves, and because we conceive of our decisions as being part of our own
evaluative reasoning, we cannot separate our decisions from ourselves. 
Let us return to the thesis T4: If a person conceives of one of her decisions
as irrational, she might also conceive of herself as irrational. This statement
does obviously not imply that a person will (or even should) conceive of
herself as irrational if she conceives of certain of her actions as irrational. She
probably will not conceive of herself as irrational if she occasionally conceives
of certain of her actions as irrational and can deal with the effects of those
actions on her adopted (long(er)-term) purposes that she still wants to
achieve. However, she might conceive of herself as irrational if she, for
example: (1) regularly conceives of her own actions as irrational; (2)
frequently has to think of and perform ‘repair-actions’ to undo the hindering
or damaging effects of her irrational actions, because she still wants to achieve
the purpose the actualization of which is hindered by her irrational action(s);
(3) regularly has to (that is to say, feels the need to) rework her evaluative
agenda to resolve any incoherence between her adopted purposes (and their
corresponding action structures); or (4) has to (that is to say, feels the need to)
remove long(er)-term purposes from her evaluative agenda, because she
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adopted purposes (and performed the corresponding action structures) which
obstructed those earlier adopted long(er)-term purposes. 
The aforementioned examples have in common that the person in question
does not conceive of herself as irrational along with conceiving of one of her
actions as irrational, but she, for example, conceives of herself as irrational
after having conceived of her actions as irrational a number of times, or after
having been confronted with the need to (more or less radically) rework her
evaluative agenda; thus she conceives of herself as irrational as a result of
reflection on herself qua self. We may say: Conceiving of oneself as irrational
is a possible result of reflecting on oneself qua self. I believe that, even though
a person may conceive of herself as irrational based on one action of herself
which she conceives of as irrational, her conception of being irrational is not
a direct result of her conceiving of that action as irrational, but an indirect one,
that is to say, her conceiving of a certain action of herself as irrational has led
her to reflect on herself18, which in turn resulted in her conception of being
irrational. 
Taking these considerations into account, and combining the two theses T3
and T4, we arrive at the final thesis of this section:
(T5) Conceiving of one’s own action as irrational involves conceiving of the
corresponding decision to perform that action as irrational; and if a
person conceives of one of her decisions as irrational, she might – via
reflection on herself qua self – conceive of herself as irrational, because,
in our self-conception, we cannot separate our decisions from
ourselves.
But why do we bother at all whether our actions are irrational?
Part II – Why acting irrationally or being irrational 
matters to us 
After having analysed the notion of conceiving of one’s own action as
irrational and having shed light on the notion of conceiving of oneself as being
irrational, the question remains: Why does it matter to us whether we
conceive of certain of our actions as irrational or of ourselves as being
irrational? I claim: The brute fact that we act(ed) irrationally or are irrational
bothers us, even apart from the fact that conceiving of one’s own actions or of
oneself as irrational means that we occasionally or regularly do not achieve the
purposes we really want(ed) to achieve.
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8 Acting irrationally matters to us
– the concern with the soundness of our will
A person who conceives of her action as irrational did (or does) not do what
she really wants to do, since according to our thesis T2, she (retrospectively,
during the performance of her action, or right from the beginning) would
rather have given (or rather give) more weight to another (new) adopted
purpose than to the one she decided on (or is going to decide on), during her
evaluative reasoning about the action in question. On the other hand, she
herself decided (or is going to decide) to perform that action, because, and
again according to our thesis T2, she conceives of her action as resulting from
her (conscious) evaluative reasoning. And if a person decides to pursue a
certain purpose (and to perform the corresponding action structure), then this
person is moved by a desire or motivation (to act in certain way) which she, at
that moment, actually wants to be moved by. Therefore we might say: A person
who conceives of a certain action of herself as irrational did what she actually
wanted to do at that moment, and yet, at the same time, she did not do what
she really (would have) wanted to do. This is an unsurprising conclusion,
because an action that we conceive of as irrational is irrational with respect to
a certain earlier adopted purpose which functions as a standard in our
assessment of irrationality, but our action is rational with respect to the
purpose we actually have decided to pursue. Although the conclusion may well
be unsurprising, it helps to illuminate our question ‘Why does it matter to us
whether we conceive of certain of our actions as irrational?’. 
A person who, according to her self-conception, did what she actually
wanted to do at that moment, and who, at the same time, did not do what she
really (would have) wanted to do, cannot conceive of her will as a unity. Why
are we concerned with that unity? Persons, because of their capability of
rational agency, conceive of themselves as rational agents. Rational agents,
when they act rationally, are motivated by reasons (to act in a certain way)
which they want to be motivated by.19 The problem with a person who
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conceives of her action as irrational is that she in fact wanted to be moved by
two conflicting motivations for action. On the one hand, she wanted to do
what she actually did, while at the same time she did not do what she really
(would have) wanted to do. Hence, this person is confronted with a substantial
divergence in her will. Such being the case, she in fact cannot justifiably
conceive of herself as a rational agent. But persons, because of their self-
conception of being rational agents, strongly desire to justifiably conceive of
themselves as rational agents, and are therefore concerned with the soundness
of their will. This soundness of the will is what I also label the unity of the will.
We can summarize the result of this argumentation in the following thesis:
(T6) A person who conceives of certain of her actions as irrational is
confronted with a substantial divergence in her will, and can therefore,
in the light of those actions, not conceive of her will as sound. But
persons are concerned with the soundness of their will, because they
desire to justifiably conceive of themselves as rational agents.
This thesis entails the claim that I made in the introduction: Conceiving of
our actions as irrational matters to us, even apart from the specific purpose
the achievement of which is threatened by acting the way we do (or did).
I should address a possible objection which expresses scepticism
regarding the concern with the soundness of our will. It seems to be
attractive to (certain) persons to deliberately act irrationally (with respect to
a certain adopted long(er)-term purpose); hence, these persons do not bother
whether they act irrationally; on the contrary, they are attracted by
(occasionally) acting irrationally – or so the objection goes. This objection is
based on a misinterpretation of the first-personal conception of acting
irrationally. The objection (a) confuses a self-related conception of acting
irrationally with a third-personal one; (b) overlooks the possibility of
‘camouflage behaviour’; or (c) labels certain kinds of motivations for action
as irrational, and transfers this labelling to the action in question. In what
follows, I discuss the three misconceptions, which might be the basis for the
sceptical objection, one by one. 
Regarding the first misconception: If a person’s action conflicts with a
certain long(er)-term purpose which she announced (and probably still
announces) as being a purpose of herself, an observer of that person’s action
may think that the person acts irrationally. But the observer cannot
legitimately conclude that the person in question is not concerned with the
soundness of her will. Why is that? The fact that an observer assesses the
person’s action as irrational does not mean that the person herself assesses
her action as irrational. She might be content with her decision to act in
conflict with her long(er)-term purpose and (a) therefore adjusted or will
adjust that purpose (the corresponding action structure, or its internal or
external schedule conditions); (b) may have removed (or will remove) that
purpose from her evaluative agenda; or (c) does not need to rework her
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evaluative agenda, because the action structure, or the internal or external
schedule conditions of her long(er)-term purpose left room for the action
that she actually performed. 
Regarding the second misconception: There may be persons who ‘flirt’
with acting irrationally. That is why our objector might think that these
persons are not concerned with the soundness of their will. I believe this
conclusion is mistaken. A person who ‘flirts’ with acting irrationally (a) does
not conceive of her own actions as irrational (she may, for example, have
learned to build some slack into the action structures for certain long(er)-
term purposes in order to allow for actions which she otherwise may have
conceived of as irrational), but, for whatever reason, wants to be seen as a
person who occasionally acts irrationally, or (b) conceives of certain of her
actions as irrational and wants to avoid a negative judgement about herself
from her interlocutors because of her irrational actions. I admit that this is a
psychological interpretation of the person’s behaviour, but I think that
‘flirting’ with acting irrationally is ‘camouflage-behaviour’ and can therefore
only be explained psychologically.
Regarding the third misconception: Generally, we think of persons who
are, in certain situations, moved by ‘emotional motivating reasons’, in a
positive way. For example, we assign to them attributes like sensitive or
gentle. Even persons who sometimes act unwisely are generally seen as more
sympathetic than persons who seem to act wisely all the time; this is because
certain weaknesses or feelings are typical of humans; after all, we are not
machines. Such being the case, it is natural that we like to be seen as persons
who are sometimes moved by ‘emotional motivating reasons’. Our objector
might have had this in mind when stating that persons are attracted by
(occasionally) acting irrationally and are, therefore, not concerned with the
soundness of their will. But he made a mistake, which has its source in folk-
psychology. What exactly is his mistake? In folk-psychology, certain kinds of
motivations for action, which people conceive of as emotional reasons, are
often labelled as ‘irrational’, and people may transfer this label to those
actions which are, according to their classification, based on emotional
motivating reasons. But conceiving of the motivating reasons for one’s action
as emotional neither excludes that the person in question conceives of her
action as resulting from her own (conscious) evaluative reasoning, nor does
it mean that she (retrospectively, during the performance of the action, or
right from the beginning) views that action as hindering or preventing the
achievement of a certain adopted purpose which she would rather have given
more weight to than to the (new) one she decided on (or is going to decide
on), during her evaluative reasoning about the action in question.
Furthermore, it should not pass unnoticed that people, knowing their own
weaknesses and thus situations in which they probably might act unwisely,
are able to anticipate situations where they otherwise might conceive of their
actions as irrational by taking their own weaknesses into account when
planning the action structures, or internal or external schedule conditions
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for certain long(er)-term purposes which they decide to pursue. In other
words, persons are able to anticipate (in their evaluative agenda) that they are
sometimes moved by certain ‘emotional motivating reasons’, and through
this try to keep themselves from situations where they otherwise might be
confronted with a substantial divergence in their will.
In conclusion, we can say: The objection to thesis T6 that it seems to be
attractive to (certain) persons to deliberately act irrationally (with respect to
a certain adopted long(er)-term purpose), and that these persons thus do not
bother whether they act irrationally, is not tenable, but rests on a
misinterpretation of the first-personal conception of acting irrationally, as it
is defined in thesis T2. 
9 Being irrational matters to us
- the concern with coherence of our evaluative agenda
To approach the question ‘Why does it matter to us whether we are
irrational?’, I recapitulate thesis T5 regarding conceiving of oneself as
irrational: Conceiving of one’s own action as irrational involves conceiving of
the corresponding decision to perform that action as irrational; and if a
person conceives of one of her decisions as irrational, she might – via
reflection on herself qua self – conceive of herself as irrational, because, in
our self-conception, we cannot separate our decisions from ourselves. In
short, persons who conceive of certain of their actions as irrational and who
reflect on themselves qua self in the relevant way might conceive of
themselves as irrational. Two questions arise: Firstly, what is the relevant way
of self-reflection which, presupposing the person conceives of certain of her
actions as irrational, may lead to conceiving of herself as irrational? Secondly,
do all persons reflect on themselves qua self in the relevant way, and if not,
which persons engage in the relevant way of self-reflection, and why? When
we know the relevant way of self-reflection, which persons engage in such
self-reflection, and what exactly they are concerned with in that self-
reflection, we presumably know why conceiving of ourselves as irrational
bothers us.
Regarding the first question: The kind of self-reflection that may lead to
conceiving of oneself as irrational is a reflection on one’s own decisions,
processes of evaluative reasoning, and evaluative agenda, across a period of
time. This statement may be unsurprising, but it does not follow that it is not
useful, nor does it follow that nothing illuminating can be said about the
kind of self-reflection under consideration. Let me describe our evaluative
reasoning in the light of the involved maintenance of our evaluative agenda in
order to illustrate how one’s evaluative agenda may become incoherent. Our
decisions (for action) are part of our evaluative reasoning. Confronted with
various motivations for action and hence with various alternatives, we decide
to pursue certain short-term, medium-term or even long-term purposes.
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Together with the decision to pursue a certain purpose, we also decide which
action structures we plan to perform to achieve that purpose, the internal or
external schedule conditions, and, probably, a set of behavioural rules to
support the actualization of the purpose in question. Deciding to pursue a
certain purpose means adopting that purpose, and, therefore, putting the
purpose on one’s evaluative agenda in order to take that purpose into account
when being engaged in further processes of evaluative reasoning. Sometimes
the decision to pursue a certain purpose will not fit in with our evaluative
agenda. In such situations, the decision to pursue that purpose may involve
adjusting, abandoning or removing certain earlier adopted purposes
(together with their corresponding action structures, or internal or external
schedule conditions), or we may decide to refrain from pursuing that
purpose because of the conflict with earlier adopted purposes. If we used our
capability of evaluative reasoning in the way described, we would never ‘find
ourselves’ in situations where we conceive of our own actions as irrational.
But we are not perfect. 
We sometimes make decisions to act (in a certain way) which we
(retrospectively, during the performance of the action, or right from the
beginning) conceive of as irrational. When we think that one of our actions
hindered (or hinders) of even prevented (or may prevent) the achievement
of an adopted purpose, then we normally try to repair the situation, or
rework our evaluative agenda, or both. In the first case (that is, if a person
thinks that her action hinders the achievement of an adopted purpose), the
person may still be in a position to abandon her irrational action without
hindering effects on the adopted purpose that she wants secured, or it may
be possible for her to undo the hindering effects of her irrational action by
performing ‘repair-actions’, so to speak. If she cannot abandon the irrational
action, because, for example, it cannot be stopped half-way or is already
completed, or if she cannot undo the hindering effects of her irrational action
on the adopted purpose that she still wants to achieve and which she has not
given enough weight to during her process of evaluative reasoning, then,
normally, the person will adjust the adopted purpose in question, adjust the
action structure that she planned to perform to achieve that purpose, adjust
its schedule conditions, or adjust or remove other adopted purposes the
action structures of which could interfere with the purpose the achievement
of which she wants to secure. In the second case (that is, if a person thinks
that her action makes the actualization of a certain adopted purpose
impossible), the situation is similar. The person may still be in a position to
abandon her irrational action without damaging effects on the adopted
purpose in question, or it may be possible for her to undo the damaging
effects of her irrational action by performing ‘repair-actions’. If the
obstruction of her adopted purpose is a fact, then, normally, the person will
remove that purpose from her evaluative agenda. 
In conclusion, if a person adopts new purposes which do not fit in with
her evaluative agenda without reworking that agenda, or, when conceiving of
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a certain action of herself as irrational, does not abandon that action, perform
‘repair-actions’, or rework her evaluative agenda according to the new
situation, then this person’s evaluative agenda has become incoherent. And a
person with an incoherent evaluative agenda will, quite likely, regularly ‘find
herself’ in situations where she may conceive of her actions as irrational.
Each of these situations may trigger her to rework her evaluative agenda to
achieve a situation in which all the parts of that agenda (that is to say, the
purposes together with the corresponding action structures, behavioural
rules, or internal or external schedule conditions) fit together well, in other
words, to achieve coherence of her evaluative agenda. And each of these
situations may also lead to a reflection about the fact that she regularly ‘finds
herself’ in situations where she conceives of her own actions as irrational and
feels the need to (more or less radically) rework her evaluative agenda. By
asking herself ‘why do I regularly end up in situations where my goals don’t
fit together?’, she will reflect on her decisions, processes of evaluative
reasoning, and the state of her evaluative agenda, across a period of time.
This is the relevant way of self-reflection that those persons engage in who
(as a result of that reflection) might conceive of themselves as irrational.
We can state so far:
(T7) A person who – as a result of reflecting on herself qua self in the
relevant way, that is, by reflection on her decisions, processes of
evaluative reasoning, and evaluative agenda, across a period of time –
conceives of herself as irrational is confronted with an incoherent
evaluative agenda.
Let us now turn to the second question: Do all persons reflect on themselves
qua self in the relevant way, and if not, which persons engage in the relevant
way of self-reflection, and why? Only persons with a narrative self-
conception (being a property which is characteristic of adult human persons)
will engage in self-reflection regarding the state of their evaluative agenda
across a period of time. Why is that? Persons with a narrative self-conception
conceive of their life as a unity. They connect their actions, experiences,
traits, desires, and goals (and position them in relation) with each other, and,
as a result of that, they ‘produce’ the autobiographical narrative that they
conceive of as their life. Such persons conceive of themselves qua self as the
protagonist of their continuously developing self-narrative. This self-
conception requires a certain degree of coherence in the person’s self-
narrative. And the coherence of a person’s autobiographical narrative is
threatened, disturbed or even disrupted by actions which the person herself
conceives of as irrational, because these actions do not accord with certain
goals which are still part of her self-narrative. The person will either have to
‘rewrite’ her self-narrative, which in this situation means that she will have
to adjust or dismiss certain of her goals, or she will, due to a fragmentation of
her self-narrative, not be able to conceive of herself as the well-defined
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protagonist of her autobiographical narrative anymore. The latter case,
however, would frustrate her, because, owing to her narrative self-
conception, she desires to be able to conceive of herself as the well-defined
protagonist of her self-narrative.20 
To sum up, a person’s concern with the coherence of her self-narrative
involves a concern with the coherence of her evaluative agenda. After all, an
incoherent evaluative agenda will quite likely lead to situations where a
person will conceive of her own actions as irrational, which in turn – via
reflection on herself in the relevant way – might lead to conceiving of herself
as irrational, which is a threat to her self-conception as being the well-
defined protagonist of her developing self-narrative, because, strictly
speaking, a person with an incoherent evaluative agenda has a fragmented
self. Even if a person reworked her evaluative agenda in each situation where
she conceived of actions of herself as irrational or in each situation which
otherwise would have led to incoherence of her evaluative agenda, she will,
at least if this happens frequently, at a certain moment no longer be able to
conceive of herself as the well-defined protagonist of her self-narrative,
because her evaluative agenda is seriously incoherent across a period of time.
We can summarize the answer to our second question in the following thesis:
(T8) A person who conceives of herself as irrational is confronted with an
incoherent evaluative agenda (across a period of time). But persons
(with a narrative self-conception) are concerned with the coherence of
their evaluative agenda, because incoherence of a person’s evaluative
agenda implies incoherence of her self-narrative; persons, however,
desire to be able to conceive of themselves qua self as the well-defined
protagonist of their autobiographical narrative and thus are concerned
with the coherence of their self-narrative.
And combining theses T7 and T8, we can answer this section’s question ‘Why
does it matter to us whether we are irrational?’:
(T9) A person who – as a result of reflecting on herself qua self in the
relevant way, that is, by reflection on her decisions, processes of
evaluative reasoning, and evaluative agenda, across a period of time –
conceives of herself as irrational is confronted with an incoherent
evaluative agenda (across a period of time). But persons (with a
narrative self-conception) are concerned with the coherence of their
Practical irrationality from a self-related perspective • 75
20 I should mention that, in my view, the property of having a narrative self-conception can be
developed to a higher or lower degree. Whether and to what degree one suffers from a
fragmented self depends on the strength of one’s desire for coherence of one’s self-narrative. And
this in turn depends on the degree to which the corresponding property is developed. In short,
different persons may be satisfied with different degrees of coherence of their self-narrative.
Therefore, different persons may be bothered by different degrees of incoherence of their
respective evaluative agendas. See also Chapter 2 (The relation of oneself to one’s self).
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evaluative agenda, because incoherence of a person’s evaluative agenda
implies incoherence of her self-narrative; persons, however, desire to be
able to conceive of themselves qua self as the well-defined protagonist
of their self-narrative and thus are concerned with the coherence of that
narrative.
10 Concluding summary 
I analysed the notion of first-personal practical irrationality, and argued the
following main theses, each of them related to one of the major subtopics:
(T2)  Conceiving of one’s own action as irrational: Conceiving of one’s own
action as irrational means (1) that we conceive of the action as resulting from
our (conscious) evaluative reasoning, and (2) that we (retrospectively, during
the performance of the action, or right from the beginning) view that action
as hindering or preventing the achievement of a certain adopted purpose
which we would rather have given more weight to than to the (new) one we
decided on (or are going to decide on) during our evaluative reasoning about
the action in question.
(T5)  Conceiving of oneself as irrational: Conceiving of one’s own action as
irrational involves conceiving of the corresponding decision to perform that
action as irrational; and if a person conceives of one of her decisions as
irrational, she might – via reflection on herself qua self – conceive of herself
as irrational, because, in our self-conception, we cannot separate our
decisions from ourselves.
(T6)  Conceiving of one’s own action as irrational matters to us: A person
who conceives of certain of her actions as irrational is confronted with a
substantial divergence in her will, and can therefore, in the light of those
actions, not conceive of her will as sound. But persons are concerned with
the soundness of their will, because they desire to justifiably conceive of
themselves as rational agents.
(T9)  Conceiving of oneself as irrational matters to us: A person who – as a
result of reflecting on herself qua self in the relevant way, that is, by reflection
on her decisions, processes of evaluative reasoning, and evaluative agenda,
across a period of time – conceives of herself as irrational is confronted with
an incoherent evaluative agenda (across a period of time). But persons (with
a narrative self-conception) are concerned with the coherence of their
evaluative agenda, because incoherence of a person’s evaluative agenda
implies incoherence of her self-narrative; persons, however, desire to be able
to conceive of themselves qua self as the well-defined protagonist of their
self-narrative and thus are concerned with the coherence of that narrative.
76 • Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:16  Pagina 76
To avoid misinterpretation, I should re-emphasize that this chapter did not
analyse the notions of conceiving of one’s own actions as non-rational,
mistaken or wrong, although we saw the shape of the theory that would
emerge concerning these notions. 
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Chapter 4
Wrongness 
from a self-related perspective
In certain situations, persons may conceive of their actions as wrong. This
phenomenon calls for further explanation, because questions like the
following arise: When do we conceive of our actions as wrong? Do all persons
sometimes have self-related conceptions of acting wrongly? What standards
do we apply (whether consciously or not) when conceiving of our actions as
wrong? Does it matter to us whether we act wrongly, and if so, why? Let me
illustrate the phenomenon of conceiving of one’s action as wrong with an
example, which, although it does not cover all aspects of the notion it is meant
to illustrate, may clarify my view of a self-related conception of wrongness of
action, and specifically the distinction I draw between that conception and a
self-related conception of irrationality of action. 
A couple has a savings account which they dedicated to periodical or
unexpected household expenses (for example, the yearly premium for the fire
and theft insurance, or the cost of a new refrigerator); every month, they pay
a fixed amount of money into that account. One day, when doing some
window-shopping, the woman sees a beautiful dress; and, while she knows
that she cannot effort it, she tries on the dress. It suits her very well, and she
really wants to have that dress. She thinks about the possibility of drawing
some money out of the special savings account; she first hesitates, but
eventually she draws money out of that account and buys the dress. Having
bought the dress and come back home, she feels regret. On the one hand, she
conceives of her action as irrational, because she knows that it hinders the
actualization of her (and her husband’s) goal to be prepared for special
household expenses; on the other hand, and incomparably more important to
her, she conceives of her action as wrong, because she broke the agreement
that she has made with her partner (namely to use the special savings account
only for the expenses that it is meant for, and by this to secure their standard
of living). She blames herself, because her action does not fit the kind of
person she wants to be, namely a person who is reliable. 
I claim: Whenever a person conceives of one of her actions as wrong, this
way of conceiving of her action overrides all other possible ways of conceiving
of that action (regarding aspects of rational agency). And further: Conceiving
of our actions as wrong bothers us, because it threatens our desire for loyalty
to ourselves. 
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Before arguing for these claims, I will elucidate the notion of conceiving of
one’s action as wrong, which in turn will lead to some reflection about the
notions of person, action, purpose and value, and to an elaboration of the
different functions of values and purposes in our evaluative reasoning. I will
conclude the first part of this chapter by extending the self-related conception
of wrongness of action to a conception of wrongness of oneself. In the second
part, I will be concerned with the ‘mattering-questions’. I shall begin with the
overriding nature of the self-related conception of wrongness of action with
respect to other ways of conceiving of one’s action, and then turn to the
question ‘Why does acting wrongly bother us?’. Finally, I will try to answer the
question ‘What is it about us that makes wrongness of ourselves matter to us?’.
I should emphasize that, although the notion of conceiving of oneself as wrong
is the subject of the final sections of both Part I and Part II and might therefore
be seen to be the culmination of this chapter, my primary concern is with the
first-personal conception of wrongness of action (and with the corresponding
‘mattering-question’). Once that notion has become clear, the notion of
conceiving of oneself as wrong develops naturally, so to speak.
Let me first dispose of a possible question concerning the subject of this
chapter: Why am I concerned with the first-personal notion of wrongness of
action instead of focussing on the first-personal notion of rightness of action?
Our moral emotions relate predominantly to actions that we conceive of as
wrong. We blame ourselves for having acted as we did, we feel regret or
remorse, or we may be full of contrition when we conceive of certain of our
actions as wrong. Those feelings may lead to reflections on our motivations for
action and on the ‘qualitative standards’ we apply to ourselves. Admittedly, we
may also have feelings when we conceive of certain of our actions as right. A
person may, for example, feel relieved that she managed to uphold her values
although she risked her career by acting as she did. But explicitly conceiving of
our actions as right happens less frequently than conceiving of our actions as
wrong, furthermore the corresponding feelings are less vivid and they do not
typically lead to further reflections on our motivations for action and on the
‘qualitative standards’ we apply to ourselves. It is the deviation from our own
self-regarding qualitative standards that raises moral emotions and can threaten
our self-conception. 
Part I – Conceiving of one’s own actions 
(or of oneself) as wrong
In my view, conceiving of one’s action as wrong differs essentially from
conceiving of one’s action as irrational. Although both ways of conceiving of
one’s action require reflection on (one’s motivations for) one’s action, they
differ essentially in the reference criterion that is applied during that
reflection: when a person conceives of her action as wrong, that conception
results from her concern with her values, whereas when a person conceives
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of her action as irrational, that conception results form her concern with the
achievement of her adopted purposes. Therefore, to make a start with my
account of a first-personal conception of wrongness, I will first distinguish
the two kinds of reflection on (one’s motivations for) one’s actions, and
elucidate the notion of a person’s values by drawing the distinction between
a person’s values and a person’s purposes.
1 Prerequisites of conceiving of one’s own action as wrong
A person may conceive of (her motivation for) her action as wrong when she
thinks and feels that she does not want to be the kind of person who acts in
the way she does (did or considers doing). This preliminary thesis implies that
a being that may conceive of its own actions as wrong necessarily fulfils three
requirements: (1) it is conscious of its agency; (2) it has the ability to reflect
on (its motivations for) its actions; and (3) it has the ability to apply self-
regarding qualitative standards when assessing its actions. Let me explain
these three requirements.
To be conscious of one’s agency requires a first-person perspective, that is to
say, it requires that the being in question is aware of the fact that it has its own
perspective and that this perspective differs from the perspective of others. A
being that fulfils this characterization is a self-conscious being. But conceiving
of one’s actions as actions of oneself requires more than a rudimentary form
of self-consciousness; it requires that the being is able to conceptualize its own
perspective and, because of this, to think of itself as itself. Such a being is
called a person. A person thinks of herself as the subject of her behaviour,
thoughts, feelings and experiences. She thinks of herself as an agent, that is to
say, as a being that wants to achieve her own purposes (by acting the way she
does) and has her own motives, and, more specifically, as an agent that decides
on her own actions by reasoning. These ways of thinking of oneself require a
highly developed form of self-consciousness, in other words, of the property
of having a first-person perspective. From now on, when I talk about a first-
person perspective, I mean this highly developed form of a first-person
perspective, which is fundamental for being a person. Owing to a first-person
perspective, persons (among other abilities which are based on a first-person
perspective) (a) can think of themselves in the future and in other
circumstances, and this means that they can imagine alternatives for their own
futures, and (b) are capable of taking a position regarding their motives for
their actions and of reflecting on these motives, and this means that they are
capable of rational agency.
In conclusion, because of their property of having a first-person
perspective, persons fulfil the first two of the aforementioned prerequisites for
a self-related conception of wrongness of action: they are conscious of their
agency and have the ability to reflect on (their motivations for) their actions.
What about the third prerequisite, that is, the ability to apply self-regarding
Wrongness from a self-related perspective • 81
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:16  Pagina 81
qualitative standards when assessing one’s actions? In my view the ability to
reflect on (one’s motivations for) one’s actions does not entail in itself the
ability to apply self-regarding qualitative standards. 
Based on their property of having a first-person perspective, persons are
able to reflect on (their motivations for) their actions (before, during, or
after the performance of actions) in a number of different ways. When
reflecting on their motivations (to act in a certain way) and their alternative
actions before performing a certain action1, persons typically evaluate
whether (the purpose of) the action they are considering fits in with other
(longer-term) purposes that they want to achieve, whether a certain
alternative is more effective or efficient than another to fulfil a current
spontaneous desire, or, in case of conflicting motivations for action, which
action purpose they want to give more weight to. When reflecting on their
actions during or after their performance, persons evaluate, for example,
whether their action is (or was) an effective or efficient means to achieve the
purpose they want(ed) to actualize, or whether they, for the benefit of a
certain longer-term purpose that they had adopted earlier, should rather
have rejected the spontaneous desire which they had decided to fulfil. 
An essentially different way of reflecting on one’s motivations and
alternative actions is to ask oneself questions like ‘What kind of person do
those motivations characteristically belong to; and do I want to be that kind
of person?’ or ‘What kind of person would I be if I performed that action?’.
Reflections of this kind require that the person in question makes qualitative
distinctions between certain kinds of persons (or kinds of life), assessing
them in terms of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ (for example, honourable versus
dishonourable, or caring versus selfish), and that she applies these
qualitative standards to herself qua person (or to her life). When reflecting
on her motivations (to act in a certain way) before performing a certain
action, such a person may reject a certain motivation for action, because she
does not want to be the kind of person that is moved by that (kind of)
motivation. She may judge that she would act wrongly if she were moved to
act (in a certain way) by the motivation in question. When reflecting on her
action during its performance, such a person may judge that, by acting as she
does, she is the kind of person that she does not want to be. She may judge
that she acts wrongly, may feel regret, and might abandon her action or try
to undo its consequences by performing ‘repair-actions’. And when a person
who makes qualitative distinctions between kinds of persons or kinds of life
reflects on her actions retrospectively, she may judge that she frequently
performed actions which belong to a kind of life which she thinks of in
negative terms (or in other words, which she regards as qualitatively ‘low’).
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She may judge that she acted wrongly and might be disappointed with
herself.
To sum up: The ability to apply self-regarding qualitative standards when
assessing one’s actions, which is the third prerequisite for a self-related
conception of wrongness of action, is not implied by the property of having
a first-person perspective; it requires that the person has the property of
making qualitative distinctions, which is the property of assessing (one’s
motivations for) one’s actions in terms of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’; after all, she
must be able to reflect on (her motivations for) her actions in terms of the
kind of person or kind of life that these (motivations for) actions
characteristically belong to. 2, 3, 4
Let me – before unfolding my account of regarding one’s actions as wrong
any further – consider a possible objection to the (preliminary) thesis,
which is included in my above explanations concerning a person’s ability to
make qualitative distinctions and to apply them as qualitative standards to
herself, namely: a person may conceive of her action as wrong when she
thinks and feels that she does not want to be the kind of person who acts in
the way she does, did or considers doing. This thesis may at first sight seem
to require one thought too many. The woman in the introductory example,
for instance, does not ask herself – or rather, does not have to ask herself –
what kind of person she wants to be in order to regard her action as wrong.
She blames herself, because she did not stick to her agreement with her
partner. Period. Or so the objection goes. Admittedly, when we conceive of
one of our actions as wrong, because we think of that action in a negative
way and experience reflexive emotions of regret or remorse, we do not
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2 The property of making qualitative distinctions, although not being implied by the property of
a first-person perspective, obviously requires that property; after all, all kinds of self-reflection
require a first-person perspective.
3 I should repeat that I owe the inspiration for this aspect of my view on a self-related
conception of wrongness of action to Charles Taylor’s explications of what ‘strong evaluation’
means. “Motivations or desires do not only count in virtue of the attraction of the
consummations, but also in virtue of the kind of life and kind of subject that these desires
properly belong to.” (Taylor 1985, p. 25).
4 By the way, my view that only persons – or rather, only persons with the property of making
qualitative distinctions in the sense described above – have the ability to apply self-regarding
qualitative standards when assessing their actions does obviously not entail that only beings that
are persons may behave in ways that we would describe, for example, by attributing empathetic
emotions or feelings to those beings. There are research reports (I refer to a special lecture
(NWO/Huygenslecture 2002) given by the psychologist and ‘apes expert’ Frans B.M. de Waal,
organized and published by NWO (the Dutch organization for scientific research), original title
(freely translated): ‘Man as a social ape, and the reduced popularity of greed’) about the
behaviour of certain species of anthropoid apes that can give rise to believe that we are born with
the building blocks of morality, such as consolation, peacemaking, and mutual help. However
that may be, only beings that are able to reflect on themselves (which requires the property of a
first-person perspective) by applying self-regarding qualitative standards to themselves (which
requires the property of making qualitative distinctions) may conceive of certain of their actions
as wrong.
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always explicitly think – as a kind of after-thought – “and I do not want to
be such kind of person”. However, that thought is entailed if I disqualify
one of my actions. If I conceive of my action as wrong, I regard my action
– or rather, my motivation for that action – as belonging to a kind that I
myself condemn for myself, and I also have corresponding negative
reflexive emotions. Thus, conceiving of my action as wrong and having bad
feelings about it definitely involves the thought, even if not engaged in
explicitly, “I do not want to perform actions of that kind” or “I do not want
to be moved by the kind of motives that moved me to perform that action”.
But these thoughts in turn entail that I do not want to see myself as the
kind of person that performs such actions or has such motivations. It may
be true that if we blame ourselves for having been insensitive to someone’s
feelings, we do not automatically conceive of ourselves as a person who is
insensitive to the feelings of others. Still, the fact that we blame ourselves
is only intelligible if we want to be a person who is sensitive to the feelings
of others. Given the seriousness of our reflexive emotions, our acts of
insensitiveness will soon threaten our self-conception of actually being
sensitive or really striving to be sensitive. Potentially, every action that we
conceive of as wrong is a threat to our self-conception of actually being or
really striving to be a particular kind of person. That is why I think that the
woman in the introductory example, who regards her action as wrong
because she did not stick to her agreement, does not have to engage in the
after-thought “I do not want to be a person who does not stick to her
agreements” in order to implicitly think of herself in that way. I am
therefore drawn to the view that a qualitative assessment of one’s action,
when it is part of a self-related conception of wrongness of action, entails
not wanting to be the kind of person that acts as one does, did or considers
doing.5
2 A person’s purposes and a person’s values
Persons generally have the ability to reflect (whether consciously or not)
on their motivations and alternative actions in two ways: (1) weighing
them, by assessing them in the light of conflicting spontaneous desires or
adopted long(er)-term purposes, and (2) judging what kind of person
those (motivations for) action characteristically belong to, by applying self-
regarding qualitative standards which represent the person’s values. What
exactly are a person’s values? Let me clarify the notion of a person’s values
by discussing essential differences between values and purposes.
Persons, like all agents, are capable of purposeful action and of more or
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earlier version of this chapter, at the symposium ‘The Constitution View of Persons and
Artefacts’, held at the Technical University of Delft, The Netherlands, 20 October 2003.
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less complex instrumental reasoning. Although beings without a first-
person perspective do not conceive of themselves as subjects of their actions,
their actions can be explained, as for persons, by assigning desires, beliefs, and
intentions to the beings in question. But only persons, because they can think
themselves in the future and in other circumstances and are able to reflect on
(their motives for) their actions, can think of longer-term purposes, adopt
them, and take them into account when reflecting on (their motivations for)
their actions. Furthermore, only persons can think of and adopt (long-term)
purposes the achievement of which requires that the person thinks of and sets
behavioural rules or guidelines for herself that she plans to take into account
(when evaluating her motivations for action) until those purposes are
achieved. All adopted purposes and the purpose-related behavioural rules stay
on a person’s evaluative agenda6 until the purpose in question is achieved,
modified or abandoned. To sum up: A person’s adopted purposes have ‘natural
life-cycles’, that is to say, they appear on a person’s evaluative agenda when
they are adopted, they are taken into account when the person evaluates her
motivations for action while pursuing those purposes, and they disappear
from a person’s evaluative agenda when they are achieved. Furthermore, a
person can modify or abandon adopted purposes by her own decision, that is
to say, as a result of her evaluative reasoning.
A person’s values, by contrast, do not have ‘life-cycles’ and cannot be
modified or removed by her decision. Let me explain. A person cannot decide
to ‘have’ a certain value and by this add it to her ‘set of values’, so to speak.
Furthermore, a value is never realized and will therefore not disappear from
her ‘set of values’ because of its realization. And a person cannot decide to
modify certain values or remove them from her ‘set of values’; thus she cannot
decide not to apply certain self-regarding qualitative standards anymore. This
is why: A person applies certain self-regarding qualitative standards because
she cares about being a person of a certain kind or about living a certain kind
of life, and she cannot decide not to care.7 Persons who care about the kind of
person that they are (by acting as they do and by having the motivations for
action that they have), and thus ask themselves ‘kind-of-person questions’,
think of their motivations and actions in terms of, for example, honourable
and dishonourable, noble and despicable, brave and cowardly, self-disciplined
and impulsive, caring and selfish, merciful and merciless, or loving and
loveless. And making these qualitative distinctions in actual situations of
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6 As already mentioned in note 13 of the preceding chapter, I owe the idea for the label
‘evaluative agenda’ to Scanlon, who briefly introduces the term ‘deliberative agenda’; see Scanlon
1998, pp. 46-47.
7 I was inspired by Harry Frankfurt’s essay The importance of what we care about (Frankfurt
1982) to use the notion of care in this way. Frankfurt characterizes ‘caring’, for example, in the
following way: “The fact that someone cares about a certain thing is constituted by a complex
set of cognitive, affective, and volitional dispositions and states. […] It certainly cannot be
assumed that what a person cares about is generally under his immediate voluntary control.” 
(p. 85)
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action is constitutive of ‘having’ certain values, of being sensitive to other
situations where those values are at stake, and of being inclined to apply the
relevant self-regarding qualitative standards in those situations. In other
words, making qualitative distinctions makes the values in question
normative for oneself, ‘it is equivalent to committing oneself, first-
personally’8, to accord with these values. 
How do we know our values if we cannot decide to have them, as we
(can) do with purposes? We do not know that we have a certain value as
long as we do not apply that value as a self-regarding qualitative standard
when reflecting on (our motivations for) our actions. Only by assessing, in
a concrete situation, (our motivations for) our actions in terms of ‘higher’
and ‘lower’ (for example, as honourable versus dishonourable, merciful
versus merciless), and thus thinking of the kind of person that those actions
or motivations would belong to in those terms, we may become conscious
of caring about being the kind of person that we ourselves can conceive of
as a person whom a certain value can be justifiably attributed to. Having
made a certain qualitative distinction in a concrete situation of reflection on
(one’s motivation for) one’s action, a person may conceive of herself as
having a certain value, in the sense that she is conscious of caring about
being the kind of person whom that value can be justifiably attributed to.
We might say: Whereas persons can decide to pursue a certain purpose, they
get to know which values they care about. In other words, persons get to
know that they committed themselves, first-personally, to accord with
certain values. 
When do we experience evidence of having a certain value? We
experience evidence of having a certain value (at a certain moment) when
we effectively apply that value as a self-regarding qualitative standard or
when we feel and think that we should have applied that value effectively.
What does it mean to effectively apply a certain value as a self-regarding
qualitative standard? It means that a person (a) reflects on a certain action
before its performance, (b) makes a certain qualitative distinction when
assessing her motivations and alternative actions, and (c) actually acts in
accordance with her self-regarding qualitative judgement. Consequently, a
person may feel and think that she should have applied a certain value
effectively if she (a) failed to reflect on a certain action before its
performance, (b) failed to judge her motivations and alternative actions by
asking herself ‘kind-of-person questions’ at all, or failed to judge them in
accordance with the value in question, or (c) failed to act in accordance with
her self-regarding qualitative judgement. In both cases – when a person
actually applies a certain value effectively or feels and thinks that she should
have done so – the evidence of having a certain value is experienced
retrospectively, that is to say, when she judges that she has (or should have)
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instrumental reason by Christine Korsgaard; see Korsgaard 1997, especially p. 245.
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effectively applied the value in question. By contrast, the evidence of having
a certain purpose is experienced when one adopts a purpose, plans actions
to achieve an adopted purpose, or thinks of and sets behavioural rules for
oneself (for the duration of the pursuit of a certain adopted purpose). That
is why failing to effectively take a certain adopted purpose into account
(when evaluating one’s motivations for action in a concrete situation) in
most cases9 perfectly accords with conceiving of oneself as still having that
purpose. After all, a person can adjust her planned actions to achieve the
purpose in question, she can plan ‘repair-actions’ in case her original action
hinders the achievement of her adopted purpose, or she can adjust the
behavioural rules that she has set for herself for the duration of the pursuit
of that purpose. In short, as long as a person plans actions to achieve a
certain adopted purpose, she conceives of herself as having that purpose.
We might say: Whereas the first-personal evidence of having a certain value
is experienced when one retrospectively judges that one has (or should
have) effectively applied that value during one’s evaluative reasoning
concerning a certain action, the first-personal evidence of having a certain
purpose is experienced when we plan actions (including probable ‘repair-
actions’ in case we hindered the achievement of that purpose by failing to
take that purpose effectively into account when evaluating our motivations
for action in concrete situations) in support of the achievement of that
purpose. 
How long will a person have a certain value? As long as she cares about
being the kind of person whom that value can be justifiably attributed to.
And that means that a person has a certain value as long as she reaffirms that
value in concrete situations of reflection on (her motivations for) her action.
She will never conceive of a value as definitively realized as she can conceive
of purposes as definitively achieved. Although she may, in a concrete
situation, conceive of herself as having realized a certain value in that
situation, because she effectively applied a certain value as a self-regarding
qualitative standard when reflecting on (her motivations for) her action, this
will not stop her caring about being the kind of person whom that value can
be justifiably attributed to. This is not to say that a person cannot stop caring
about herself in that way, but she will not do so because of the realization of
the value in question or because she decides not to care anymore about
being the kind of person whom that value can be justifiably attributed to.
How then can she stop caring? A person may stop caring (in some cases by
first caring less) about being the kind of person whom a certain value can
be justifiably attributed to because of certain changes in her personal
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too costly, in other words, only if the person stops planning actions to achieve a certain purpose,
will she no longer experience evidence of having that purpose. 
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circumstances (in the broadest sense). A person might (whether she is aware
of it or not) not assess (her motivations for) her action (anymore) in terms of,
for example: (a) brave and cowardly when becoming older; (b) honourable
and dishonourable after having become a victim of racial prejudice; (c)
merciful and merciless when making a successful career as a ‘captain of
industry’; or (d) self-disciplined and impulsive after having had therapy to
conquer her obsessive-compulsive behaviour. Such a person does not apply
(whether consciously or not) a certain value as a self-regarding qualitative
standard anymore when reflecting on (her motivations for) her action. A
person who stopped ‘having’ a certain value may not even be aware of not
having that value anymore. In other words, a person’s first-personal
commitment to accord with a certain value may (just) disappear.
What are the sources of a person’s values? That question obviously may
arise, but I will not deal with it. Why not? I am concerned with the function of
values in our evaluative reasoning, not with their sources; and I can ignore the
question, because my account of a first-personal conception of wrongness is
neutral with respect to the sources of a person’s values.
Do all persons have values? No. As argued in Section 1 (Prerequisites of
conceiving of one’s own action as wrong), only persons who have the property
of making qualitative distinctions – which is the property to assess (her
motivations for) her actions in terms of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ – have values.
Although persons characteristically have that property10, having the property
does not imply that those persons always take their values into account when
reflecting on (their motivations for) their action. Furthermore, even if a
person, in a concrete situation, originally asks herself ‘kind-of-person
questions’ before performing an action, she may then (consciously) deviate
from certain self-regarding qualitative standards (that she originally applied)
in order not to hinder or obstruct certain long(er)-term purposes of herself,
with the result that her actual action may violate the value(s) she originally
took into account. 
Can one’s values conflict with each other? Yes! In a concrete situation, a
person’s values may conflict with each other. A person may, for example, care
about being the kind of person that keeps her promises and that helps people
who need her help. In a concrete situation, she may only be able to accord
with one of those values. She may solve the conflict by ‘feeling’ and thus
knowing that she cares more about one value than about the other, in that
situation. Or she may be in a dilemma, because she either does not know
(beforehand) which of the values she cares about more, or she cares equally
about both values.11 Does this mean that a person should not have those two
values (at the same time)? No. In contrast with a person’s adopted purposes
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11 See also Frankfurt 1982, especially p. 85.
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that should be coherent with each other on pain of conceiving of oneself as
irrational12, a person’s values may conflict in concrete situations.13 In other
words, while it is up to the person in question not to have conflicting adopted
purposes, a person cannot avoid to be first-personally committed to values
that may conflict in concrete situations. 
Can one’s adopted purposes conflict with one’s values? Yes, in at least four
circumstances. Firstly, a person may adopt a certain purpose without
reflecting on that purpose by applying self-regarding qualitative standards, in
other words, without ‘testing’ that purpose against her values. She may later
on, when performing actions in support of the achievement of that purpose,
recognize that her adopted purpose conflicts with her values and probably
abandon that purpose. Secondly, a person – after having reflected on that
purpose by applying self-regarding qualitative standards – may adopt a certain
long-term purpose. Later on, however, she may judge that certain actions,
which she performs to support the actualization of her long-term purpose, do
not accord with her values. She might then recognize that her values have
changed during the pursuit of that purpose, and that her purpose is in fact in
conflict with her (current) values. In that case, she may decide to abandon the
long-term purpose in question. Thirdly, a person may adopt a certain long-
term purpose which ‘passes the test’ (that is to say, does not conflict with her
values) without knowing in detail which actions will be required to actualize
that purpose. Later on, when thinking of certain concrete actions to achieve
her purpose, she may judge that those actions do not accord with her values.
She may then decide to abandon her purpose. Fourthly, a person may adopt a
purpose despite her judgement that the purpose conflicts with her values.
Later on, when performing actions to achieve that purpose, she may again
reflect on that purpose, and may abandon it because it conflicts with her
values. In the aforementioned four circumstances of conflicts between one’s
purposes and one’s values, the person can decide to abandon the purpose in
question or not. If a person, when confronted with a conflict between her
purposes and her values, does not decide to abandon (or adjust) the purpose
in question but to further pursue that purpose, she can either not conceive of
herself anymore as having the value in question or (as I will explain in the
next section) she pursues a purpose on pain of conceiving of (her motivations
for) her actions as wrong. 
Let me sum up. I have described six essential differences (Dn) between
one’s purposes and one’s values:
Wrongness from a self-related perspective • 89
12 In the context of this chapter, I will not argue why a person’s adopted purposes should be
coherent with each other on pain of conceiving of oneself as irrational. See, for that
argumentation, Chapter 3 (Practical irrationality from a self-regarding perspective).
13 This is not to preclude that certain values might conflict per se and not only per accidens, but
I cannot think of such a pair of values; that is why I am tempted to think that, for a certain
person, values can only conflict in concrete situations.
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(D1) Role: Taking one’s purposes into account when reflecting on (one’s
motivations for) one’s action means weighing them, by assessing them in the
light of conflicting spontaneous desires or adopted long(er)-term purposes.
Taking one’s values into account, by contrast, means judging what kind of
person those (motivations for) actions characteristically belong to, by applying
self-regarding qualitative standards which represent the person’s values.
(D2) ‘Life-cycle’: Contrary to a person’s adopted purposes, a person’s values
do not have ‘life-cycles’. A person’s purposes appear on a person’s evaluative
agenda when they are adopted, and (as long as the person does not remove or
modify them before their achievement) they disappear ‘naturally’ from a
person’s evaluative agenda when they are achieved. By contrast, values do not
disappear from a person’s ‘set of values’ because of their realization, since values
are never definitively realized.
(D3) Control: Whereas a person can decide to pursue a certain purpose
(and by this put that purpose on her evaluative agenda), she cannot decide to
care about being the kind of person whom that value can be justifiably
attributed to, in other words, a person cannot add a value to her ‘set of values’,
so to speak. Furthermore, whereas a person can, abandon adopted purposes
and so remove them from her evaluative agenda, she cannot remove a value
from her ‘set of values’ by her own decision. A person cannot, by her decision,
stop caring about being the kind of person whom that value can be justifiably
attributed to.
(D4) Knowledge: Whereas a person can decide to pursue a certain purpose,
she gets to know which values she cares about. Only by actually applying a
certain self-regarding qualitative standard in concrete situations of reflection
on her actions does a person become conscious of caring about being the kind
of person whom the value in question can be justifiably attributed to.
(D5) Evidence: Whereas the first-personal evidence of having a certain
purpose is experienced when a person plans actions in support of the
achievement of that purpose, the first-personal evidence of having a certain
value is experienced when one judges that one has (or should have) effectively
applied that value during one’s evaluative reasoning concerning a certain
action.
(D6) Conflicts: While it is up to the person in question not to have
conflicting adopted purposes, a person cannot avoid to be first-personally
committed to values that may conflict in concrete situations.
3 A first-personal conception of acting wrongly
Persons, normally, have adopted (longer-term) purposes and they have values.
Both are ‘meant’ to be taken into account when one acts. A person’s adopted
purposes as well as her values are based on first-personal normative acts,
namely the acts of adopting a purpose and of effectively making a certain self-
regarding qualitative distinction (during a process of evaluative reasoning)
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respectively. The former – adopting a purpose – is equivalent to committing
oneself, first-personally, to pursue that purpose; the latter – effectively making
a certain self-regarding qualitative distinction – is equivalent to committing
oneself, first-personally, to accord with the value in question.14 But making a
commitment entails that one can deviate from that commitment; thus persons
can deviate from their first-personal commitments regarding both their
adopted purposes and their values. When a person deviates from her first-
personal commitment to pursue a certain purpose, she may (under certain
further conditions) conceive of her action as irrational. When a person deviates
from her first-personal commitment to accord with a certain value, she may
(under certain further conditions) conceive of her action as wrong. Because my
concern here is with the notion of a first-personal conception of wrongness, let
me focus on deviation from one’s first-personal commitment to accord with
certain values, and on the further conditions for conceiving of one’s own
actions as wrong. 
From a first-personal perspective, we can distinguish different cases of
deviation from a person’s commitment to accord with her values: a person may
be conscious of her deviation or not, and the reasons for her deviation may be
different. For each case, I will first characterize the reason for the deviation, I
will then describe the circumstances of that situation, and finally, I will discuss
whether a person may conceive of her action as wrong under the described
conditions. (By the way, I do not claim to cover all possible cases.)
Case 1: A person may consciously deviate from her former first-personal
commitment to accord with a certain value because her values have changed. 
The person recognizes that she, although she performed, performs, or is going
to perform an action which is not in accordance with a value she thought she
had, does not view (her motivation for) her current action as not belonging to
the kind of person that she wants to be. She becomes aware that she does not
care anymore about being the kind of person whom that value can be
justifiably attributed to. In other words, she recognizes that her values have
changed, and this means that she is no longer committed, first-personally, to
the value in question.
Conclusion: A person who deviates from her former commitment to accord
with a certain value, because she recognizes that she actually does not care
anymore about being the kind of person that has the value in question, in other
words, because she recognizes that her values have changed, does not conceive
of the action in question as wrong.
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(Korsgaard 1997) to see ‘adopting a purpose’ and ‘effectively making a certain self-regarding
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end just is committing yourself to realizing the end. Willing an end, in other words, is an
essentially first-personal and normative act. [...] So willing an end is equivalent to commit-
ting yourself, first-personally, to taking the means to that end.” (Korsgaard 1997, p. 245) 
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Case 2: A person may consciously deviate from her first-personal com-
mitment to accord with a certain value, because, in the actual situation,
that value conflicts with another value that she cares about more.
The person is sensitive to the fact that two of her values are at stake in a
certain situation, and she thinks that all available alternatives would violate
one of the two values. Reflecting on herself, she finds out which value she
cares about more, by recognizing that she ‘cannot’15 act otherwise than in a
way that accords with that value. In other words, the person becomes aware
which of her values she cares about more, and she consciously deviates
from her first-personal commitment regarding the other value. 
Conclusion: A person who consciously violates one of her values because,
when confronted with a conflict between two of her values (in a concrete
situation), she recognizes that she cares more about another value, does not
conceive of the action in question as wrong.
Case 3: A person may consciously deviate from her former commitment
to accord with a certain value, because she is confronted with a conflict of
two values which she cares about evenly.
The person is sensitive to the fact that two of her values are at stake in a
certain situation, and she thinks that all available alternatives would violate
one of the two values. Reflecting on herself, she cannot find that she cares
more about either of the two values; she seems to care evenly about both of
them. Because she (thinks that she) cannot avoid actualizing one of the
alternatives, she acts while being conscious of violating a value that she
definitely wants to accord with.
Conclusion: A person who, in a situation of two conflicting values that she
cares about evenly, violates one of them, may conceive of her action as
wrong, although she thinks that she has no other alternative than violating
one of the values which she cares about evenly.
Case 4: A person may consciously deviate from her former commitment
to accord with a certain value, because she wants at all costs to pursue a
certain purpose the achievement of which would be obstructed if she were
to accord with the value in question. 
The person is sensitive to the fact that a certain value is at stake in the
concrete situation, but she strongly desires to achieve a certain purpose
(whether it is an adopted long(er)-term purpose or based on a spontaneous
desire); and, while being aware that she cannot conceive of herself anymore
92 • Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations
15 This is not to say that the person does not have the capacities to act otherwise. Frankfurt
illustrates the impossibility in question with Luther’s famous declaration “Here I stand; I can
do no other.” Frankfurt explains: “It is clear, of course, that the impossibility to which Luther
referred was a matter neither of logical nor of causal necessity. After all, he knew well enough
that he was in one sense quite able to do the very thing he said he could not do; that is, he
had the capacity to do it. What he was unable to muster was not the power to forbear, but the
will.” (Frankfurt 1982, p. 86; italics in original).
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as the kind of person whom that value can be justifiably attributed to if she
acts as she considers acting, she ignores her judgement that she will violate
one of her values, and decides to pursue that purpose, despite of her
judgement that she sacrifices her value. 
Conclusion: A person who, for the benefit of a purpose that she wants to
achieve at all costs, consciously ignores her judgement that she will violate
(one of) her values if she acts as she considers acting, may conceive of her
action as wrong.
Case 5: A person may deviate from her (former) first-personal com-
mitment to accord with a certain value without being conscious of that
deviation. 
This could be the case in different situations. (a) The person does not ask
herself ‘kind-of-person questions’ when reflecting on (her motivations for)
her action, because (for her) none of her values seems to be at stake in the
concrete situation; she weighs the alternatives in the light of her adopted
long(er)-term purposes, decides on what to do and acts accordingly. (b)
The person does not reflect on the alternatives at all (whether consciously
or not), and thus performs a ‘wanton action’16. (c) The person, although
she asks herself ‘kind-of-person questions’ when reflecting on (her
motivations for) her action, does not take the value in question into
account, because – without being aware of that change – she does not care
anymore about the value in question. (d) The person, although she asks
herself ‘kind-of-person questions’ when reflecting on (her motivations for)
her action, does not take the value in question into account, because she is
not sensitive to the fact that the value in question is at stake in that
situation.
Conclusion: A person who is not sensitive to the fact that, when being
moved by a certain motivation (to act in a certain way) or acting as she
does, a (former) value of herself is at stake, does not conceive of her action
as wrong. 
Having analysed possible reasons for deviation from one’s (former)
commitment to accord with a certain value, we have individuated two
circumstances – the circumstances of case 3 and case 4 – when a person may
conceive of certain of her actions as wrong. In both situations, the person
conceives of her action as wrong right from the beginning, that is to say, she
is conscious of going to act wrongly, during her deliberation concerning that
action. We might phrase the following thesis:
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the term ‘wanton’ from Harry Frankfurt; see Frankfurt 1971, especially p. 16.
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(T1) A person may conceive of her action as wrong right from the beginning
of that action
(a) if she, for the benefit of a purpose that she wants to achieve at all
costs, consciously ignores her judgement that she violates her
value if she acts as she considers acting; 
(b) or if she, in a situation of two conflicting values that she cares
about evenly (and thinking that she has no other alternative than
violating one of them), violates one of those values.
But persons not only reflect on (their motivations for) their actions before
they act, they also (can) reflect on their actions during or after their
performance, and there are circumstances when persons conceive of their
actions as wrong then. The situations of case 5 could be possible candidates,
because, in those situations, a person deviates from her (former) first-
personal commitment to accord with a certain value without being conscious
of that deviation, at that moment.
Case 5a: Reflecting on her action during (or after) its performance, a
person may recognize that she was not sensitive to the fact that a certain
value is (or was) at stake, and that she violates (or violated) that value by
acting as she does (or did). She further recognizes that she evaluated (her
motivations for) her action without applying self-regarding qualitative
standards at all. This person may judge that she should have been sensitive
to the fact that the value in question was at stake and that she should have
effectively applied the value in question as a self-regarding qualitative
standard during her reflection, because she cares about being a person whom
the value in question can be justifiably attributed to. In that case, she
conceives of her action as wrong.
Case 5b: Reflecting on her action during (or after) its performance, a
person may recognize that she started that action as a wanton (or that she
performed a ‘wanton action’), and that she violates one of her values by
acting as she does (or that she violated one of her values by acting as she
did). This person may judge that she should have reflected on (her
motivations for) her action before performing the action, and that she should
have effectively applied the value in question as a self-regarding qualitative
standard during that reflection, because she cares about being a person
whom the value in question can be justifiably attributed to. In that case, she
conceives of her action as wrong.
Case 5c: Reflecting on her action during (or after) its performance, a
person may recognize that, although she reflected on her action – by
applying self-regarding qualitative standards – before starting to act, her
action does not accord with a value which she thought she had. She may now
become aware of the fact that she does not care anymore about being the kind
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of person whom that value can be justifiably attributed to; thus she may now
become aware of the fact that her values have changed. In that case, she will
not conceive of her action as wrong. (By the way, this seems to me a highly
hypothetical situation, but I did not want to omit the possibility of such a
case.)
Case 5d: Reflecting on her action during (or after) its performance, a
person may recognize that, although she reflected on her action – by
applying self-regarding qualitative standards – before starting to act, she was
not sensitive to the fact that a certain value is (or was) at stake, and that she
violates (or violated) that value by acting as she does (or did). This person
may judge that she should have been sensitive to the fact that the value in
question was at stake and that she should have effectively applied the value
in question as a self-regarding qualitative standard during her reflection,
because she cares about being a person whom the value in question can be
justifiably attributed to. In that case, she conceives of her action as wrong.
Based on this analysis, we might phrase a second thesis:
(T2) A person may conceive of her action as wrong during or after its
performance if she, reflecting on her action, recognizes that she violates
(or violated) a certain value by acting as she does (or did), while she
cares about being the kind of person whom the value in question can
be justifiably attributed to, and if she judges that she should have
effectively applied the value in question as a self-regarding qualitative
standard. 
To summarize: I constructed a number of possible cases of deviation from
one’s (former) commitment to accord with a certain value, and, taking into
account the possibility of reflection on one’s actions before, during and after
their performance, I arrived at two theses. Although we lose certain nuances
and information about the conditions, we might, on the basis of T1 and T2,
formulate the following more general thesis: 
(T3) Conceiving of one’s own action as wrong (before, during, or after the
performance of that action) means: a person judges that her action does
not accord with one (or more) of her self-related qualitative standards
which she thinks and feels she should not violate or have violated (in
the situation in question), because she cares about being the kind of
person whom the value(s) in question can be justifiably attributed to.
Wrongness from a self-related perspective • 95
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:16  Pagina 95
4 Critical analysis of my view 
on conceiving of one’s own action as wrong
Let me submit, with the knowledge of T1 and T2, thesis T3 to a critical
analysis by asking some questions.
Question 1: A person is forced (under threat of violence) to perform a
certain action, which she does not want to perform because performing
that action means violating her values. The person succumbs to the threat.
Might this person conceive of her action as wrong? The answer depends on
the specific circumstances. (a) The person may conceive of her action as
wrong if she, although she cannot (or could not) resist succumbing to the
threat of violence, nevertheless thinks and feels, before or during that
action (or thinks, feels, and judges after that action), that she should not
succumb (or not have succumbed) to the threat, and should accept (or
have accepted) the consequences, however bad they may be. (b) The
person does not conceive of her action as wrong if she decides to succumb
to the threat, because she judges, for example, that nothing is worth
sacrificing one’s life for. This does not preclude that the person,
retrospectively, may judge that she should have decided otherwise and may
conceive of her action as wrong then. (c) The person does not conceive of
her action as wrong if she, although she cannot resist succumbing to the
threat of violence, approves the fact that she succumbs to the threat,
because she, for example, thinks that nothing is worth sacrificing one’s life
for. This does not preclude that the person, retrospectively, may judge that
she should not have succumbed to the threat and may conceive of her
action as wrong then.
Question 2: A person feels the need to perform a certain action under
certain circumstances, no matter what. For example, a person feels the
need to have her house cleaned up whenever she leaves it. This leads – at
least, according to the judgement of others – to absurd behaviour. She, for
example, does not respond adequately when a neighbour asks for help,
after all, she first has to clean up her house before helping her neighbour.
Will this person conceive of her action as wrong?  It depends. If the person
cannot resist the need to clean up her house, although she feels and judges
that she should resist that need and that another action would be required
to accord with her values, then she will conceive of her action as wrong. In
that case, she does not conceive of ‘having the house cleaned up’ as a value
but as a compulsion. By contrast, if she really cares most about having her
house cleaned up, that is to say, if she applies that self-related qualitative
standard when evaluating her alternatives for action and, in case of
conflicting values17, really thinks that she should not violate it, no matter
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what, then she will not conceive of her action as wrong. In that case, her
caring about being a certain kind of person is grounds for her need to have
her house cleaned up. (Obviously, others might judge that having cleaned up
one’s house is not worth caring about most.) 
Question 3: A person is physically forced by external influences to do what
she does. For example, she is given a certain medication as a result of which
she exactly follows the instructions of another person (performing the bodily
movements that person tells her to perform). After that event she finds what
she did detestable, in other words, she does not want to be the kind of person
who does such things. Might this person conceive of her action as wrong?
No.18 If a person was forced to perform a certain bodily movement by
external influences, that is to say, if the person simply could not avoid
performing that movement because of those external influences, she will
not conceive of what she did as wrong, because she does not conceive of
what she did as her action.
Question 4: At a certain moment, a person consciously deviated from her
former commitment to accord with a certain value. She did not conceive of
that action as wrong, neither before, during, or right after the action. Is it
possible that the person, later on, conceives of that action as wrong,
nonetheless? Yes. A person can retrospectively reflect on her actions more
than once and during different periods of her life, and with different
results.19 Depending on her current set of values, a person’s judgement
concerning the wrongness of certain of her past actions may differ at
different points in time. 
Question 5: By performing a certain action, a person consciously
sacrifices one of her values for the benefit of another. Might this person
conceive of her action as wrong? Yes or no. She might conceive of her
action as wrong retrospectively if she thinks and feels that she in fact cares
more deeply about the sacrificed value than about the other one, thus if she
judges that she should have decided otherwise. But she will not conceive of
her action as wrong if she still thinks and feels that, in a situation where
she could not accord with both values, she accorded with the value she
cares about most.
Question 6: A person, having reflected on (her motivations for) her
alternative actions (with or without applying self-regarding qualitative
standards), performs a certain action. Her action has an unforeseen
detestable effect by which one of her values is violated. She thinks that she
would not have performed that action if she had foreseen these
consequences, in other words, she thinks that she would have taken the
sacrificed value effectively into account. Might this person conceive of her
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action as wrong? Yes or no. If she now judges that she could have foreseen
those consequences by reflecting on that action more carefully, she may
conceive of her action as wrong. By contrast, if she now judges that she by
no means could foresee those consequences, she will not conceive of her
action as wrong. 
Question 7: A person performs a certain action (with or without
reflection on that action beforehand), which, according to her own
retrospective judgement, would have had detestable consequences if the
process of that action had not been interrupted by another person or event.
Might this person conceive of her action as wrong?  Yes or no. She might
not conceive of her action as wrong if she did reflect on the action
beforehand by taking her values into account and if she retrospectively
judges that she could by no means have foreseen the consequences in
question. She may, however, conceive of her action as wrong if she judges
that she did not reflect at all on her action, or that she, although reflecting
on (her motivations for) her action, was not sensitive to the fact that one
of her values was at stake. It is important to note that her conception that
she acted wrongly is independent of the fact that the consequences of her
action did not occur.
In conclusion, the answers to the six questions, all of them being allowed by
thesis T3, explain that: 
(1) being forced (under threat of violence) to perform a certain action does
not imply that the person necessarily will not conceive of that action as
wrong; she may (retrospectively) judge that she should not succumb (or
have succumbed) to the threat.
(2) feeling internally forced to perform a certain action under certain
circumstances, no matter what, and fulfilling that need does not imply
that the person will not conceive of that action as wrong; she may judge
that she should be able to resist that internal force (presupposing that she
does not experience that force as an expression of her caring about being
the kind of person whom a certain value can be justifiably attributed to). 
(3) conceiving of an action as wrong implies that the person conceives of
what she does (or did) as her action.
(4) a person’s judgement concerning the wrongness of her past actions may
differ at different points in time, depending on her current set of values. 
(5) being conscious of having sacrificed (or sacrificing) one of two
conflicting values does not imply that a person conceives of her action as
wrong, as long as she judges that she, in that situation, could not accord
with both values and that her action accorded (or accords) with the value
which she cares about more.
(6) the fact that a person’s action has consequences by which, according to
her own retrospective judgement, her values are violated does not imply
that she conceives of that action as wrong, as long as she judges that she
by no means could have foreseen those consequences.
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(7) the fact that a person’s action did not have the (according to the person’s
own judgement) detestable consequences that it would have had if the
process of that action had not been interrupted by another person or
event does not imply that the person may not conceive of that action as
wrong.
5 A first-personal conception of one’s own wrongness
In my view, persons, under certain conditions, may conceive of themselves as
wrong. Let me explain those conditions and argue my view. Persons,
generally, not only have the ability to reflect on their actions but to reflect on
themselves qua self. A person may ask herself, for example, whether she has
planned appropriate actions to achieve her adopted purposes, or why she
frequently acts in ways which hinder or obstruct her long(er)-term purposes.
Besides reflecting on the way she pursues her adopted purposes, a person
who has the property of applying self-regarding qualitative standards may
also ask herself whether she can justifiably conceive of herself as a person
who has the values which she conceives of as being her values. Both kinds of
reflections are meta-reflections, because the person does not focus on one
concrete situation of action, but she focuses on herself qua self (taking a
number of concrete actions into account). I claim: conceiving of oneself as
wrong can only result from a meta-reflection on oneself – or rather on oneself
qua being a certain kind of person.
In my view, we can distinguish two situations in which a person might
conceive of herself as wrong. Firstly, a person might conceive of herself as
wrong if she, reflecting on herself, recognizes that she frequently violated
(one or more) values which she conceives of as being her values. The person
in question may be full of contrition, judging she should effectively apply her
values during her evaluative reasoning, and wanting that judgement to affect
her reflections in future concrete situations of action. She wants to change
herself, so to speak. If this is the case, then the person (presumably)
conceives of herself as wrong. But it is also possible that the person, reflecting
on herself, becomes aware that she was misconceived about still having
certain values, that is to say, she recognizes20 that it does not bother her
anymore to have violated those values. If that is the case, the person does not
conceive of herself as wrong.
Secondly, a person may conceive of herself as wrong if she, reflecting on
herself, thinks and feels that the kind of person which she (until now or
during a certain period of her life) thought of in positive terms (or in other
words, which she regarded as qualitatively ‘high’) is not the kind of person
she cares about anymore; on the contrary, she now thinks of such a kind of
Wrongness from a self-related perspective • 99
20 See also Section 2 (A person’s purposes and a person’s values), D5 (Evidence) and the
corresponding explanation.
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:16  Pagina 99
person in negative terms. She becomes aware that her ‘set of values’ has
changed (completely). Such a person may conceive of herself as wrong
retrospectively, especially (but not exclusively) if she cannot imagine
anymore that she could care about being the kind of person she cared about
being. 
There seems to be a certain tension between, on the one hand, the fact
that it is not a matter of a person’s decision to care about being the kind of
person which she cares about being (and by this to care about the specific
values that she cares about)21 and, on the other hand, the fact that a person
may conceive of herself as wrong retrospectively, because she, during a
certain former period of her life, cared about being the kind of person (or
living a kind of life) which she now assesses in negative terms (or in other
words, which she now regards as qualitatively ‘low’). Without denying that
tension, we can understand why persons may conceive of themselves as
wrong retrospectively, although it is not a matter of their decision to care
about what they care about. Let me explain. Caring about certain values,
that is to say, effectively applying certain self-regarding qualitative standards
is a first-personal normative act; it is equivalent to committing oneself, first-
personally, to accord with the values in question.22 Therefore a person may
now think and feel that she should have always applied the self-regarding
qualitative standards in question; after all, she is now committed to accord
with these values. Consequently she might now judge that she had the
wrong values, in other words, that she assessed the wrong ‘things’ as
qualitatively ‘high’. That is why she may conceive of herself as wrong
retrospectively. 
We can summarize by stating:
A person, by way of a meta-reflection on herself,
(a) may conceive of herself as wrong now if she recognizes that she
frequently violated (one or more) values which she conceives of as
being her values, is full of contrition, judges that she should effectively
apply those values during her evaluative reasoning, and wants that
judgement to affect her reflections in future situations of action – in
short, if she suffers from having (frequently) violated her values and
therefore wants to change herself;
(b) or may conceive of herself as wrong retrospectively if she thinks and feels
that the kind of person which she (until now or during a certain former
period of her life) thought of in positive terms (or in other words,
which she regarded as qualitatively ‘high’) is not the kind of person she
cares about anymore, on the contrary, she now thinks of such a kind of
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person in negative terms – in short, if the person conceives of herself as
having had ‘wrong values’.
By shortening this description, we arrive at the following thesis:
(T4) A person, by way of a meta-reflection on herself, may conceive of herself
as wrong now if she suffers from having (frequently) violated her values
and therefore wants to change herself, or she may conceive of herself as
wrong retrospectively if the person conceives of herself as having had
‘wrong values’.
Let me conclude this part of the chapter with two remarks concerning the
possible effect of meta-reflection, or rather the kind of meta-reflection under
discussion. Firstly, I believe that (regular) reflection on oneself, by asking
oneself whether one justifiably can conceive of oneself as a person who has
the values which one conceives of as being one’s values, will normally have
effect on one’s reflections in future concrete situations of action, because it
will sharpen one’s sensitivity to situations where one’s values are at stake, and
strengthen one’s inclination to ask oneself ‘kind-of-person questions’ when
reflecting on one’s actions in concrete situations. 
Secondly, a radical reflection about oneself qua kind of person might affect
the values one cares about, even though it is not a matter of decision. For
example: A man, who plays a major role in public life and who, in his self-
conception, derives his dignity from being famous, is confronted with a
serious disease of one of his friends. Owing to the pressure of work, he only
visits his ill friend once before the friend dies. The death of his friend acts as
a trigger for him to reflect on his own life and on the things that are
important to him. Doubts arise as to whether being famous is really worth
caring about; and he starts thinking that being the kind of person who
justifiably can conceive of himself as loving and caring is in fact much more
important. His thoughts and judgement about what is worth caring about
most may affect the things he really cares about. I believe that doubting
whether the values one cares about are worth caring about and thinking that
being the kind of person whom certain other values can be justifiably
attributed to would be much more important may affect the values one cares
about, that is to say, the person may – in future concrete situations of
evaluative reasoning – find herself applying other self-related qualitative
standards than before. The values she thought of as more important may
have become the values she really cares about more.
Part II – Why wrongness of (actions of) ourselves matters to us
As stated in Part I, effectively making certain self-regarding qualitative
distinctions, during processes of evaluative reasoning, is equivalent to
committing oneself, first-personally, to accord with the values in question.
Wrongness from a self-related perspective • 101
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:16  Pagina 101
But why exactly do persons find it necessary to act in accordance with their
values? Why, for example, do we feel committed to certain values in the face
of adopted purposes that we (might) fail to achieve because of according with
our values? Why does it bother us whether we act wrongly? And what is it
about us that we might even conceive of ourselves (retrospectively) as being
wrong? Before trying to answer these ‘mattering-questions’, I will argue my
‘overridingness claim’ – that is, the claim that conceiving of one’s action as
wrong overrides all other possible ways of conceiving of that action
(regarding aspects of rational agency) – since the argumentation for this
claim will give us insights that will be helpful in dealing with the ‘mattering-
questions’.
6 The overriding nature of the self-related conception 
of wrongness of action
When we conceive of one of our actions as wrong, we assign the negative
attribute ‘wrong’ to that action based on our judgement concerning a certain
aspect of rational agency, namely whether we effectively reflected on that
action by applying certain self-regarding qualitative standards. But we may
also evaluate (whether consciously or not) our actions concerning other
aspects of rational agency, and conceive of them (depending on our
judgement) as rational, irrational, non-rational, or mistaken. My claim is that
conceiving of one’s action as wrong overrides all other possible ways of
conceiving of that action. I will, in the context of this chapter, not elaborate
on the different ways of conceiving of one’s own actions (concerning aspects
of rational agency)23 but limit myself to the relevant definitions. 
Non-rational: When we conceive of our action as non-rational, we do not
conceive of that action as resulting from our evaluative reasoning. 
(Ir)rational: When we conceive of our action as either rational or
irrational, we, in both cases, conceive of that action as resulting from our
evaluative reasoning (whether it happened consciously or not), that is to say,
we reflected on that action (whether consciously or not) and acted according
to our decision. 
Irrational: In the case of conceiving of our action as irrational, we regard
that action as hindering or preventing the achievement of a certain adopted
(longer-term) purpose which we, during our evaluative reasoning
concerning the action in question, would rather have given more weight to
than the one we decided on (or are going to decide on). 
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Mistaken: When we conceive of our action as mistaken, we recognize that
we made mistakes in our instrumental reasoning (and more or less know the
mistakes), in other words, we recognize that the action structure or
behavioural rules we decided on to achieve a certain (longer-term) purpose
are not appropriate (and we more or less know the mistakes in our
reasoning).
Let me complete this list by adding thesis T3 (its formulation is slightly
modified for the sake of consistency of this list).
Wrong: When we conceive of our action as wrong, we judge that our
action does not accord with one (or more) of our self-related qualitative
standards which we think and feel we should not violate or have violated (in
the situation in question), because we care about being the kind of person
whom the value(s) in question can be justifiably attributed to.
When I state that a first-personal conception of wrongness of action
overrides all other possible ways of conceiving of one’s action (concerning
aspects of rational agency), I do not claim that the conception of wrongness
excludes the others, but that the others are pushed into the background, so
to speak, as soon as we conceive of a certain action as wrong.24 Let me
illustrate my point by presenting situations where a person conceives of her
action as both wrong and either non-rational, rational, irrational, or
mistaken. 
Case 1 (Non-rational and wrong): A woman has put herself on a diet
because she wants to lose weight. Having woken up at night and having got
out of bed half-asleep, she ‘finds herself’ eating chocolate cake, which was
meant for next day’s birthday party of her little daughter. On the one hand,
she conceives of her action as non-rational, because she (thinks that she)
was not engaged in a process of evaluative reasoning concerning that action;
on the other hand, and much more important for her, she conceives of her
action as wrong, because what she did will sadden her little daughter, and
she does not want to be the kind of person who saddens someone she cares
so much about. She blames herself for acting as she did.
Case 2 (Rational and wrong): A couple has a savings account which they
dedicated to periodical or unexpected household expenses (this is the
example from the introduction of this chapter). One day, although not
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without hesitating, the woman takes money from that savings account to
buy a dress. Having bought the dress, she feels regret that she decided to act
as she did. She conceives of her action as wrong, because she broke the
agreement that she made with her partner (namely to use the special savings
account only for the expenses that it is meant for, and by this securing their
standard of living). She blames herself, because her action does not fit the
kind of person she wants to be, namely a person who is reliable.
Case 3 (Irrational and wrong): A woman, who has put herself on a diet
because she wants to lose weight, feels like eating chocolate. She tries to take
her mind off it, but she cannot think of anything else. Eventually, conscious
of violating her diet, she eats chocolate and other sweet things, including the
ones that were meant for this afternoon’s birthday party of her little daughter.
At other times, when she deliberately ate sweet things while being on a diet,
she conceived of those actions as irrational, because they hindered the
achievement of her goal to lose weight. In the current situation, however, the
fact that her action will sadden her little daughter (because there are no
sweets left for the birthday party) is incomparably more important to her
than the fact that, by eating the chocolate, she hinders the achievement of her
goal to lose weight. After all, she does not want to be the kind of person who
saddens someone she cares so much about.
Case 4 (Mistaken and wrong): A couple has a savings account which they
dedicated to certain household expenses. One day, the woman wants to buy
a dress that she actually cannot afford. She thinks about taking money from
the savings account but hesitates. Suddenly, there seems to be a solution;
after all, she will receive her holiday pay at the end of the month. The woman
decides to take money from the savings account to buy the dress, and to pay
the same amount back into the account when she receives her holiday pay.
Having bought the dress, she recognizes that she made a mistake in her
reasoning: her holiday pay is not an unexpected additional income, but it is
part of the couple’s yearly budget which their financial plans and agreements
are based on. Nevertheless, what really bothers her, when reflecting on her
action, is not that her action was mistaken, but that her action was wrong
anyway. After all, she broke an agreement that she made with her partner
(namely to use the special savings account only for the expenses that it is
meant for). She feels regret and blames herself, because her action does not
fit the kind of person she wants to be, namely a person who is reliable.
Why does the first-personal conception of wrongness of action push other
possible ways of conceiving of one’s action (concerning aspects of rational
agency) into the background? I can think of the following arguments (An): 
(A1) Threat: Acting wrongly is a threat to one’s self-conception of being
a certain kind of person (who has certain values). By contrast, occasionally
acting non-rationally, irrationally, or mistakenly is not a threat to our self-
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conception of being a rational agent (that is, an agent that has the ability of
evaluative reasoning and who acts in accordance with the results of that
reasoning). After all, we generally allow ourselves to occasionally act non-
rationally, mistakenly or irrationally, because we know that we are not
machines. 
(A2) Control 1: When we recognize that one of our actions irrevocably
hinders (or hindered) the achievement of one of our adopted purposes, we
can adjust or abandon that purpose. By contrast, when we judge and feel
that we irrevocably sacrificed one of our values by acting the way we did,
we cannot deal with our wrong action by deciding to adjust our ‘set of
values’. After all, if we were able to remove the value in question from our
‘set of values’ by our own decision, then we would not really care about
being the kind of person whom that value can be justifiably attributed to,
and thus would not conceive of our action as wrong in the first place.
(A3) Control 2: We may set the pursuit of a certain adopted purpose
aside for a certain period of time or until certain conditions are in place
without ceasing to have that purpose, whereas, when we care about being
a certain kind of person, we cannot postpone that caring.
(A4) Hierarchy: Our values are more important to ourselves than our
purposes, for we reflect on our purposes by applying self-regarding
qualitative standards, and reject, adjust, or abandon (adopted) purposes if
they do not ‘pass the test’, and not the other way round, that is to say, we
do not ‘test’ our values with respect to our purposes. 
(A5) Having versus being: Our purposes are linked to what we achieve,
whereas our values are linked to the kind of person we are. And for persons
who ‘deeply’ care about being a certain kind of person, being (that person)
is more important than having (achieved purposes), or so it seems to me.
Obviously, one might raise objections against each of the five arguments.
Let me therefore present and reject some possible objections (O-An).
(O-A1) Threat: There may be persons for whom every irrational action
means a threat to their self-conception. Think of a person who cares about
being the kind of person who always (a) takes her adopted (longer-term)
purposes into account when being engaged in a process of evaluative
reasoning; (b) decides to pursue an action that accords with her adopted
purposes; and (c) acts accordingly. For this person, conceiving of an action
as irrational will push all other possible ways of conceiving of her action
into the background, or so the objection might go. Our objector makes a
mistake, however. The person in question, besides conceiving of her action
as irrational, conceives of her action as wrong; after all, her action does not
accord with her value of having control of herself. The fact that she –
according to her own judgement concerning the (ir)rationality of her
action – acted irrationally, means – according to her own judgement
concerning the rightness or wrongness of her action – a violation of her
value of having control of herself. That is why her action is a threat to her
self-conception of being the kind of person who has control of herself. And
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this threat to her self-conception of being a certain kind of person whom a
certain value can be justifiably attributed to is what really bothers her.
(O-A2/A3) Control: A person may conclude from one of her actions
that she is prepared to give up a certain value for the benefit of the
achievement of certain (longer-term) purposes, and she may think that she
will decide accordingly in comparable situations. Couldn’t we say that this
person deals with her wrong action by adjusting her values? No. This
person does not really conceive of her action as wrong; after all, she does
not think, feel and judge that she should have accorded with the value in
question. And a person who does not think, feel and judge that she should
accord with a certain value does not really care (anymore) about being the
kind of person whom the value in question can be justifiably attributed to.
Hence, the person in question, firstly, does not deal with a wrong action of
herself, since she does not conceive of her action as wrong, and, secondly,
does not adjust her values, because she does not have these values
(anymore).One may wonder how a person can think that she has a certain
value (that is what the objection suggests) whereas she actually does not
have that value – as I argue. Here is why: As long as a person has not
actually been in situations where a certain value is at stake, or if a person
has not been in such situations for a period of time, she might think that
she has that value without experiencing evidence of having it. Let me give
two examples to illustrate my point. (a) A person may think that she has a
certain value, because, during her upbringing, that value was presented to
her as being important to accord with. However, when confronted with a
situation of that value being at stake, she consciously violates the values
and recognizes that she does not really care about being a person whom the
value in question can be justifiably attributed to. (b) A person may think
that she has a certain value, because, in an earlier period of her life, she
abandoned the pursuit of a certain purpose to accord with that value.
However, confronted with a new situation of that value being at stake, she
is not willing to abandon the pursuit of a certain purpose, which she would
have to give up to accord with the value in question. She recognizes that
she does not care anymore about being the kind of person whom that value
can be justifiably attributed to, in other words, she recognizes that her
values have changed. In conclusion: when not being in the concrete
situation of a certain value being at stake, one might think that one has that
value, but one will only experience evidence of having that value when one
effectively applies that value during one’s evaluative reasoning concerning
a concrete action (or judges and feels that one should have done so).25
(O-A4) Hierarchy: Persons can derive purposes from their values. For
example, a person who cares about being the kind of person that helps
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others might derive her long-term purpose to become a physician from that
value. Such purposes are as important to us as our values and have the same
function as values, or so our objector might argue. I agree that a long-term
purpose which a person once derived (or thinks that she has derived) from
one of her values is important to that person and that she normally will give
that purpose a lot of weight when she evaluates alternative actions in
concrete situations, but such a purpose does not take over the function of a
value. After all, if the person who wants to become a physician, instead of
(also) asking herself the relevant ‘kind-of-person questions’ (during concrete
processes of evaluative reasoning) only asks herself which alternative best
agrees with that long-term purpose, then this person is not sensitive anymore
to situations where her value of being helpful is at stake. Indeed, by pursuing
a ‘value-derived’ purpose at all costs, a person might not even be sensitive
anymore to situations where her original value, which she derived that
purpose from, is at stake.
(O-A5) Having versus being: Achieving purposes is of great importance
to (most) people; it happens, more often than not, that people violate their
values for the benefit of their purposes, and they do not seem to suffer from
violating their values. This objection is not only an objection against my
‘overridingness claim’, but also against the claim that acting wrongly bothers
us. I will therefore discuss this objection in the next section, which is devoted
to that topic.
7 Acting wrongly matters to us 
– the desire to be loyal to oneself
We – presupposing that we are persons who have the property of making
qualitative distinctions, in other words, persons who apply qualititative
standards to themselves26 – conceive of ourselves as persons who have
values. But this way of conceiving of ourselves would be threatened if we did
not actually act in accordance with our values, that is to say, if we, in concrete
situations, when certain of our values are at stake, did not evaluate our
(motivations and) alternative actions by applying self-regarding qualitative
standards; we then could not justifiably think of ourselves as persons who
have values. This fact can explain why the property of making qualitative
distinctions not only is the basis for conceiving of ourselves as having values
but also for our concern with our values. In short, conceiving of oneself as
having values involves concern with one’s values.
Being concerned with one’s values means having a strong desire to
justifiably conceive of oneself as a person who has certain values, in other
words, to conceive of oneself as the kind of person whom these values can be
justifiably attributed to. And this in turn means, for every concrete action
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which we perform, that conceiving of the action as wrong (whether right
from the beginning, during the action, or retrospectively) is a threat to our
conception of being the kind of person who ‘really’ cares about the value in
question. The fact that we experience a first-personal conception of
wrongness of action as a threat to our self-conception of being a certain kind
of person confirms my earlier statement that effectively27 making a certain
self-regarding qualitative distinction is equivalent to committing oneself,
first-personally, to accord with the value in question.28
We might say: Effectively making certain qualitative distinctions between
kinds of persons (or kinds of life) is equivalent to committing oneself, first-
personally, to accord with the value in question; it is the basis for both one’s
self-conception of having a certain value and for one’s concern with that
value. This concern is a strong desire to justifiably conceive of oneself as the
kind of person whom a certain value can be justifiably attributed to; it is the
phenomenological evidence of our first-personal commitment to accord with
the value in question. The frustration of that desire – and a first-personal
conception of acting wrongly definitely is such a frustration – is therefore a
threat to one’s self-conception of being the kind of person who ‘really’ cares
about the value in question.
I call our desire to justifiably conceive of ourselves as the kind of person
whom certain values can be justifiably attributed to our desire to be loyal to
ourselves. Why do I use this label? A person who is loyal to someone remains
firm in her support for that person; in other words, by being loyal to
someone a person exhibits a certain constancy. In case of our desire to
justifiably conceive of ourselves as the kind of person whom certain values
can be justifiably attributed to, we desire to be constant in our support of
ourselves to be the kind of being that we care about being. And this desire
also entails that we conceive of ourselves as constant in our caring about
being a certain kind of person, since in case of supporting oneself, subject
and object are one. Thus, it is the constancy of oneself that is entailed by the
term ‘loyalty to oneself’ which makes that term appropriate. Such constancy
of oneself, if I am right, is determined by one’s values. Let me explain. 
If we effectively apply certain self-regarding qualitative standards during
processes of evaluative reasoning, and, by doing so, become conscious of
caring about being the kind of person whom the corresponding values can be
justifiably attributed to, then we cannot, at the same time, think that we will
only care about being that kind of person for a certain period of time, or as
long as certain conditions are in place. If we ‘really’ care about something, we
cannot plan to stop caring at a certain moment or under certain conditions.
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This is not to claim that we may not stop caring at a certain moment or under
certain conditions (we presumably will), but the notion of caring precludes
planning (or deciding) (not) to care. The notion of caring about something
entails the continuity of that caring. That is why conceiving of oneself as
having a certain value entails conceiving of oneself as a constant ‘thing’. We
might say: The constancy of oneself, which one’s desire for loyalty to oneself
entails, is determined by one’s values. 
Let me summarize my argumentation by stating the following thesis:
(T5) A person who conceives of certain of her actions as wrong is confronted
with disloyalty of herself to herself. But persons have the desire to be
loyal to themselves, because, by virtue of caring about being the kind of
person who has certain values, they are concerned with their values and
desire to justifiably conceive of themselves as persons who have these
values.
One might object that the constancy of ourselves, as it may appear to us at
the moment of caring about being a certain kind of person, is an illusion,
and that we know that it is an illusion, and hence that the loyalty to
ourselves cannot really matter to us. This objector confuses our ability to
conclude from our experiences with others and with ourselves (because our
values actually may have already changed during our life, and we may be
aware of that change) that our values can change with the first-personal
phenomenology of caring. First-personally, caring entails, as I argued, the
continuation of that caring. Therefore, even if we know that our values
might change, we cannot help experiencing a first-personal conception of
violating our values as not being loyal to ourselves. 
Another objector might argue that, to most people, according with their
values is of less importance than achieving certain purposes. After all, it
happens, more often than not, that people violate their values for the benefit
of their purposes. Hence, most people do not bother about acting wrongly.
This is objection O-A5 (Having versus being) from the last section, and my
response will be threefold. 
Firstly, our objector may confuse a first-personal perspective with a third-
personal perspective. The fact that we (from a third-personal perspective)
think that a person does not bother about violating one of her values, in a
concrete situation, does not imply that we know that the person herself
conceives of her action as wrong: (a) the person might (still) not be aware
that one of her values was at stake in the situation in question, and hence
not conceive of her action as wrong; (b) she might have been confronted
with conflicting values, may have acted in accordance with the value she
cares about more, and therefore does not conceive of her action as wrong;
(c) her values may have changed, and that is why she did not take her
former value(s) into account when reflecting on her alternative actions; she
consequently does not conceive of her action as wrong; or (d) we might be
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mistaken in believing that the person had the value(s) we thought she had. 
Secondly, our objector might confuse effectively applying certain self-
regarding qualitative standards with making people (and probably even
oneself) believe that one’s actions are guided by certain values. A person
who, more often than not, violates what we thought are her values, and
who generally does not conceive of those actions as wrong, does not have
those values. After all, having certain values means effectively applying
certain self-regarding qualitative standards, or thinking and feeling that
one should have effectively applied those standards29, and thus conceiving
of one’s own action as wrong, in the latter case. 
Thirdly, our objector may be right in her assessment that for (most)
people it is of the utmost importance to achieve certain purposes, and that
people, in most situations, aim for the achievement of their purposes at the
expense of their values. But then, (a) she is either mistaken in her
assessment that those people violate their values – in that case we are back
at my second response; or (b) she is mistaken in her assessment that these
people do not conceive of certain of their actions as wrong; after all, it
might be the case that (most) people often think and feel that they act
wrongly.
In short, if a person ‘really’ has certain values, in other words, if she
really cares about being the kind of person whom the values in question
can be justifiably attributed to, then it bothers her when she – according to
her own self-conception – acts wrongly.
Let me present a final objection which says that it can be doubted
whether one’s desire for loyalty to oneself leads to (socially) desirable
behaviour. One’s desire for loyalty to oneself and thus one’s acting in
accordance with one’s values – no matter what other values are at stake –
can lead to absurd behaviour, so the objection goes. The objector’s example
is a woman to whom nothing is more important than having her house
cleaned up before leaving it. As a result, the woman exhibits socially
unacceptable behaviour: for example, she does not take her children to
school in time, and she does not respond adequately when her mother, who
lives next door, calls for help. The objector claims (1) that this woman
deeply cares about her house being cleaned up whenever she leaves it, since
no matter what reason she has to leave her house for, she first has to clean
it up, and (2) that the woman’s socially unacceptable behaviour is a result
of her desire to accord with her deepest value, in other words, of her desire
to be loyal to herself. I will reject both parts of the claim. Firstly, I doubt
that the woman cares – in the right sense of caring – about having her
house cleaned up. Caring in the right sense implies endorsement of that
caring; and I doubt that the woman endorses her caring about having her
house cleaned up no matter what. In other words, caring about a certain
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value implies caring about being the kind of person whom that value can
be justifiably attributed to; and I doubt that the woman really wants to be
the kind of person who cares about having her house cleaned up no matter
what. I rather think that she feels an internal force to clean up her house,
and that she cannot resist succumbing to that internal force. In that case
she does not conceive of ‘having her house cleaned up no matter what’ as
a value but as a compulsion. Secondly, if I am right that the woman does
not endorse her caring about having her house cleaned up no matter what,
but conceives of that ‘caring’ as an internal force that she cannot resist
succumbing to, then the woman’s socially unacceptable behaviour is not a
result of her desire to accord with her deepest value, but a result of an
obsessive-compulsive disorder. By the way, it may even be the case that the
woman conceives of her action of first cleaning up the house before
responding to her mother’s call for help as wrong; after all, she might think
that she should be able to resist the internal force (to first clean up the
house).30 I must admit: my argumentation is primarily a rejection of the
presented example and the related claim, but may not rule out the
objector’s initial doubt whether one’s desire for loyalty to oneself leads to
(socially) desirable behaviour.
The point is that I will not argue against the objector’s doubt whether
one’s desire for loyalty to oneself leads to (socially) desirable behaviour,
because I did and do not claim that one’s desire for loyalty to oneself
necessarily leads to socially desirable behaviour. A person may, for
example, care more about being famous than about being a loving husband,
or more about being self-disciplined than about being merciful, while our
objector might think that caring about being a loving husband or being
merciful will lead to socially more desirable behaviour. And taken into
account that persons by virtue of caring about being the kind of person
who has certain values are concerned with their values and desire to
justifiably conceive of themselves as persons who have these values, and
thus will exhibit a certain constancy in their caring about these values (as
I argued when I introduced thesis T5), a person’s ‘value-based’ behaviour
(whether it is socially desirable or not, according to our objector’s
judgement) will be considerably resistant to changes, because – by virtue
of the nature of caring – a person’s ‘set of values’ is relatively resistant to
changes. 
In conclusion, one’s desire to be loyal to oneself entails that one cares
about being the kind of person whom certain values can be justifiably
attributed to, which in turn entails constancy of that caring and resistance
to changes in one’s ‘set of values’.
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8 Wrongness of oneself matters to us 
- the desire to be worthy of self-esteem
Conceiving of one’s own actions as wrong is not only a matter of one’s
thinking but also a matter of one’s feeling. One’s thought that one acted
wrongly is accompanied by feelings of regret or remorse. Sometimes it may
seem to us that the thought (that we acted wrongly) was primary, and that our
feelings of regret result from our judgement that we acted wrongly, whereas
in other situations, it may seem to us that the judgement that we acted
wrongly is secondary, and that we first felt that we acted wrongly. However it
may be, conceiving of one’s own actions as wrong is accompanied by feelings
of regret or remorse (that one acted as one did). Conceiving of oneself as
wrong, however, is normally accompanied by even stronger feelings – such a
person is full of contrition. 
By saying that conceiving of oneself as wrong normally is accompanied by
even stronger feelings than feelings of regret or remorse, it is apparent that
there are exceptions. These exceptions belong to the second category of a
first-personal conception of wrongness of oneself. Before characterizing the
exceptions, let me recapitulate thesis T4 about conceiving of oneself as
wrong:
A person, by way of a meta-reflection on herself, may conceive of herself as
wrong now if she suffers from having (frequently) violated her values and
therefore wants to change herself, or she may conceive of herself as wrong
retrospectively if the person conceives of herself as having had ‘wrong
values’.
A person who retrospectively conceives of herself as having had ‘wrong values’
judges that she (during a certain period of her life) cared about the wrong
‘things’. She conceives of herself as having changed essentially. Such a person
may still be full of remorse about the fact that she cared about the wrong
‘things’, but those feelings may not come to the surface frequently (anymore)
or may have disappeared completely. The person may manage to avoid those
feelings, for example, by attributing the fact that she cared about the wrong
‘things’ to certain circumstances of her childhood, to the requirements of her
job, or to the influence of ‘wrong friends’. But psychological explanations are
not relevant in the context of this chapter. The point is that a person who
retrospectively conceives of herself as having been wrong (during a certain
period of her life) and whose judgement is not accompanied by corresponding
feelings does not really bother (anymore) that she was wrong. These are the
exceptions which I mentioned earlier and which I will leave aside for the rest
of my analysis of the question ‘Why does it bother us to conceive of ourselves
(qua self) as wrong?’
Persons who have the property of making qualitative distinctions
regarding kinds of persons (or kinds of life) and who thus have the ability to
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apply self-regarding qualitative standards, when reflecting on (their
motivations for) their actions, conceive of themselves as beings who have the
ability to judge whether (their motivations for) their actions accord with their
values, or in other words, as beings who are able to assess their purposes and
actions as right or wrong. But this way of conceiving of ourselves would be
threatened if we were to recognize (by judging and feeling) that we in fact
(frequently) do not use that ability, or did not use that ability during a certain
period of our life, or were mistaken in the qualitative distinctions that we
made in that period – in short, if we conceived of ourselves as wrong. When
a person, reflecting on herself qua self, conceives of herself as wrong, she
cannot justifiably conceive of herself anymore as a person who is able to
assess (her motivations for) her actions as right or wrong. 
I believe that a being which in principle has the ability to apply self-
regarding qualitative standards strongly desires to be able to justifiably
conceive of herself as a being which has that ability, and that this desire is
frustrated when a person conceives of herself as wrong. I call that desire our
desire to be worthy of self-esteem. Let me explain why I use that label. A person
who has the ability to assess her purposes and actions as right or wrong
conceives of herself as the kind of person who has that ability, and she
strongly desires to justifiably conceive of herself in that way, in other words,
she cares about being a person who assesses her purposes and actions as right
or wrong. Caring means behaving in a way that ensures the flourishing of the
object of one’s caring, and being sensitive to situations where the object of
one’s caring is in danger. And a person who in fact cares about herself as a
person who assesses her purposes and actions as right or wrong – otherwise
she would not be able to conceive of herself as wrong – and conceives of
herself (qua self) as wrong, is being torn by remorse that she in fact did not
care about herself as the kind of person who assesses her purposes and
actions as right or wrong. After all, in a (substantial) number of concrete
situations or during a certain period of her life, she did not use her ability to
reflect on (her motivations for) her actions in the relevant way; that is why
such a person feels unworthy of self-esteem. By the way, there may be
situations where persons, by way of self-reflection, feel unworthy of self-
esteem because of ‘just’ one action by which they sacrificed their ‘deepest
values’. 
We might phrase the following thesis:
(T6) A person who conceives of herself (qua self) as wrong is confronted with
her own judgement – accompanied by strong feelings of remorse – that
she actually did not care about herself as a person who is able to assess
her purposes and actions as right or wrong. But persons who care about
themselves in that way strongly desire to justifiably conceive of
themselves as persons who assess their purposes and actions as right or
wrong. That is why a person who conceives of herself (qua self) as
wrong feels unworthy of self-esteem. 
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I do not know whether it happens frequently that persons conceive of
themselves as wrong, and what we might conclude if it happened seldom. I
can think of four possibilities: (a) persons seldom reflect on themselves qua
self in the relevant way, that is, qua being the kind of person who has the
ability to assess her purposes and actions as (right or) wrong; (b) persons
rarely perform actions which they conceive of as wrong; (c) most persons
have an emotional barrier to conceiving of themselves as wrong, and thus as
not worthy of self-esteem; or (d) a combination of the other three
explanations. 
Presuming that persons characteristically have the property of making
qualitative distinctions between certain kinds of persons (or kinds of life)
and are able to apply corresponding self-regarding qualitative standards
when reflecting on (their motivations for) their actions, we can exclude
possibility ‘b’. Possibility ‘a’ has a higher probability, because there may be a
considerable number of persons who are (mentally) unable to perform the
required meta-reflection, have not developed that capability, or ‘just’ do not
engage in the required kind of self-reflection. But, in my view, the main
reason is given by possibility ‘c’: It might be a mechanism of self-
preservation, that people have an emotional barrier to feeling unworthy of
self-esteem; after all, people who judge themselves unworthy of self-esteem
are in a deep mental crisis.
9 Concluding summary
I explained some essential differences between purposes and values and
showed their respective roles in our evaluative reasoning. Based on my view
on the notion of ‘having values’, I developed the notion of a first-personal
conception of wrongness, and argued the following theses:
(T3) Conceiving of one’s own action as wrong: Conceiving of one’s own
action as wrong (before, during, or after the performance of that action)
means: a person judges that her action does not accord with one (or more)
of her self-related qualitative standards which she thinks and feels she should
not violate or have violated (in the situation in question), because she cares
about being the kind of person whom the value(s) in question can be
justifiably attributed to.
(T4) Conceiving of oneself as wrong: A person, by way of a meta-reflection
on herself, may conceive of herself as wrong now if she suffers from having
(frequently) violated her values and therefore wants to change herself, or she
may conceive of herself as wrong retrospectively if the person conceives of
herself as having had ‘wrong values’. 
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I then discussed the overriding nature of a first-personal conception of
wrongness of action with respect to all other possible ways of conceiving of
one’s action (regarding aspects of rational agency). Finally I tried to answer
the ‘mattering-questions’ and presented the following theses:
(T5) Conceiving of one’s own action as wrong matters to us: A person who
conceives of certain of her actions as wrong is confronted with disloyalty of
herself to herself. But persons have the desire to be loyal to themselves,
because, by virtue of caring about being the kind of person who has certain
values, they are concerned with their values and desire to justifiably conceive
of themselves as persons who have these values.
(T6) Conceiving of oneself as wrong matters to us: A person who conceives
of herself (qua self) as wrong is confronted with her own judgement –
accompanied by strong feelings of remorse – that she actually did not care
about herself as a person who is able to evaluate her purposes and actions as
right or wrong. But persons who care about themselves in that way strongly
desire to justifiably conceive of themselves as persons who assess their
purposes and actions as right or wrong. That is why a person who conceives
of herself (qua self) as wrong feels unworthy of self-esteem. 
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1 I use the term ‘personality’ in a broad sense, covering, for example, one’s character traits,
dispositions, adopted long-term goals and plans, lasting practical beliefs, the objects (for
example, traditions, ideals or persons) one cares about or which are important to oneself, or
moods that are characteristic of oneself. 
Chapter 5
Selfhood: Unity in changeability 
Looking at a photograph labelled ‘my school class, 14 years old’, which I had
not seen since then, I tried to find out which of the girls was me. Eventually,
I found myself. I tried to dig out memories of that period of my life: I could
think of my first dancing lesson, a bicycle accident that brought me into
hospital, and the teacher who made me enthusiastic for mathematics. I didn’t
have any doubt that it was me who attended that dancing lesson, that it was
me who had the accident and went to hospital, and that it was me who
enjoyed the mathematics lessons of that teacher; I even seem to be able to
recall how I felt in those situations. Thinking about those three events now,
I connect them to certain character traits that I had when I was young, to
certain experiences that followed those events, and to certain goals that I,
later on, tried to achieve. But do those three events from my youth really
stand in these relations to my self? Do I really know myself? After all,
thinking about myself when I was fourteen years old, I only came up with
three events; I couldn’t even recognize myself on a photograph. I decide to
talk to my parents and school friends, when I visit them next year, about that
period of my life. By the way, I have no doubt that I will be the one who will
talk to them. However, it is possible that by then I will not be interested
anymore in analysing those events and their connection to myself as I am
now; other things may then be much more important to me.
The example illustrates, on the one hand, that we are sure to be the ones
who remember, feel, reflect upon, consider, and plan certain things at a
certain moment, and, on the other hand, that we are not sure about our past
experiences and actions, their interrelations, their relations with our
character traits and with our current beliefs, goals, and plans, about the
stability of those goals and plans in the future, and about the things that
might become important to us. In short, the example presents two pre-
philosophical intuitions: our certainty of our continued selfhood, and our
uncertainty about who we are, that is to say, our uncertainty about our
personality1.
The tension is problematic to us, for we have a desire for unity of our self.
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I will argue that one’s desire for unity of one’s self – a desire that expresses
itself in certain ways of self-reflection – is based on one’s sense of one’s
continued selfhood. The view I am drawn to will emerge as I successively
address, in the seven sections of this chapter: (1) one’s sense of selfhood; (2)
one’s sense of one’s continued selfhood; (3) one’s self-conception as a rational
agent; (4) one’s awareness of the changeability of one’s self; (5) embedded
self-reflection and the desire for unity of one’s self; (6) explicit self-reflection
and the desire for unity of one’s self; and (7) meta-reflection about oneself
and the desire for unity of one’s self.
1 One’s sense of selfhood
Persons are beings that conceive of themselves as themselves.2 This means
in particular (the following list is not meant to be complete but to cover
those aspects that are relevant at this stage of the argument) that a person:
(a) thinks of herself as the subject of her behaviour, thoughts, feelings and
experiences; (b) is aware of the fact that she has her own perspective and
that this perspective differs from the perspective of others; (c) thinks of
herself as a subject that is aware of itself; (d) can think of herself qua self
in the future and in other circumstances; and (e) can take a position
regarding her behaviour and reflect on it. Such a being conceives of itself
as a self.
Conceiving of oneself as a self means more than mere self-con-
sciousness; it is an expression of reflective self-consciousness. Reflective
self-consciousness means thinking of oneself as a subject that is conscious,
whereas ‘mere’ self-consciousness means being pre-reflectively aware of
oneself. The latter – pre-reflective self-consciousness – is a prerequisite for
reflective self-consciousness; after all, one can only reflect on something
that is already ‘given’ to oneself. How could one ever identify oneself as the
‘thing’ one wants to relate to in an act of self-reflective thinking or feeling
if one did not already ‘know’ oneself?3 We would be caught up in an infinite
regress, wouldn’t we?4 But we are immune to the error of misidentification,
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2 As I argued in the foregoing chapters, especially in Chapter 2 (The relation of oneself to one’s self),
the property of conceiving of oneself as oneself, which is the property of having (a highly developed
form of) a first-person perspective, is the fundamental property of persons. On top of that property,
persons characteristically also have the non-fundamental properties of a narrative self-conception
and of applying self-regarding qualitative standards; and those two properties – as I argued earlier –
are both not entailed by the property of a first-person perspective, although they require it. 
3 See also Frank 2002, pp. 127-128, especially “I cannot identify any object as myself if I did not
have self-knowledge before the identification” (translated by myself; italics in original, corre-
spondingly).
4 For explications of this infinite regress, see, for example, Frank 2002, pp. 127-128 and 240,
Shoemaker 1986, p. 13, or Zahavi and Parnas 1999, pp. 259 and 261.
5 For a denial of the possibility of misidentification, see, for example, Baker 2000, pp. 136–137,
Shoemaker 1986, pp. 11-12, or Zahavi and Parnas 1999, p. 262.
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because we do not identify ourselves at all.5 We have a pre-reflective sense
of identity. Let me explain.
One’s subjectivity reveals itself to oneself6, so to speak, in one’s being
conscious of experiencing a certain external object and in being conscious
of one’s feelings or thoughts. We may call this kind of awareness – which
means to be conscious not only of an external object but of one’s
experience of the object as well7 – self-awareness in a fundamental sense.
To avoid misinterpretation, I should emphasize that the distinction
between being conscious of an external object and being conscious of one’s
experience of that object is a conceptual distinction that does not imply an
epistemological or a phenomenological distinction. More specifically, it
does not imply that a creature’s being conscious of an external object is
presented to a certain feature of that creature, and that the creature then
becomes conscious of experiencing that external object and of (to use
Thomas Nagel’s well-known expression) ‘something it is like’ to experience
that object.8 Being conscious of an external object is always a subject’s
consciousness of experiencing that object. That is why we might call that
kind of consciousness self-awareness in a fundamental sense. It is
fundamental for two reasons: it is the most basic kind of self-awareness and
it is pre-reflective. 
But self-awareness in this fundamental sense is not sufficient for being
pre-reflectively self-conscious, at least if, as I take it, pre-reflective self-
consciousness can provide us with ‘something’ we can relate to in an act of
reflective self-awareness. Consciousness of one’s experience of an external
object or of one’s feeling does not ‘give’ oneself to oneself as an object that
one could relate to in an act of reflective self-awareness. For example, a
subject’s consciousness of feeling tired and its consciousness of watching
television do not entail in itself that the subject experiences itself as one
and the same tired and television watching subject. The pre-reflective sense
of being one and the same subject in both acts of pre-reflective self-
awareness is, however, a prerequisite for the subject to perform acts of
reflective self-awareness in that concrete situation, for example thinking
about whether to go to bed or keep watching television. What is lacking in
self-awareness in its fundamental sense in order to count as pre-reflective
self-consciousness is a pre-reflective sense of selfhood. A sense of selfhood
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6 The expression is derived from Zahavi and Parnas 1999, p. 255: “It is possible to speak of self-
awareness the moment I am no longer simply conscious of a foreign object, but of my experience
of the object as well, for in this case my subjectivity reveals itself to me.” (Italics in original)
7 Zahavi and Parnas 1999, p. 255; I refer to the same sentence as in the foregoing note.
8 See for example: Manfred Frank’s argumentation for the functional unity of being conscious of
something (‘Empfindungsbewusstsein’) and pre-reflective self-consciousness, in Frank 2002,
p. 133; Zahavi and Parnas’ elaboration on the ‘first-personal givenness of phenomenal
consciousness’, which they speak of in terms of self-awareness, in Zahavi and Parnas 1999, 
pp. 255-256; or Sydney Shoemaker’s ‘objection to the idea that there is introspective perception
of anything whatever’, in Shoemaker 1986, pp. 19-20.
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entails more than consciousness of one’s experience of an external object or
of one’s feeling, it entails synchronic unity; more specifically, it requires
that the subject pre-reflectively experiences itself as one and the same
perceiving, thinking, and feeling subject in various acts of pre-reflective
self-awareness that may appear at the ‘same’ moment. Otherwise – that is,
without a sense of selfhood – a being might experience itself as the subject
that perceives a certain external object and as the subject that has a certain
feeling without experiencing the two subjects as one and the same.9 But
only a creature that pre-reflectively experiences itself as one and the same
perceiving, thinking, and feeling subject, in the present moment10, exists as
a self for itself, in that moment. Its self appears to that creature as the
certainty of being-self, and by this as ‘something’ constant that it can relate
to, in that moment, in reflective acts of, for example, evaluating conflicting
desires or explaining why it is doing what it is doing. Such a being has a
sense of identity11, in the present moment. 
The question might arise how we pre-reflectively come to know
ourselves in the relevant way. Developmental psychology may be able to
give an answer here.12 George Butterworth, for example, describes
observations in support of ecological and interpersonal aspects of self that
are directly perceived and are important “in underpinning later, more
cognitively defined aspects of self”.13 According to him “[t]he mental
reflective self is just one relatively late-developing component of self.
Although adult introspection may (unreliably) suggest differently,
introspection cannot reveal the inter-related, mutually-embedded levels of
self awareness which have been shown by empirical inquiry.” 14
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9 Manfred Frank raises a similar point when arguing that selfhood requires a certain intimacy with
oneself (‘Vertrautheit’), without which we could not talk about the phenomenon of the self.
Without that intimacy with oneself one could not identify one’s being conscious of experiencing a
certain external object and one’s being conscious of one’s feelings or thoughts as two manifestations
of one peculiar phenomenon. We, possibly, would be other subjects (or none at all) as perceiving
beings than as thinking beings. (See Frank 2002, p. 144) This passage is not a translation of Frank’s
argumentation but my interpretation of his point and applied to my line of thought.
10 Admittedly, a moment still is a certain period of time. But I will not enter into the discussion
here about what period of time may count as a moment in the relevant sense. According to Galen
Strawson’s ‘Pearl view’, for example, that moment might be defined as an ‘uninterrupted or hiatus-
free period of consciousness’; see Strawson 1997, p. 21. 
11 I was inspired by Frank 2002 to use the term ‘sense of identity’. He cites (p. 171) Christoph
Meiners (1776), who uses the German term ‘Gefühl der Identität’, and who characterizes it
(according to Frank, and free translated by myself) as the ability to keep various (internal and
external) mental modifications ‘consciously’ present in the same moment and to relate them to a
numerical unique entity, the person, that does not lose itself in the change of impressions.
12 See, for example, Maria Legerstee’s proposal about the mechanisms that lead to the
development of self-awareness in human infants during the first months (Legerstee 1999), and
George Butterworth’s developmental-ecological approach (Butterworth 1999). Both authors react,
in the referred articles, to Galen Strawson’s view (see Strawson 1997) that our sense of self is the
sense of a mental self.
13 See Butterworth 1999, p. 206.
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To sum up: Acts of reflective self-awareness – for example, deliberating
about what to do in a situation of conflicting desires, which could move us
to act in a certain way – require a pre-reflective sense of selfhood, which in
turn entails a sense of identity. After all, when I, in a concrete situation of
conflicting desires, take a position regarding those desires and reflect on
them, I already know – without performing any reflective act of
identification – that I am the one who has those different conflicting
desires; and that means that I pre-reflectively exist for myself as a self – at
least, in the present moment. But most, if not all, capabilities that are
linked to personhood – that is to say, which are based on the essential
property of persons to conceive of themselves as themselves – seem to
require not only a sense of selfhood in the present moment but also a sense
of continued selfhood; think, for example, of a person’s ability to think of
herself qua self in the future and in other circumstances. 
2 One’s sense of one’s continued selfhood
Let us imagine a person who has a sense of selfhood, in the present moment.
Such a person pre-reflectively experiences herself as one and the same
perceiving, thinking, and feeling subject, in the present moment, and
therefore has the certainty of being-self and a sense of identity, in the present
moment. But the person might not have any sense of personal continuity from
the past to the present and into the future; she may, for example, have lost that
sense due to brain damage. This person would be very, very different from us.15
She can, for example (to recall some of the capabilities that are relevant to
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14 See Butterworth 1999, p. 204. Butterworth refers to Neisser (Neisser, U. (1988), ‘Five kinds
of self knowledge’, Philosophical Psychology, 1, pp. 35-39) and writes (p. 204): “Although
Neisser’s taxonomy [of self-knowledge] was not intended to be a developmental description, the
aspects of self he describes make their appearance at different times in development and help in
explaining the origins of a distinctively mental sense of self. The five aspects of self are: 1. The
ecological self, which is directly perceived with respect to the physical environment. 2. The
interpersonal self, also directly perceived, which depends on emotional and other species-typical
forms of communication. 3. The extended self, which is based on memory and anticipation and
implies a representation of self. 4. The private self, which reflects knowledge that our conscious
experiences are exclusively our own, and this is also dependent on representation. 5. The self
concept, defined as a theory of self based on socio-cultural experience.”
15 Andrew Brook gives the following illustration: “Oliver Sacks has explored cases in which
virtually all sense of continuity over time has been lost (for example, cases in which the patient
has to [be] introduced to the medical staff anew on every meeting). While these patients
continue to be aware of themselves as they are in the present moment (ask if they are happy and
they can answer yes or no), something is profoundly different. […] Now consider a hypothetical
patient with no ability to anticipate a future as his or her own. […] A person who could not
think of him- or herself as existing in the future, who could not, for example, plan what to have
for dinner, wonder what tomorrow will hold, think about who might visit next week, would be
even more uncanny than the patients with no ability to form memories.” (Brook 1999, p. 46)
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(fully developed) personhood) not take a position regarding her behaviour of
a few moments ago and reflect on that behaviour, and she cannot think of
herself in the future and in other circumstances. The question could be raised
whether this human being still is a person, but I will not address this question
here. Whether we call such a human being a person or not16, it seems clear to
me that a person without a sense of continued selfhood lacks capabilities that
are essential for (fully developed) personhood.17
Unity and permanence of oneself qua self, that is diachronic unity, are
implied in various acts of reflective self-awareness that are characteristic of
persons. Unity and permanence of oneself are, for instance, implied in: (a)
the willingness to accept, or the attempt to avoid the consequences of one’s
actions; (b) the feeling of responsibility for one’s actions; (c) the adoption of
long-term purposes; (d) the explanation of one’s actions by referring to one’s
purposes or desires, to certain earlier experiences, to certain adopted goals,
or to a combination of (some or all of) those in the form of a self-narrative;
(e) the act of setting behavioural rules for oneself; and in (f) caring about
being a certain kind of person.18 Let me recall why all those acts are acts of
reflective self-awareness: they are reflective, because they require that one
thinks of oneself as oneself, and thinking of oneself as something is a
reflective act of self-awareness. But the aforementioned acts do not only
require that one thinks of oneself as oneself, they require that one thinks of
oneself as a self over time – the self that is, has been and continues to be. The
question is whether such permanence and unity that are implied in those acts
are based on a pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood (just as a person’s
conception of herself as herself is based on a pre-reflective sense of selfhood)
– or, rather, on a person’s conception of herself as herself and on her belief in
her long-term continuity.
When we envisage concrete situations of performing the aforementioned
reflective acts, there seems to be a major difference between the way
permanence and unity are implied in, for example, feeling in general
responsible for one’s actions, or being willing to accept or wanting to avoid
the consequences of one’s actions, on the one hand, and in setting
behavioural rules for oneself, or adopting long-term purposes, on the other
hand. When we feel responsible for our actions, we conceive of ourselves as
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16 There may be various reasons to call a being that has lost the sense of continued selfhood a
person. For example, we may: (a) not know whether the damage is irreparable; (b) not know
whether all sense of continuity is lost; or (3) want to keep that human being within the
community of persons for legal or ethical reasons.
17 Andrew Brook, for example, argues: “For one thing, beings with no sense of personal continuity
would also and for that very reason be cognitively impaired in a certain way. The ability to retain
the contents of earlier experiences and, via remembering (or q-remembering) them from the
inside, synthesize them with current experiences is an unsubstitutable feature of virtually all forms
of cognition of any complexity. But when I (q-)remember an earlier experience from the inside, I
also remember that experience as though I had it.” (Brook 1999, p. 46; italics in original)
18 Regarding examples (a) and (b), see also Gallagher and Marcel 1999, p. 296.
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agents that are responsible for what they do. Our feeling responsible for our
actions in this general sense is not linked to particular actions or to particular
periods in our life, but to every event – without having any specific event in
mind – which we, at a certain moment, might conceive of as our own action.
Such a feeling of being in general responsible for one’s actions requires a
conception of oneself as an agent who acts based on her own motives, and
that in turn means that it requires a conception of oneself as a continuous self
rather than as a momentary one. And it seems to me, because I believe that
experiencing ourselves as agents belongs to our pre-reflective self-
awareness19, that this conception is simple instead of twofold. One does not
first conceive of oneself as a momentary self and then comes to realize that
one has been and continues to be. We pre-reflectively experience ourselves
as one and the same perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting subject. And
because actions can consist of more or less complex behavioural structures
across a period of time and may need adjustment during their performance,
a creature that pre-reflectively experiences itself as an acting subject is ‘given’
to itself as a continuing self. That is why our conceiving of ourselves as
existing over time is not a twofold act of reflective self-awareness but a
simple one. Consider the example of being willing to accept or attempting to
avoid the consequences of one’s actions. When I recognize that an action
which I am thinking of performing has certain consequences for myself, I
may deliberate whether I am willing to accept or would rather avoid those
consequences and thus whether to perform, slightly modify, or completely
refrain from that action; but whatever I decide, the very fact that I think of
certain consequences of the action as consequences for myself means that I
relate, in the act of reflecting on my action, to myself as a self that continues
to be. 
Our experience confirms that there is not first a momentary self that is
then, by way of a reflective act of self-awareness, extended to the conception
of a continuing self. If we recognize that an action, which we are thinking of
performing, will or may – immediately or in the short term – have
undesirable consequences for ourselves, we normally will evaluate whether
we are prepared to accept these consequences or whether we prefer to refrain
from that action. However, if the undesirable consequences for ourselves are
to be expected in the long term, we sometimes ignore those consequences or
take them less seriously into account. In other words, we seem to be less
inclined to take the long-term consequences into account than the short-
term ones. A possible explanation of this phenomenon is that we perceive the
immediate or short-term consequences of our actions as directly connected
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19 Shaun Gallagher and Anthony J. Marcel write: “[E]cological self-awareness gives us more
than just a snap-shot profile of our posture, location and action. Implicit in this kind of self-
awareness is a sense of what I have just been doing, and, of equal importance, what I can do, and
what I am just prepared to do, a sense of capability which goes beyond the momentary.”
(Gallagher and Marcel 1999, p. 292; italics in original)
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to the action in question, whereas we have to think of ourselves qua self in
the future and in other circumstances in order to conceive of the long-term
consequences of our actions as consequences for ourselves. This
explanation would support our line of thought concerning a pre-reflective
sense of continued selfhood in the following way: because, firstly, the direct
consequences of one’s actions are perceived as connected to the action in
question, secondly, experiencing ourselves as acting subjects belongs to our
pre-reflective self-awareness, and, thirdly, actions and their direct
consequences for oneself range over a period of time, a creature that pre-
reflectively experiences itself as an acting subject is ‘given’ to itself as a
continuing self. 
Now think of the way we set behavioural rules for ourselves and adopt
long-term purposes. When we think of long-term goals for ourselves, we,
firstly, have to think of ourselves in the future and in other circumstances.
Secondly, we will have to think about ways to achieve those goals, because
the processes required for their realization will not be readily available to
us. Thirdly, we sometimes – for example, because of the complexity or
vagueness of the required processes – will define behavioural rules in
support of the achievement of our long-term goals. All three aspects make
intelligible that we will not conceive of the complex of processes that is
required for the actualization of a long-term goal as an action – the required
behavioural structures are far too complex and too dependent on
incalculable circumstances. And if, as I argued so far, our pre-reflective
sense of continued selfhood is predominantly linked to pre-reflectively
experiencing ourselves as acting subjects, then the unity and permanence
of oneself qua self that are implied in adopting long-term purposes and
setting behavioural rules for oneself seem to require conceptualization of
oneself as a self over time – more specifically, as existing in particular
circumstances in the future (or in the past) – instead of being solely based
on a pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that we often take our age and finitude into account
when thinking of long-term goals for ourselves. Think of a person who
decides to put some of her monthly income aside in order to save up
enough to buy a house. Normally, a person will not make that plan if she
cannot realistically expect to be still alive by the time she will have saved
up enough money. And taking one’s age or finitude into account requires a
conceptualization of oneself as a self that exists through time.
To sum up: Various acts of reflective self-awareness that are
characteristic of persons imply the unity and permanence of oneself qua
self. I argued that we can distinguish between two kinds of those acts:
firstly, acts in which we relate to ourselves as subjects of our actions, which
in turn may consist of complex behavioural structures across a period of
time and may need adjustment during their performance, but which we
still perceive as actions; and, secondly, acts that require that we think of
ourselves in the future or in other circumstances and in which we relate to
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ourselves as initiators of processes or as subjects that are involved in
processes. In the former acts of reflective self-awareness, one’s self is pre-
reflectively given to oneself as a self that has been and continues to be; the
latter, by contrast, require conceptualization of oneself as a self over time –
or even as existing at a particular point in time or in particular
circumstances – instead of being solely based on a pre-reflective sense of
continued selfhood.20
A further question might be what period of time is covered by our pre-
reflective sense of continued selfhood. I must admit, that I am not sure
about the answer. But if I am right that our pre-reflective sense of
continued selfhood is tied to our perceiving ourselves as agents, then the
period of time that is covered by our pre-reflective sense of selfhood seems
to be connected to the degree of complexity of our actions. I am therefore
drawn to the view that our pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood
covers a certain period of time, the length of which may vary from person
to person and during the life of a person. Anyway, our pre-reflective sense
of continued selfhood does not cover the complete period from birth, or
more specifically from becoming a person, to a distant future. In situations
in which we are engaged in acts of reflective self-awareness that involve
conceiving of ourselves as living a life – as is the case when we, for
example, think of long-term goals for ourselves, explain our actions by
presenting an autobiographical narrative, or ask ourselves what kind of
person we want to be – the unity and permanence that are implied in those
acts are not directly based on an immediate sense of such unity and
permanence, but on a conceptualization of oneself qua self as existing
through time. And conceptualization of oneself qua self as existing through
time is definitely not a pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood but a
detached, reflective sense of continued selfhood, whereby the latter
presupposes the former; after all, without a pre-reflective sense of
continued selfhood we would lack the ‘givenness’ of a self that has been and
continues to be, and thus would have nothing to relate to and
conceptualize. 
To conclude: Firstly, a pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood
provides us with the certainty of being-self over time. We pre-reflectively
experience ourselves as a self that has been and continues to be, and by this
as ‘something’ constant over time. A pre-reflective sense of continued
selfhood thus entails a sense of identity over time. Secondly, the period of
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20 See also Gallagher and Marcel’s view on the temporally extended self, as presented in Gallagher
and Marcel 1999, Section ‘Ecological self and temporal extension’, pp. 292-294. According to
their view, “proprioceptive and ecological awareness also must include a sense of self over time”
(p. 292). They further argue that the self expressed in action is temporally extended, more
specifically, that one’s actions are nonreflectively informed “by one’s past experience, by beliefs,
lasting attitudes, moral positions, by one’s personal knowledge, concerns, and practical interests”
(p. 293), but they doubt that people have an immediate sense of their long-term continuity.
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time which is covered by our pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood and
identity is not a lifetime or, for example, a fixed period before and after the
current moment, but, if I am right, depends on the time frames of events
that we pre-reflectively experience as actions; after all, our pre-reflective
sense of continued selfhood seems to be linked to pre-reflectively
experiencing ourselves as acting subjects. Thirdly, given our pre-reflective
sense of continued selfhood and identity, and because we, moreover (after
all, we are persons), have the property to conceive of ourselves as
ourselves, we conceive of ourselves as the self that has been and continues
to be – as existing as one and the same ‘thing’ over time. But as far as our
property to conceive of ourselves as ourselves is concerned, that reflective
act of self-awareness means nothing more than conceiving of oneself as
being-self. The self is a content-free self, so to speak. And identity in this
sense is a ‘neutral identity’21, precisely because a notion of the self as being-
self is the notion of a ‘content-free’ self. Finally, owing to our reflective
capabilities, we are able to think of ourselves qua self in the future and in
other circumstances, that is to say, beyond the future and the circumstances
that are within the scope of a concrete action. And such a reflective act
requires conceptualization of our existence as a self over time, a
conceptualization which in turn depends on one’s conceiving of oneself as
a self. 
3 One’s self-conception as a rational agent
Conceiving of ourselves as ourselves is fundamental for personhood. Based
on that property and on capabilities that are dependent on it – especially
the capability to reflect on (one’s motives for) one’s actions, we have the
general self-conception of being rational agents; that is to say, we generally
think of ourselves as agents that decide what to do and how to do it.22 This
does, however, not imply that every individual person would assent to the
sentence ‘I think of myself as being a rational agent’ or ‘I think of myself as
an agent that decides what to do and how to do it’. One might even lack the
capability to understand these sentences and yet comprehend oneself as
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21 The term ‘neutral identity’ is derived from Charles Taylor (Taylor 1989). See note 7 in Chap-
ter 2 (The relation of oneself to one’s self). 
22 More specifically: (a) we conceive of our actions as our actions, in the sense that the actions
would not have happened if we did not have certain beliefs, desires, and intentions; (b) we
conceive of our actions as having motivating reasons and as, in general, being intelligible,
presupposing one knows those motivating reasons; and (c) we conceive of our actions as being
motivated by motives which we want to be motivated by to perform the action in question. This
is not to deny that, in a concrete situation of doing something, one or more of the aforementioned
characteristics may be lacking. We may, for example, find ourselves doing something without
knowing why we are doing what we are doing, or we may know that a certain desire has moved
us to act but we would rather have rejected that desire. Nevertheless, such situations do not
normally influence a person’s general conception of herself as being a rational agent.
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:16  Pagina 126
being a rational agent. The self-conception of being a rational agent does
not have to be highly reflective, much less articulated.23 The fact that we
conceive of ourselves as rational agents becomes evident when we are
engaged in acts of reflective self-awareness that belong to the domain of
rational agency, for example when we explain why we are doing what we
are doing by providing the purpose or the motive for our action, or when
we reject a certain motive for action because it would be selfish to perform
that action. But do we, in those acts, conceptualize ourselves as being
rational agents? And do we conceptualize ourselves as being a self over
time if we, for example, decide to postpone a particular action until the
weekend? 
Rational agency, in a concrete situation, does not necessarily entail a
conceptualization of one’s continued selfhood or of oneself as being a rational
agent, because certain acts of reflective self-awareness that are most basic for
rational agency – for example, specifying the purpose of one’s present action,
or evaluating one’s alternatives in a concrete situation – are not concerned
with oneself qua self but with oneself as an agent in the context of a
particular action.24 Let me explain. A person who responds to “What are you
doing?” by providing an explanation of her action in terms of the purpose of
that action, performs an act of reflective self-awareness, since she takes a
position regarding her action and reflects on her action. Hence, such a person
is able to provide an account of herself as an agent in the context of action.
And that ability obviously requires that she conceives of herself as a rational
agent, which in turn requires – after all, (most) actions cover a period of time
– that she conceives of herself as a self over time. But, if I am right, providing
an account of herself as an agent in the context of a particular action does not
entail conceptualization of herself as a self over time or of herself as being a
rational agent, because – in the act of reflective self-awareness in question –
the person’s conception of herself is not detached from herself as the agent in
the context of a particular action but embedded in the reflexive act of
explaining her action. I label acts of reflective self-awareness that are
embedded in the context of action as embedded self-reflection.
There are, however, other kinds of acts of reflective self-awareness, which
also – like the aforementioned ones – belong to the domain of rational
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23 Owen Flanagan writes: “One might simply not have a very reflectively held self-conception.
One might even lack the ability to understand and thus to assent to (or dissent from) the
appropriately formulated sentences when they are expressed in abstract philosophical terms.
Both possibilites are compatible with being a self-comprehending creature.” He writes further
(p. 52): “[T]here is no incoherence whatsoever in thinking that […] self-comprehension can
accrue in environments that are relatively impoverished linguistically and by means of all
manner of intrapersonal and extrapersonal feedback mechanisms: by way of feelings of
coordination, integration, and integrity, of fit with the social world mediated by the body
language of others, and so on.” (Flanagan 1990, p. 44)
24 I was inspired to develop this view by Shaun Gallagher and Anthony J. Marcel’s essay ‘The
self in contextualized action’, see Gallagher and Marcel 1999.
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agency, but which indeed require a detached stance towards oneself qua self
and therefore entail conceptualization and symbolization of one’s self. Think
(I deliberately use examples in which the person’s conceptualization and
symbolization of her self is very explicit) of a person who tries to justify her
insensitive behaviour towards family and friends by telling an extensive
autobiographical narrative, explaining how and why she became the person
that she is now; or think of a person who consciously strives to be a certain
kind of person and who regularly engages in radical self-reflection in order
to change and improve herself qua self. In this kind of acts of reflective self-
awareness, the person’s attention is explicitly directed at herself qua self. She
has torn herself away, so to speak, from the level and context of particular
actions. I label this kind of acts of reflective self-awareness as meta-reflection
about oneself qua self.
There is still another category of acts of reflective self-awareness, also
belonging to the domain of rational agency. If we take the degree of
detachment from engagement in concrete action as criterion – or rather, the
degree of detachment of oneself as the agent in the context of concrete
action, this kind of acts of reflective self-awareness has to be positioned
between embedded reflection and meta-reflection. Imagine: A man is asked
by his colleague about his plans for the weekend; he responds that he will do
some work in the garden. His colleague says “I did not know that you liked
gardening, I didn’t even know that you had a garden.” The first man explains
that he recently got a girlfriend, who has a garden and really loves gardening,
and that he wants to spend as much time as possible with her. The second
man, thinking of his own experiences in relationships, remarks “But you
shouldn’t give up all your own hobbies. Didn’t you train for the marathon?”
The answer to the first question, presupposing that the man had already
made his plans for the weekend before being asked, is an expression of an act
of embedded self-reflection; the man states the purpose of a particular,
planned action. The second answer is an expression of an act of reflective
self-awareness that belongs to the new category. The man interprets his
planned action, and explains the planned action by providing a self-narrative.
He takes a more detached stance towards the action – as part of his reflection
about the planned action – by conceptualizing himself qua self. Eventually,
moved by the last remark of his colleague, the man might engage in meta-
reflection about himself qua self later on. I label the second kind of acts of
reflective self-awareness, which comprises reflective acts that, firstly, are not
entailed by one’s conceiving of oneself as a rational agent in the context of a
concrete action, secondly, are nevertheless related to certain of one’s actions,
but thirdly, require conceptualization of oneself qua self, as explicit self-
reflection.
To sum up: Persons conceive of themselves as rational agents, that is to
say, as beings that act based on reasons. They engage in various acts of
reflective self-awareness that belong to the domain of rational agency. Those
acts can be classified into three kinds: embedded self-reflection, explicit self-
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reflection, and meta-reflection. In the case of embedded self-reflection, the
reflective act is embedded in the context of a particular action, for example
when providing the motivating reason for our present or planned action, or
when evaluating our motives for action in the current situation. In the case
of explicit self-reflection, we take a detached stance towards a particular
action and towards ourselves as agent in the context of that action, and
conceptualize ourselves qua self. For example, we justify a past action by
providing a self-narrative in which we interpret that action in a certain way.
In the case of meta-reflection, we take an even more detached stance; our
attention is not directed anymore towards a particular action and towards
ourselves as subject of that action, but we are explicitly concerned with
ourselves qua self. It should be mentioned that in concrete situation of self-
reflection the three kinds of acts of reflective self-awareness may sometimes
blend into one another. We then switch, so to speak, from one category to the
other within one process of evaluative reasoning.
Whereas embedded self-reflection ‘merely’ requires conceiving of oneself
as the self that has been and continues to be, explicit self-reflection and meta-
reflection require, on top of it, conceptualization of oneself qua self, which in
turn means that we symbolize our self – and symbolization requires content.
And as most of us will confirm from their own experience with meta-
reflection about themselves qua self, our self seems to have a certain
vagueness and instability. We have a ‘sense’ of who we are in terms of
character or personality; after all, we often refer to our character traits when
justifying our actions. But that ‘sense’ does not provide us with a stable self-
image. And if we engage in meta-reflection by asking ourselves who we really
are, our self seems to slip away. A conception of our self as a vague and
unstable ‘thing’ is, however, in conflict with the self-conception of being
‘something’ constant over time, which in turn inherently belongs to our
conceiving of ourselves as ourselves and which is based on our pre-reflective
sense of continued selfhood and identity over time. Let me therefore, in the
next section, call attention to a sense of self which conflicts with our pre-
reflective sense of continued selfhood, namely one’s awareness of the
changeability of one’s self. It imposes tension on one’s (overall) self-
conception: the tension between constancy and changeability.
4 One’s awareness of the changeability of one’s self
Persons are able to ask themselves ‘Who am I?’. In answering that question,
a person may think of her character traits and dispositions, and of certain
experiences, goals and values of herself. By answering the same question
after a certain period of time, the person may recognize that her answer has
changed, that she, for example, now assigns other goals to herself, that
certain experiences have lost their meaning, or that certain values have faded
away. And when asking the question periodically, at a certain moment, the
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person will recognize that her personality has slightly or dramatically
changed. But do we indeed periodically ask ourselves ‘Who am I?’ I am
inclined to deny this. Nevertheless, we are aware of the changeability of our
self. 
The question is whether one’s awareness of the changeability of one’s self
is a pre-reflective sense of self, or a kind of reflective self-awareness. In the
first case, two opposite and incompatible pre-reflective senses of self would
be ‘given’ to oneself: firstly, the sense of continued selfhood, which entails a
sense of identity over time and which means that one’s self appears to oneself
as the certainty of being-self over time, as ‘something’ constant that has been
and continues to be; and, secondly, the sense of changeability of one’s self,
which means – at least if we really had a pre-reflective sense of changeability
of one’s self – that one’s self appears to oneself as ‘something’ unstable over
time. The psychological condition of a creature with such a mental make-up
is hard to imagine. But from the very moment that this creature conceived of
itself as itself, it would be in utmost confusion about itself, to say the least.
And if the sense of the changeability of the self were indeed a pre-reflective
sense of self, that situation of utmost confusion would be the psychological
point of departure of all persons, and thus of each of us. However, to my
knowledge, there is no evidence of such being the case. Small children, who
conceive of themselves as themselves, do not seem to experience confusion
about themselves qua selves. This fact seems to refute the thesis about the
pre-reflectiveness of one’s sense of the changeability of one’s self. But there is
still the theoretical possibility that one of the two pre-reflective senses of self
is dominant, presumably our sense of identity over time (which is entailed
by our sense of continued selfhood). In that case our not being in utmost
confusion about ourselves becomes intelligible if we assume that our
conceiving of ourselves as ourselves is grounded in the dominant pre-
reflective sense of self.25 This proposal, however, opens the possibility that for
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25 Sydney Shoemaker discusses a similar proposal in a different but related context. When
analysing a case presented by Parfit, he imagines the impossible case that two streams of
consciousness were realized in the two hemispheres of a brain in such a way that there would
be no possibility of integrating their contents. For the sake of argument he supposes that what
we would have is one person with two streams of consciousness, and that a particular
experience occurs in one stream but not in the other. It seems to be, so he writes, that such a
person is conscious of that particular experience in, say, the right hemisphere of the brain, but
not in the left. “This suggests that the property of being conscious is really a relational one, and
that our example should be described as one in which the experience is conscious relative to
one stream and not relative to the other.” (Shoemaker 1996, p. 191, italics in original) He then
speculates that “the relativization of the notion of consciousness” provides a strategy in dealing
with certain issues (for example, issues of repressed wishes, desires, intentions and beliefs, or
of psychological continuity): “Let us say that in the normal case, unlike in Parfit’s case, there is
a “dominant” stream of consciousness; a temporally extended set of states and events that is
highly integrated, i.e., characterized by a high degree of unity of consciousness, and includes
most of the subject’s mental states, or at any rate significantly more of them than any other such
set.” (p. 192)
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:17  Pagina 130
some persons the other pre-reflective sense might be the dominant one,
which would imply that their conceiving of themselves as selves is grounded
in a sense of an unstable self. To my knowledge, there is no empirical
evidence for that theoretical option.
Anyway, according to my account of selfhood, there is a conceptual
problem with the aforementioned speculative proposal. Awareness of the
changeability of the self requires awareness of oneself as a ‘thing’ that has
certain content, in other words, it requires awareness of personality – the
awareness of, for example, having certain character traits, dispositions, or
moods that are characteristic of oneself. But now we are confronted anew
with the question whether that self-awareness is pre-reflective or reflective.
Let us for a moment presuppose that awareness of personality is a pre-
reflective kind of self-awareness. How could we – without any reflection – be
aware of the changeability of that personality? Awareness of the changeability
of one’s self requires awareness of one’s personality and is, for that reason, an
act of reflective self-awareness. But awareness of one’s personality is, contrary
to the assumption just made, not conceivable as being a pre-reflective kind
of self-awareness either. One’s awareness of oneself as a self with a
personality, as evidenced by assigning character traits or dispositions to
oneself, is an act of reflective self-awareness; after all, assigning something to
oneself requires a conception of oneself as oneself and is, therefore, an act of
reflective self-awareness. Moreover, it is an act of reflective self-awareness
that implies unity and permanence of oneself, for aspects of personality are
by their very nature not momentary. After all, being self-consciously aware of
a particular character trait of oneself is not like being self-consciously aware
of a momentary feeling or thought. 
Having clarity about the reflectiveness of one’s awareness of one’s
personality, the question about the required kind of reflective act arises:
embedded self-reflection, explicit self-reflection, or meta-reflection about
oneself qua self. The answer is that all three kinds are possible. Firstly, as we
know from our own experience, persons can engage in meta-reflection about
themselves qua personality. A person may, for example, ask herself whether
certain repetitions in her behaviour happen by accident, or whether they
show that she has a disposition to behave that way. Secondly, acts of
awareness of one’s personality are often acts of explicit self-reflection. Think,
for instance, of a person who responds to a request to justify some of her past
actions and who, in this context, refers to certain of her character traits or
dispositions. Thirdly, acts of awareness of one’s personality can also be
embedded in the context of a particular action. They are characteristically
entailed by processes of evaluative reasoning concerning the action one is
considering, the motive for that action, or one’s alternatives. A person may,
for example, reject an alternative because she assesses that action as risky and
she knows that she does not like risky actions; she may decide to perform a
particular action because that action will support her long-term career-goal;
or she may reject a particular motive for action, because it would be selfish
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to be moved by that motive. In these situations, the act of awareness of her
personality is embedded in the person’s evaluative reasoning concerning
what to do and/or how to do it, in the context of a concrete action; in other
words, the person takes her personality into account without leaving the
context of the present action. 
Awareness of one’s personality is a prerequisite for awareness of the
changeability of one’s self. A person will, obviously, not be able to explicate
the motives for her actions by referring to a change in her plans, goals, the
things that are important to her, or by referring to a change in her character
– all those explications being expressions of her awareness of the
changeability of her self – without being aware of herself as a self with a
personality. But, as for the sense of one’s personality, there is the question
about the required kind of reflective act. Awareness of the changeability of
one’s self can, firstly, be an act of meta-reflection about oneself qua self. Think
of a person who repeatedly, having decided on a career in a particular
profession or to practice a certain hobby, is sidetracked by other careers or
hobbies. She may engage in meta-reflection, asking herself why she cannot
stick to the plans that she makes for herself. That person is clearly aware of
the changeability of her self. But a person’s awareness of the changeability of
her self may, secondly, also be an act of explicit self-reflection. When asked
to justify her former actions, a person may, for example, refer to the fact that
she, in those days, had other plans and goals, and that other things were
important to her then. A person who provides this kind of account of herself
is definitely aware of the changeability of her self. Awareness of the
changeability of one’s self can, thirdly, be an act of embedded reflective self-
awareness, namely when it is part of one’s evaluative reasoning concerning a
concrete decision for action. Take the following example. A person is busy
planning her holidays. She sees an advertisement for a summer course about
African dance; she thinks of immediately booking that course; but a few
moments later she rejects that alternative, because she thinks that she might
be not in the mood for African dance when the time comes. This person
reasons, in the context of action, as an agent who is aware of her changeable
personality. 
To sum up: One’s awareness of the changeability of one’s self presupposes
awareness of one’s personality. Both are forms of reflective self-awareness,
and they imply unity and permanence over time. However, they do not
necessarily imply a detached stance towards oneself. In other words, they do
not necessarily imply that the person in question conceptualizes and
symbolizes her self as a self with a certain (changeable) personality:
awareness of one’s personality and of the changeability of one’s self may be
acts of meta-reflection about oneself qua self or of explicit self-reflection, but
they can also be embedded in the context of a concrete action.
Although one’s awareness of the changeability of one’s self is not a pre-
reflective sense of self and therefore does not conflict on one and the same
level with one’s pre-reflective sense of identity over time, there is still a
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tension – the tension between constancy and changeability – between one’s
conceiving of oneself as existing as one and the same ‘thing’ over time26,
which is based on one’s pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood, and one’s
reflective awareness of the changeability of one’s self. In the forthcoming
sections, I will argue that we strive – whether consciously or not – to relieve
that tension. We desire unity of our self, despite our awareness of the
changeability of our self. This desire expresses itself in certain ways of
conceiving of our actions and of ourselves, and in certain self-reflexive
emotions. And in my view, our desire for unity of our self is based on our pre-
reflective sense of identity over time.
5 Embedded self-reflection 
and the desire for unity of one’s self
When we explain a present or planned action by stating the purpose or
motive of that action, or when we, in a concrete situation of deciding what
to do and/or how to do it, evaluate (our motives for) our alternative actions,
we are engaged in acts of reflective self-awareness. Those acts are acts of
embedded self-awareness, assuming that one reasons as an agent in the
context of a concrete action, more specifically, assuming that a person does
not, for example, provide an extensive autobiographical narrative to make
her action intelligible to her interlocutors, or ask herself whether the action
she is considering fits in with the picture that her friends have of herself. And
frequently and regularly – when reasoning concerning a current or planned
action – we do not take such a detached stance towards ourselves and
conceptualize ourselves qua self. Therefore, providing the purpose or motive
for a present or planned action, and evaluating (one’s motives for) one’s
action when deciding what to do or how to do it, are, frequently and
regularly, acts of embedded reflective self-awareness.27 
In the numerous occurrences of acts of embedded reflective self-
awareness, we sometimes conceive of our actions in particular ways or have
certain reflexive emotions. For example, when providing the purpose or
motive of our present action, we may, suddenly, regard our action as wrong
and experience regret or remorse. Or, when considering performing a certain
action, we may come to realize that the action would be irrational. Such ways
of conceiving of our actions exhibit, as I will argue, a desire for unity of our
self. This is not to say that they only exhibit one’s desire for unity; a person’s
regarding her action as wrong because of acting impulsively, for example,
also – and perhaps primarily – exhibits her caring about being self-
disciplined. Before turning, in more detail, to the question how the desire for
unity of one’s self expresses itself in acts of embedded self-reflection, we have
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to pay attention to the fact that there are two kinds of evaluative reasoning
concerning a concrete action. 
When engaged in processes of evaluative reasoning concerning a concrete
action, persons may, for instance, give more weight to the fulfilment of
certain momentary desires than to others; they may give more weight to the
fulfilment of certain momentary desires than to the pursuit of their adopted
longer-term purposes; or they may reject their momentary desires for the
benefit of the pursuit of certain adopted purposes. These persons decide
what to do and/or how to do it based on weighing alternatives. But persons
also decide on other grounds whether to pursue a certain purpose or not.28
They may reject certain desires or alternative actions, adjust purposes that
they adopted earlier, or remove certain adopted purposes from their
‘evaluative agenda’, because performing the corresponding actions would not
be in accordance with the self-regarding qualitative standards which they
apply to themselves. Such persons conceive of (their motives for) their
actions in terms of, for example, honourable and dishonourable, noble and
despicable, brave and cowardly, caring and selfish, merciful and merciless,
loving and loveless, self-disciplined and impulsive, independent and
dependent, well groomed and badly groomed, neat and chaotic, or famous
and unknown – to name just a few of those qualitative distinctions, and
reject or decide to perform the corresponding actions based on that
judgement. I call (with Charles Taylor29) the first kind of evaluation ‘weak
evaluation’ and the second kind ‘strong evaluation’. Both kinds of evaluation
are acts of embedded reflective self-awareness as long as they are performed
in the context of one’s evaluative reasoning in a concrete situation
concerning (one’s decisions for) one’s action in that situation.30 In that case
they are expressions of the person’s ability to provide an account of herself
as a rational agent in the context of action. 
How does the desire for unity of one’s self express itself in acts of
embedded weak or strong evaluation? Take the following example. When
asked ‘What are you doing?’, I come to realize – while providing the purpose
of my present action – that my action is irrational. At the same time, I
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Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:17  Pagina 134
conceive of the action as resulting from my own reasoning, that is to say, I do
not suddenly ‘find myself’ performing that action. But I now assess the action
as hindering or preventing the achievement of an adopted purpose that I
really want to achieve. And, retrospectively, I would rather have rejected the
spontaneous desire, which moved me to act, for the benefit of that longer-
term purpose. It is not necessary that someone asks me about my present
action; it may also happen that I conceive of my action as irrational while
being engaged in executing that action. It may even happen that I conceive
of an action as irrational while deciding to perform that action. In all three
cases, the person in fact wanted (or wants) to do what she actually does,
whereas on the other hand she does not do what she thinks that she would
really want to do.31 
Conceiving of our action as irrational is an expression of our recognition
that the action hinders or prevents the achievement of a purpose which we,
during our evaluative reasoning concerning that action, should rather have
given more – or rather, most weight to. However, I am inclined to interpret
our regarding our action as irrational also as an expression of our desire for
unity of our self, more specifically, as an expression of our desire for
synchronic unity of our will – a desire which inherently belongs to our
general self-conception of being rational agents. In conceiving of ourselves as
rational agents, we conceive of ourselves as agents that act based on reasons,
or so I have argued. And rational agents, at least when they act rationally, are
motivated by reasons (to act in a certain way) which they want to be
motivated by. But in cases when we conceive of our actions as irrational,
there is or was not one motive which we want(ed) to be motivated by but
there are at least two, namely the one we actually are or were motivated by
and the one we think that we really want to be or have been motivated by.
We might therefore say that, in such cases, there is a ‘divergence in our will’.
And I believe that we experience this divergence in our will – if we do or did
not solve the conflict by rejecting or wholeheartedly accepting a certain
motive for action – as a lack of a unity of our self, namely the soundness of
our will. And we will only experience something as a lack of unity if we
desire that unity. 
When we conceive of our action as irrational, we are engaged in weak
evaluation; but, as I explained, there is a second kind of assessment of our
actions, namely strong evaluation. And strong evaluation may lead to the
conception of acting or planning to act wrongly, which – as the conception
of acting or planning to act irrationally – is an expression of our desire for
unity, although in another way. Let us first pay attention to situations where
we might regard our present or planned action as wrong. Firstly, when asked
‘What are you doing?’ it may happen that, while explaining my action, I
conceive of my action as wrong, because I recognize that the purpose of or
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the motives for my action do not accord with the self-regarding qualitative
standards that I implicitly apply to myself and which represent my values. I
may, for example, conceive of (my motives for) my action as selfish instead
of caring, or merciless instead of merciful, and by this conceive of my action
as wrong. Secondly, as for the conception of acting irrationally, the
conception of acting wrongly may not only arise when explaining one’s
action, but also during one’s performance of one’s action. For instance, when
I originally deliberated about my current action, I weighed the alternatives
regarding their contribution to the realization of my longer-term purposes.
But now, when performing the action, I come to realize that my action is
wrong, more specifically, I regard my action as despicable, because I hurt the
feelings of my loved ones, and I am full of remorse. In general terms, I
recognize that I violate my values by acting as I do, or in other words, that
my action does not accord with my own self-regarding qualitative standards.
Thirdly, it is also possible that I conceive of a particular alternative as wrong
when deliberating what to do and/or how to do it. But whereas I normally
reject such an alternative, I now suppress my assessment that the action I am
considering does not accord with my self-regarding qualitative standards. I
decide to perform the action for the benefit of a longer-term purpose, the
realization of which would be obstructed otherwise. However, I may keep
being ‘informed’ by feelings of regret or remorse that I violate my values by
acting as I do.
In my view, conceiving of our action as wrong is not only an expression of
our recognition that, by performing that action, we violate particular values
that we care about, but also of our desire for unity of our self. More
specifically, it is an expression of our desire for unity in being a certain kind
of person, a desire that inherently belongs to our conceiving of ourselves as
having certain values. This is not to say that we necessarily conceptualize
ourselves as having those values and as being or striving to be the kind of
person which those values characteristically belong to. A person who applies
strong evaluation implicitly – by way of the self-regarding qualitative
standards that she applies to herself in those reflective acts – conceives of
herself as having those values and as striving to be the kind of person which
those values characteristically belong to. When such a person, in a concrete
situation, assesses a particular (motive for) action as not according with her
values and nevertheless performs that action, her assessment still being the
same or ‘informed’ by certain reflexive emotions, then she experiences a lack
of unity in being the kind of person that has particular values. She
experiences a divergence between the kind of person which she wants (her
motives for) her action to belong to – after all, she applies the relevant self-
regarding qualitative standards – and the kind of person which she judges
that (her motives for) action actually belong to and which she thinks of in a
negative way – after all, she conceives of her action as wrong. I label this kind
of disunity as ‘non-integrity of one’s self’. And although we, in the case of
embedded strong evaluation, experience this non-integrity within the
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context of one concrete action, we nevertheless experience it as lack of
diachronic unity of our self. Here is why. A person who applies strong
evaluation in a concrete situation of evaluative reasoning concerning a
certain action is normally inclined – because she conceives of the self-
regarding qualitative standards that she applies as her values, and because it
is inherent to the notion of values that they are enduring – to make the same
qualitative distinctions in other concrete situations of action where those
values could be at stake. Consequently, if such a person conceives of her
present action as wrong, she does, at least if it is not the first time that she
applies the self-regarding qualitative standard in question, experience ‘non-
integrity of her self over time’ and thus a lack of diachronic unity of her self. 
One might object that the experience of ‘non-integrity of our self over
time’ cannot threaten our awareness of diachronic unity of our self. After all,
one’s conceiving of oneself as the self that has been and continues to be
concerns a content-free identity32, whereas the identity that is at stake when
a person experiences ‘non-integrity of her self over time’ is an identity with a
certain content, namely her values. Therefore, the person who experiences
‘non-integrity of her self over time’, which is a lack of diachronic unity of her
personality33, does not necessarily experience a lack of diachronic unity of
her self. The objection is right, but this is not the point. I do not claim that,
by experiencing ‘non-integrity of one’s self over time’, one experiences a lack
of one’s continued selfhood. What I claim is this: because of (1) our pre-
reflective sense of continued selfhood, (2) our embedded reflective
awareness of our personality and of the changeability of our personality, and
(3) the tension between (1) and (2), we (4) have a desire to relieve this
tension by striving for unity of our self as an agent with a certain personality
over time, which (5) in case of a person applying strong evaluation is the
desire for integrity of one’s self, and which (6) expresses itself when a person
conceives of her action as wrong and/or feels remorse or regret concerning
that action. 
In conclusion: Two acts of embedded reflective self-awareness express our
desire for unity of our self. Firstly, when being engaged in embedded weak
evaluation of (our motives for) our action, we may conceive of our present
action, the action which we are currently thinking of performing, or an
action that we planned to perform, as irrational. This act of conceiving of
one’s action as irrational expresses a desire for soundness of the will instead
of divergence in the will. Secondly, when engaged in embedded strong
evaluation of (our motives for) our action, we may conceive of our present
action, the action which we are currently thinking of performing, or an
action that we planned to perform, as wrong. This act of conceiving of one’s
action as wrong, which is often informed and accompanied by emotions like
regret or remorse, expresses a desire for integrity of one’s self. Our desire for
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unity of the self – or rather, for soundness of the will and integrity,
respectively – is frustrated when we conceive of one of our actions as
irrational or wrong. By desiring unity of our self, we strive to relieve the
tension between our pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood and our
embedded reflective awareness of the changeability of our personality (in the
broadest possible sense). And I believe that our desire to relieve that tension
is based on our pre-reflective sense of identity over time, which is entailed by
our pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood.
6 Explicit self-reflection and the desire for unity of one’s self
When we explain our present or planned action by not only referring to the
motive or purpose of that action but when we present an autobiographical
narrative to make our action intelligible to others or to justify the action, we
are engaged in explicit self-reflection. After all, although our act of reflective
self-awareness is still related to a particular action, it nevertheless requires
conceptualization of oneself qua self; in the aforementioned case, it requires
the person’s conceptualization of herself as the protagonist of her
autobiographical narrative. Even if we do not provide an account of ourselves
as the protagonist of a self-narrative, as soon as our explanation or justification
concerns one of our past actions, we take a detached stance and conceptualize
ourselves as the agent of that action. After all, that reflective act of self-
awareness is not entailed by a person’s comprehension of herself as being a
rational agent in the context of a concrete action. Sometimes, we engage in self-
reflection concerning a recent action without being asked by others. We may,
for example, come to evaluate our past action because we experience certain
reflexive emotions concerning that action. We also, normally, engage in explicit
self-reflection when we evaluate alternatives that concern certain longer-term
purposes that we want to achieve. Those longer-term purposes are not just
purposes of actions that we plan to perform at a later moment, but goals that
require complex realization processes, typically dependent on various
circumstances and during a longer period of time. When deciding whether to
pursue such a goal, we normally take a detached stance and evaluate, for
example, whether this goal fits in with the rest of our long-term plans or what
others will think of us if we pursued that goal. It is also notable that persons
easily switch to meta-reflection when engaged in this sort of evaluations. In
short, what is distinctive of explicit self-reflection is that it does imply a
detached stance towards one’s self but is nevertheless still related to a concrete
action.
In the numerous occurrences of acts of explicit self-awareness, we
sometimes conceive of our actions in particular ways or have certain reflexive
emotions, which exhibit, as I will argue, a desire for unity of our self. When
we, for example, try to explain or justify our planned action by providing an
autobiographical narrative, we may come to realize that the action is not
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intelligible to us as being part of a coherent self-narrative. Or, when we –
informed by emotions like regret or remorse – retrospectively reflect on one of
our actions, we may conceive of that action as irrational or wrong.
Let us first consider how our desire for unity expresses itself when a person
tries to provide an account of herself as the protagonist of her self-narrative.34
Take the example of the man who is suddenly interested in gardening.35 The
man is asked by his colleague about his plans for the weekend; he responds
that he will do some work in the garden. His colleague says “I did not know
that you liked gardening, I didn’t even know that you had a garden.” The first
man explains that he recently got a girlfriend, who has a garden and really loves
gardening, and that he wants to spend as much time as possible with her. The
second man, thinking of his own experiences in relationships, remarks “But
you shouldn’t give up all your own hobbies. Didn’t you train for the
marathon?” The first man responds that the marathon as such was never really
important to him, but that he likes to exercise his body and especially in the
fresh air, and that gardening, at least partly, fulfils the same function. This man
tries (in his second and third answer) to make the change of his hobbies
intelligible – to others and himself – as being part of a developing self-narrative.
Generally speaking, he tries to make changes of his personality (I count
hobbies as belonging to one’s personality) intelligible to himself as
developments of the self that is the protagonist of his self-narrative. And this
means that such a person conceives of her self qua personality as the
protagonist of a developing narrative36, in other words, she conceives of her self
qua personality as something changeable that, nevertheless, needs to exhibit a
certain unity in that changeability. The unity in question is the coherence of her
autobiographical narrative. And in my view, we feel the need for coherence of
our self-narrative, and strive for that coherence by interpreting and re-
interpreting our actions, because the tension between our conception of
ourselves as one and the same self over time and our awareness of the
changeability of our personality is relieved when we can conceive of our self as
the protagonist of a more or less coherent self-narrative. 
The second situation of explicit reflective self-awareness in which our desire
for unity expresses itself is when we conceive of a past, present or planned
action as irrational. Think of a person who retrospectively reflects on
yesterday’s action of making a sailing trip instead of continuing to write a
certain article. That person explicitly reflects on her decision to make the trip.
She may think that it was a good idea to give more weight to the enticing idea
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of a sailing trip than to her adopted purpose to finish her article in the shortest
possible time. But she may also conceive of her action as irrational, thinking
that she should rather have given more weight to her adopted purpose than to
the momentary desire she decided on, because she really wants to finish her
article in the shortest possible time and yesterday’s sailing trip hinders the
actualization of that goal. However, as already argued in the foregoing section,
by conceiving of that action as irrational, the person does not only recognize
that her action hinders the achievement of an adopted purpose which she
should rather have given most weight to during her former process of
evaluative reasoning concerning that action, but her conception of having
acted irrationally is also an expression of her desire for unity of her self, more
specifically, for soundness of her will over time. After all, by retrospectively
conceiving of her action as irrational, she judges that there is no unity between
the motives she now would rather have been moved by and the ones she
actually was moved by to perform the action in question. We might say that
such a person conceives of herself as a rational agent over time. 
One might object that persons, because of their awareness of the
changeability of their self, will especially be aware of the changeability of their
momentary desires and preferences, and that it is therefore not intelligible that
persons conceive of themselves as rational agents over time. However, this is
wrong-headed. We are creatures who can think of and adopt longer-term
purposes. And longer-term purposes, by their very nature, are meant to be
taken into account when we, in future situations, think about what to do and
how to do it; after all, longer-term purposes would have no chance of ever
being realized if we did not take them into account in future situations of
evaluating our alternative actions. Therefore, a person who still wants to
achieve a particular longer-term purpose, the realization of which is hindered
by her former action, may judge that she should rather have given most weight
to that adopted longer-term purpose in her former process of evaluative
reasoning instead of having been moved by the momentary desire which she
then chose to fulfil. Such a person conceives of herself as a rational agent over
time. And that self-conception is threatened whenever she conceives of her
past actions as irrational. Therefore, our desire for diachronic unity of our will
does inherently belong to conceiving of ourselves as rational agents over time.
I must admit that I believe the time period during which we implicitly desire
our will to be united to be relatively short; after all, we do normally not
conceive of actions that we performed long ago as irrational now. By way of
comparison, I would like to recall that our pre-reflective sense of continued
selfhood has no time limitation either, but nevertheless only covers a certain
period of time.37 I am therefore inclined to say: As for our pre-reflective sense
of continued selfhood, our desire for unity of our self has no time limitation,
but this does – and again in parallel with our pre-reflective sense of continued
selfhood – not imply that it does not actually cover a limited period of time. To
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sum up: persons, although they are aware of the changeability of their self and
are thus also aware of the changeability of their momentary desires,
preferences, and goals, nevertheless desire soundness of their will over time.
This desire belongs inherently to a person’s self-conception of being a rational
agent over time, and expresses itself when a person retrospectively conceives
of certain of her actions as irrational. 
Let us now consider situations where a person, engaged in explicit self-
reflection concerning one of her actions, conceives of that action as wrong.
Take the person who made a sailing trip the day before instead of continuing
to write her article. This person, possibly informed by certain negative reflexive
emotions, may reflect on her action and conceive of the action as wrong,
judging it to be impulsive instead of self-disciplined. And by making that
judgement it becomes evident that she cares about being self-disciplined, and
that she conceives of her past action as not belonging to a self-disciplined
person. As argued in the foregoing section, a person’s conception of her action
as wrong is not only an expression of her recognition that she violated
particular values which she cares about, but also an expression of her desire for
unity of her self, more specifically, for integrity of her self. After all, applying a
certain self-regarding qualitative standard in her strong evaluative reasoning
implies that a person cares about being the kind of person that accords with
the standard in question; and because caring implies continuity of that caring,
conceiving of her past action as wrong because of having violated particular
values is also an experience of disunity of her self, more specifically, of disunity
in her being the kind of person that cares about those particular values. This
desire for unity – the desire for integrity of one’s self regarding one’s values – is
inherent to a person’s conceiving of her self as having particular values.
In conclusion: Three acts of explicit reflective self-awareness express our
desire for unity of our self. Firstly, when engaged in justifying our actions (to
others or ourselves) by providing a self-narrative, we, normally38, feel the need
to interpret and ‘present’ ourselves qua self as the – more or less well-defined –
protagonist of our autobiographical narrative, and we, especially, feel the need
to make changes of our personality intelligible to ourselves as developments of
ourselves qua self. The fact that we feel a need to interpret ourselves qua self
in this way expresses our desire for coherence of our self-narrative, which is a
desire for coherence in our personality across time. Secondly, when engaged in
explicit weak evaluation of one of our actions, we may conceive of that action
as irrational. This act of conceiving of one’s action as irrational expresses a
desire for soundness of one’s will over time – a desire that actually, in the
concrete situation, covers a limited period of time but has no time limitation in
itself. Thirdly, when engaged in explicit strong evaluation of (the motive for)
one of our actions, we may conceive of that action as wrong. This act of
conceiving of one’s action as wrong expresses a desire for integrity of one’s self,
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which is a desire for unity in one’s being the kind of person that cares about
particular values. 
The fact that we, normally, have a desire for coherence in our personality
across time, for soundness of our will, and for unity in our being the kind of
person that cares about particular values means that we have an inclination to
strive to relieve the tension between our pre-reflective sense of continued
selfhood and our reflective awareness of the changeability of our personality
(in the broadest possible sense). And our desire to relieve that tension is so
inherent to our conceiving of ourselves qua self as the protagonist of our self-
narrative, as a rational agent, and as being a certain kind of person respectively
– after all, every experience of disunity is a potential threat to the respective
self-conception – that, as it seems to me, our desire for unity can only be based
in that kind of self-awareness which is a prerequisite for all acts of reflective
self-awareness, namely our pre-reflective sense of identity over time. 
7 Meta-reflection about oneself 
and the desire for unity of one’s self
Meta-reflection is an act of self-awareness in which a person is explicitly
concerned with her self qua self. Think of a person who consciously strives
to be a particular kind of person and therefore regularly engages in radical
self-evaluation. In the act of meta-reflection, a person is detached from her
active engagement with the world; the act of reflexive meta-reflection itself
shifts her intentions far away from that active engagement.39,40 Meta-
reflection about oneself requires explicit conceptualization and
symbolization of one’s self. Admittedly, a person’s explicit reflection on and
narrative justification of one of her past actions also involves interpretation
and conceptualization, and the person’s account of her self is therefore a
constructed model of her self, instead of, as in the case of embedded self-
reflection (which provides an account of one’s self in the context of action),
part of an instantiated model of her self41, but it is a model that is still related
to herself as an agent. Meta-reflection about one’s self, by contrast, provides
142 • Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations
39 See Gallagher and Marcel 1999, pp. 286-287: “[T]he practice of reflective introspection itself
shift and redefine our intentions away from what may have been an active engagement with the
world. As in some experimental situations, such questions involve shifting the focus of attention
away from purposive activity involving meaningful objects and other persons, to our own
movements and modes of consciousness.” 
40 Gallagher and Marcel who label such self-reflection as hyper-reflection state: “Such hyper-
reflection is a third-order cognitive activity, once removed from reflective consciousness, and
twice removed from phenomenal experience or the behavioural level at which we find
contextualized action”. See Gallagher and Marcel 1999, pp. 286-287.
41 I was inspired by the following statement in Gallagher and Marcel 1999 to label the model in
question an ‘instantiated model of one’s self’ (p. 296): “The referent of such reflection and
expression is precisely a self that is instantiated in actions across a variety of personally and
pragmatically contextualized situations.”
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a model of one’s self that is based on an explicit, conceptual and objectifying
self-thematization.42,43 That is not to say that, in meta-reflection, we are
concerned with our ‘total self’, so to speak. The reverse is true: when we
reflect about ourselves qua self, we are always concerned with a particular
aspect of our self. A person may, for example, ask herself whether she cares
about things that are worth caring about, why she frequently violates certain
values which she really cares about, why she cannot stick to her life plans,
or why she frequently does not keep her promises.
Because meta-reflection means explicit conceptual self-thematization, we
might at first sight expect that meta-reflection about one’s self is exceptional,
in the sense that only certain persons engage in such self-reflective acts of
thematization of their self. Although I do not want to preclude that there
may be persons which lack the cognitive abilities to engage in meta-
reflection, persons generally have the capability to conceptualize themselves
qua self and reflect upon that symbolic self. But meta-reflection about one’s
self is exceptional in another sense. Except for persons who go through
psychotherapy or psychoanalysis, or, for instance, a minority of people
whose life-style requires regular radical self-reflection as in certain religious
movements, the circumstances in which persons engage in self-
thematization do not appear daily. Persons especially engage in meta-
reflection about themselves when they are triggered by certain experiences
to reflect upon their own life, when they are forced by the social group they
belong to, or when they experience emotions like regret, remorse,
contrition, feeling guilty, sadness about themselves, or dissatisfaction with
themselves.44 Here are some examples. Think of a young man who has to
explain to his parents why he, after having studied for years, has quitted his
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42 See also Zahavi and Parnas 1999, p. 262: “[…] reflective self-awareness – which, at least in certain
forms, is an explicit, conceptual and objectifying thematization of consciousness” (italics in original).
43 There is a special issue I want address briefly to avoid misinterpretation: the question whether
our self-image and our self-evaluation is ‘merely’ a matter of cognition. My account of meta-
reflection about one’s self does not imply that it is completely under our control how we symbolize
our self, or in other words, what kind of self-image we have. Publications of (and personal
discussions with) psychiatrists have convinced me that one’s self-image is constrained by ‘one’s
biology’ (whether those constraints are inborn or, for example, arose from trauma, or are an effect
of medication). See, for example, Jamison 1997 and Kramer 1997.
44 Charles Taylor argues that persons have a responsibility for radical evaluation, meaning, as I take
it, the radical evaluation of one’s values (in a broad sense): “We consider people deep to the extent,
inter alia, that they are capable of this kind of radical self-reflection. This radical self-reflection is a
deep reflection, and a self-reflection in a special sense: it is a reflection about the self, its most
fundamental issues, […] and what emerges from it is a self-resolution in a strong sense, for in this
reflection the self is in question […] Because this self-resolution is something we do, when we do
it, we can be called responsible for ourselves; and because it is within limits always up to us to do
it, even when we don’t – indeed, the nature of our deepest evaluations constantly raises the question
whether we have them right – we can be called responsible in another sense for ourselves whether
we undertake this radical evaluation or not.” (Taylor 1982b, p. 126; italics in original) I tend to agree
with Taylor’s view, but I will not address the question in the context of this book.
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professional education. He tries to make his situation intelligible to himself
by providing an extensive self-narrative explaining why his interests and
goals changed so radically for a second time. By the way, the young man
might also have engaged in that meta-reflection without being asked by his
parents, but, for example, because he felt dissatisfied with himself. Or think
of a woman who asks herself why her relations with men again and again
end in fiasco. She feels sad about herself and asks herself ‘What is it about
me?’ She, like the young man, may come up with a certain autobiographical
narrative, which makes her situation intelligible to herself. Or take the
example of a man who, being in midlife, asks himself whether he spends his
life in the right way. He may struggle with the question ‘What things are
really worth caring about? Or think, finally, of a teenage girl who is full of
contrition, because she, for the umpteenth time, stole money from her
parents to buy drugs. She might ask herself why she does not succeed in
changing her life. 
As for embedded and explicit self-reflection, the question is: How does
one’s desire for unity express itself in acts of meta-reflection about one’s
self?45 Firstly, persons strive for coherence of their autobiographical
narratives. After all, by conceiving of their lives as a narrative and of
themselves as the protagonist of that narrative, persons want the protagonist
of their self-narrative to be well defined.46 If a person, for example,
conceives of her self as having undergone radical changes, she will strive to
interpret those changes as developments of herself, or she will – to be able
to conceive of her life as a narrative, in the end – try to explain those
changes by referring to certain internal or external causes like illness, age,
divorce, moving to a country with another culture, or traumatic
experiences. A person may also conceive of herself as alternating between
different ‘selves’ – or rather, personalities. And that person, too, will strive
to reconcile those diverging notions of her self by searching for a self-
narrative that explains the fragmentation of her self.47 Let me, by way of
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45 This is not to claim that all acts of meta-reflection about ourselves qua self are (also)
expressions of our desire for unity of the self. The woman, for example, who feels sad, because
her relations with men again and again end in fiasco, and who seriously asks herself ‘What is it
about me?’ engages in an act of meta-reflection about herself which does not – or rather, not
necessarily – show her desire for unity of her self.
46 By the way, there may be persons without a narrative self-conception; think of young
children who do not have developed the property of having a narrative self-conception yet, or
not to the full extent. But although the property of having a narrative self-conception is not
fundamental for being a person, it is characteristic of human persons to have that property. This
is not to deny that the property in question may be developed to different degrees and that
persons therefore may be satisfied with different degrees of coherence of their self-narratives.
See also Chapter 2 (The relation of oneself to one’s self).
47 I will, in this chapter, not discuss pathological cases of ‘multiple selves’ or ‘divided minds’,
known as Multiple Personality Disorder or Dissociative Identity Disorder. It is questionable
whether those alters can count as selves. For a discussion of pathologically divided minds see,
for example, Radden 1999. See also Chapter 6 (Self-conception and the limits to dissociation).
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illustration, cite Kay Redfield Jamison, a psychiatrist who describes her life
with manic-depressive illness.
Which of the me’s is me? The wild, impulsive, chaotic, energetic, and crazy one?
Or the shy, withdrawn, desperate, suicidal, doomed, and tired one? […]
And, as with a suicide attempt, living with the knowledge that one has been
violent forces a difficult reconciliation of totally divergent notions of oneself.48
Reflecting upon her self as to how she experiences and interprets her self at
different points in time, the author of these utterances is confronted with
two completely different characterizations of her self and thus with a drastic
fragmentation of her self; and she clearly struggles to reconcile those two
totally divergent notions of her self. In my view, this struggle exhibits the
author’s desire for unity of her self, and in particular her desire for
coherence of her personality by way of being the well-defined protagonist of
her autobiographical narrative. 
Besides striving for coherence of themselves qua self, persons, secondly,
strive for integrity of themselves qua self, that is to say, persons want to be
loyal to their values, they want to be able to justifiably conceive of
themselves as the kind of person who cares about particular values.49 A
person who (frequently) violated her values may suffer from having
sacrificed her values, and she may, triggered by her deep feeling of remorse,
engage in meta-reflection about herself, and may want to change herself,
after all; she still wants to be able to conceive of herself as the kind of person
who cares about the values in question.50
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48 See Jamison 1997, pp. 68 and 120.
49 By the way, there may be persons without the property of applying self-regarding qualitative
standards to themselves. But although the property of applying self-regarding qualitative
standards to oneself is not fundamental for being a person, it is characteristic of human persons
to have that property. This is not to deny that the property in question may be developed to
different degrees and that persons therefore may be satisfied with different degrees of integrity.
See also Chapter 2 (The relation of oneself to one’s self).
50 Let me, at this point, briefly address an objection which some readers might be tempted to
raise, namely that I defend a private or egocentric perspective concerning values and ethical
action. Well, as this book is devoted to a person’s relation to herself qua self, I obviously am
concerned with a person’s own reflexive feelings and thougths, in other words, with her first-
personal perspective on her actions and herself. Regarding values, I am therefore focussing on
the impact of feelings and thoughts of wrongness of one’s actions on a person’s thoughts and
feelings concerning herself qua self. That focus, however, does, firstly, not imply that I, in
principle, dismiss the possibility of a third-personal view on the rightness or wrongness of
people’s actions. It, secondly, neither implies that a person’s values are individual character
quirks, so to speak – although it does not exclude the possibility that an individual character
quirk functions as a value in a person’s evaluative reasoning. And, finally, my focus does not
imply that I entertain the view that a person regards her action as wrong primarily or even solely
because of what that wrong action means to her self-conception. Nevertheless, a person cannot
regard her action as wrong without entertaining self-regarding thoughts and/or experiencing
reflexive emotions. In sum, I take the objection as a misinterpretation of my account.
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Let me again cite Kay Redfield Jamison to illustrate one’s desire for integrity.
I have, in my psychotic, seizurelike attacks – my black, agitated manias –
destroyed things I cherish, pushed to the utter edge people I love, and survived to
think I could never recover from the shame. […]
After each of my violent psychotic episodes, I had to try and reconcile my notion
of myself as a reasonably quiet-spoken and highly disciplined person, one at least
generally sensitive to moods and feelings of others, with an engaged, utterly
insane, and abusive woman who lost access to all control or reason. […]
These discrepancies between what one is, what one is brought up to believe is the
right way of behaving toward others, and what actually happens during these
awful black manias, or mixed states, are absolute and disturbing beyond
description […]51 
The author of these utterances is full of contrition; she obviously suffers from
what she did to her loved ones, but she also suffers from herself, because she
regularly behaves in a way that does not accord with her values. When engaged
in meta-reflection about her self, she makes explicit that she still cares about
being the kind of person who is disciplined, sensitive to moods and feelings of
others, and whose actions actually show that she cares for the people she loves.
She has a desire for integrity, even though she might (depending on the
frequency and severity of her violent psychotic episodes) never be able to
justifiably conceive of herself as actually being the kind of person that is guided
by the values she cares about – or rather, which she cares about in her non-
psychotic periods. 
People who engage in meta-reflection about their self, because they are
confronted with fragmentation of their self or with non-integrity of themselves,
experience a drastic instability of their self. They experience a lack of unity of
their self which deeply threatens their self-conception. And they often deeply
suffer from that experience and want to change themselves. Their emotions of
sadness and dissatisfaction about themselves – especially when confronted
with a fragmented self – and of shame, remorse, or contrition – especially when
confronted with non-integrity of themselves – are expressions of their desire
for unity of themselves qua self. And their struggle to reconcile their
incompatible notions of themselves or to re-establish their values in their life
is a striving for that unity. 
The inclination to strive for unity of our self is inherent to our conceiving of
ourselves as the protagonist of our developing autobiographical narrative and
to our conceiving of ourselves as being the kind of person who cares about
particular values. Both self-conceptions are characteristic of human persons.
And although both self-conceptions are acts of reflective self-awareness which
presuppose awareness of instability and changeability of the self, they are, at
the same time, compatible with our conceiving of ourselves as ‘something’
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constant, that is, as the self that has been and continues to be, because both
self-conceptions entail an inclination to strive for unity of our self. By entailing
the desire for unity of our self, they are thus compatible with the most basic
conception that we have of ourselves, namely the conception of ourselves as
the self that has been and continues to be, which in turn is based on our pre-
reflective sense of continued selfhood. No wonder that a person who does not
succeed in reconciling the different notions of herself or who even experiences
herself as different personalities ends up in a situation of mental crises.
To summarize: Firstly, meta-reflection about one’s self provides a model of
one’s self that is based on an explicit, conceptual and objectifying self-
thematization. Secondly, people, apart from exceptions, engage in reflexive
meta-reflection when they are triggered by certain experiences to reflect upon
their own life, when they are forced by the social group they belong to, and/or
are confronted with certain reflexive emotions like regret, remorse, contrition,
feeling guilty, sadness about themselves, or dissatisfaction with themselves.
Thirdly, people who engage in meta-reflection about their self, because they are
confronted with fragmentation of their self or with non-integrity of themselves,
experience a lack of unity of their self which deeply threatens their self-
conception. And their struggle to reconcile their incompatible notions of
themselves or to re-establish their values in their life is a striving for that unity.
Finally, one’s conception of oneself as the protagonist of one’s developing
autobiographical narrative and one’s conception of oneself as being the kind of
person who cares about particular values, although both self-conceptions are
acts of reflective self-awareness which presuppose awareness of instability and
changeability of the self, entail the desire for unity of the self. They are
therefore compatible with the most basic conception that we have of ourselves,
namely our conception of ourselves as the self that has been and continues to
be, which in turn is based on our pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood.
8 Conclusion
Personhood requires reflective self-awareness, thereby presupposing a pre-
reflective sense of continued selfhood. The most basic act of reflective self-
awareness is our conceiving of ourselves as ourselves. Reflective self-awareness
does not necessarily require conceptualization and symbolization of oneself
qua self. Our conceiving of ourselves as a rational agent, for example, becomes
evident in acts of self-reflection that are embedded in the context of a concrete
action without the person taking a detached stance towards herself qua self. 
When engaged in self-reflection – whether embedded, explicitly, or in form
of meta-reflection – we often experience a tension between our conceiving of
ourselves as one and the same self over time and our reflective awareness of the
changeability or instability of our self. I argued that we have the inclination to
strive to relieve that tension by desiring unity of our self, and that the desire for
unity of our self is entailed by specific self-conceptions that are characteristic
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of us: firstly, our conceiving of ourselves as a rational agent; secondly, our
conceiving of ourselves as the protagonist of our autobiographical narrative;
and, thirdly, our conceiving of ourselves as the kind of person that cares about
particular values.
The fact that persons desire unity of their self becomes evident in the
following acts of reflective self-awareness: (1) conceiving of one’s action as
irrational; (2) feeling the need to make changes of one’s personality intelligible
to oneself; (3) conceiving of one’s action as wrong; (4) experiencing
fragmentation of one’s self and feeling the need for reconciliation; and (5)
suffering from non-integrity of oneself. More specifically:
(1) conceiving of one’s action as irrational – when engaged in embedded or
explicit weak evaluation of one’s action – expresses one’s desire for
soundness of one’s will;
(2) feeling the need to make changes of one’s personality intelligible to
oneself – when engaged in explaining one’s actions to others or oneself
(presupposing that the person has the property of a narrative self-
conception) – expresses one’s desire for coherence of one’s self-narrative; 
(3) conceiving of one’s action as wrong, typically informed and accompanied
by emotions of regret or remorse – when engaged in embedded or explicit
strong evaluation of (one’s motive for) one’s action (presupposing that the
person has the property of applying qualitative standards to herself) –
expresses one’s desire for integrity of one’s self;
(4) experiencing fragmentation of one’s self and feeling the need for
reconciliation, often accompanied by emotions like sadness about oneself
or dissatisfaction with oneself, and trying to re-interpret one’s self and,
probably, to change oneself – when engaged in meta-reflection about
one’s self (presupposing that the person has the property of a narrative
self-conception) – expresses one’s desire for coherence of one’s self-
narrative; 
(5) suffering from non-integrity of oneself (that is, experiencing an
impossibility to justifiably conceive of oneself as actually being the kind
of person that is guided by the particular values one cares about),
normally accompanied by feelings of remorse or contrition, and trying to
change oneself – when engaged in meta-reflection about one’s self
(presupposing that the person has the property of applying qualitative
standards to herself) – expresses one’s desire for integrity of one’s self.
We would not experience divergence in our will, fragmentation of our self,
or non-integrity of our self if we did not, at the same time, conceive of our self
as one and the same constant ‘thing’ over time. And we, presumably, would not
so typically suffer from those experiences if our conceiving of ourselves as the
self that has been and continues to be were not the most basic conception that
we have of ourselves, which in turn is based on our pre-reflective sense of
identity over time. That is why I believe that our pre-reflective sense of identity
over time, finally, is the basis of our desire for unity of our self. Could our desire
for unity of our self be based on anything else?
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Chapter 6
Self-conception 
and the limits to dissociation 
As I am devoted to exploring our relation to our selves, the phenomenon of
dissociation from aspects of oneself, for example, from particular intentions,
actions, thoughts or experiences, calls for explanation. What exactly is
dissociation from oneself? Can we distinguish different kinds of dissociation
from oneself? Are their limits to a person’s dissociation from herself; or is a
complete dissociation conceivable? Answers to these questions are not of
philosophical interest only. The notion of dissociation is widely used in
psychology and psychiatry. It therefore seems to me that those sciences may
benefit from a philosophical clarification1 of the possibilities and
impossibilities of a person’s dissociation from aspects of herself.
I start from the assumption that we can distinguish between three
categories of dissociative phenomena: (1) lack of first-person access – a
dissociative state of mind that people can retrospectively become aware of,
for example, when you suddenly realize that you don’t know whether you
passed a particular point on your route; (2) dissociative experiences – for
example, when a certain impulse to act strikes you unexpectedly and,
although you do not understand that impulse to act, you cannot rid yourself
of it; and (3) dissociative mental acts – for example, when you distance
yourself from a former action, since you regard yourself as misled by others.
As my concern is with dissociations of ourselves from ourselves, that is to say,
with dissociations that we perform in contrast to dissociations that happen
to us, I will discuss phenomena of the first and second aforementioned
categories for the benefit of eventually getting to grips with the third. Next
to dissociative phenomena that are our shared experience, I will also examine
pathological cases. It is, however, not my primary concern to illuminate
pathological phenomena; they function like thought experiments. After all,
extreme cases are often helpful in clarifying and testing our (philosophical)
concepts.
I will argue that there are limits to a person’s dissociation from herself and
that these limits are not of a psychological but of a conceptual nature: certain
1 This is not to claim that this chapter on dissociation is in that sense unique. I refer to, for
example, Flanagan 1996, Radden 1999, Radden 2004, Stephens and Graham 2000, and a
number of papers published in Gallagher and Marcel 1999.
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dissociative mental acts are inconceivable on conceptual grounds. It would,
however, be impossible to argue for that claim without a robust
philosophical theory of the concept of a person in place. I will therefore
perform a conceptual analysis of the notion of dissociation in the light of a
philosophical account of being a person. The leading questions are: what
kinds of dissociations can count as dissociations of a person from her self and
what are the constraints on those dissociations? I take it to be fundamental
for being a person to conceive of oneself as oneself, though this fundamental
first-person self-conception does not require identification of oneself as
oneself or symbolization of oneself qua self. It will turn out to be crucial for
the proposed account of dissociation that first-person self-conceptions in
contrast to third-person self-conceptions – self-images of being such and
such or of being a certain kind of person – are not mediated by identification
or symbolization. 
I will begin with an exploration of the domain of dissociation and then
present a philosophical account of being a person. While unfolding that
account, I will successively argue which dissociations are conceptually
possible and which are impossible, respectively. Finally, I will – against the
background of my account of being a person – provide a concluding
overview of possible dissociations and of the limits to people’s dissociations.
1 The extreme case of dissociation
1.1  Taking the extreme case literally
The most extreme case of dissociation that we can think of – or rather, that
we can formulate – is a person’s dissociation from herself qua self. That
description may seem to apply to patients suffering from Dissociative
Identity Disorder. After all, those people seem to be able to switch from their
current self to one of their alters. Whether interpreted as a person’s
dissociative mental act or as something that happens to her, characterizing
that phenomenon as dissociation from one’s self sounds paradoxical. Do
people speak metaphorically when they talk about dissociation from one’s
self, or do they mean what they literally say, namely that there still is a self
and that the self-self relation has collapsed? I take the case of dissociation
from one’s self as the most extreme case on the grounds that the person’s self-
self relation must have collapsed.2 After all, a person who is dissociated from
her self must have lost her capability to conceive of herself as herself, in
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strike us as extreme as well, although in another sense. G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham,
for example, refer to a paper that describes the case of a patient who experiences his head as
alien; see Stephens and Graham 2000, p. 122. I will here not pay attention to that kind of
dissociative phenomena.
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other words, she must have lost the quality of being a self-comprehending
creature. But is this possible?
Let us have a look at both the conceiving and the conceived side of the
dissociation relation. Firstly, with respect to the conceiving side: In order for
a person to perform a dissociative mental act or to have a dissociative
experience, she has to conceive of herself as herself, in that moment. And if
a person conceives of herself as herself in the moment of dissociation, then
her self is on the side of the conceiver not of the conceived. In other words,
her (pre-)reflective awareness of being-self is on the subject side of the
dissociation relation not on the object side, so to speak. Hence (regarding
the conceiving side of the dissociation relation) the person is not dissociated
from herself qua self. 
Secondly, with respect to the conceived side: In order for a person to
dissociate herself or to experience herself as dissociated from her self, she
has to conceive of herself as having ‘that self ’. We do, however, not first-
personally conceive of ourselves as having (or being) this or that self. Such
a self-conception would be highly reflective (we might even say hyper-
reflective); it would require conceptualization of having or being a particular
self, which in turn means symbolization of one’s self. Conceiving of oneself
as oneself, by contrast, means nothing more than being reflectively aware of
oneself, or, in my terminology, conceiving of oneself as being-self. It requires
neither conceptualization of oneself qua self nor symbolization of one’s self.
Therefore, a person cannot dissociate herself or experience herself as
dissociated from her self. Hence, it is simply impossible to make sense of the
notion of dissociation from oneself qua self – at least, if we take that
expression literally, namely as a person’s dissociation from her fundamental
first-person self-conception of herself as herself.
This argument against the possibility of a person’s dissociation from her
self obviously presupposes a certain concept of a person and the self.
Although that concept has not been presented yet3, I decided not to delay my
rejection of the extreme case for two reasons: firstly, the idea that such an
extreme case might be possible may keep us busy – if only as a background
thought; secondly, my denial of this extreme case sheds light on the theory
that will emerge.
1.2  Some non-literal interpretations of the extreme case
Since I first linked the notion of dissociation from oneself qua self with
patients that suffer from Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) and then
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chapters, but I remind the reader that this book is also suitable for selective reading. The reader
who has read all foregoing chapters will, I promise, discover new implications of my account of
personhood.
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argued that that notion is paradoxical and meaningless, I want to emphasize
that I do not want to downplay the seriousness of DID. More specifically, I
do not deny that there is something it is like for DID patients to be multiples
or to have alters. The pathological phenomenon of people who seem to
experience themselves as multiple by far exceeds the normal situation of
persons conceiving of themselves as playing various roles. Let me briefly
speculate about some alternative interpretations of that phenomenon,
thereby introducing some of the notions and distinctions that we will need
in a convincing account of ‘dissociation from oneself’. 
Firstly (a very speculative proposal), there might be human bodies in-
habited by multiple selves. Think of streams of consciousness that are not
integrated, thereby presupposing that acts of conscious (self-)awareness are
relative to one of those separate streams. Sydney Shoemaker’s remark
regarding a thought experiment discussed by Parfit may illustrate that
option:
Suppose that Parfit’s description of his case is right, i.e., that both streams of
consciousness belong to one person, and suppose that a particular experience, say
a pain, occurs in one stream but not in the other. Was that experience conscious?
One might suppose that this translates into the question: “Was the person
conscious of it?” But the answer to that question seems to be: “Yes and no. He was
conscious of it in the right hemisphere, but not conscious of it in the left
hemisphere.” This suggests that the property of being conscious is really a relational
one, and that our example should be described as one in which the experience is
conscious relative to one stream and not relative to the other.4
If this option were real, that is to say, if people with completely separate
streams of consciousness existed, then DID patients might be such people.
These people would lack first-person access to (and thus first-person
knowledge of) everything that occurs in their non-current streams of
consciousness, while still conceiving of themselves as themselves. 
In a second interpretation of the phenomenon of multiples, DID
patients might ‘just’ have ego-alien experiences and attribute them to their
alters. Having ego-alien experiences means that a person experiences
certain of her actions, thoughts, intentions, experiences, or perceptions as
ego-alien or emanating from an alien source.5 The attribution of these
experiences to an alter must be based on the delusion of having
(particular) alters.
Proponents of a third interpretation suggest that multiples have a
dissociative capacity, which has developed in childhood due to emotional,
physical and sexual abuse, to avoid experiencing a certain episode. 
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5 This kind of dissociative experiences is also called ‘disownership’ experiences; see, for
example, Radden 1999, p. 350.
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To put it roughly, through dissociation the subject is able to avoid experiencing
or dealing with an intolerable episode by turning it over to an alternate
personality (or alter) who undergoes those experiences in his place.6
If this interpretation is correct and multiples indeed can bring about such
dissociations, the question still is whether those dissociative mental acts can
count as acts of the person qua person (that is to say, qua self-comprehending
creature) or whether the dissociative acts take place on a sub-personal level.
In my view, the dissociations may either be coping strategies of the human
organism and just happen to the person, or the person may indirectly be able
to bring about the dissociative state of mind, for example by self-hypnosis7.
Anyway, on this interpretation, the person (qua person) lacks first-person
access to ‘her’ perceptions, sensations, desires, beliefs, intentions and actions,
during a certain period. 
A fourth interpretation is characterized by scepticism regarding the
proliferation of selves. Owen Flanagan writes:
It is not at all surprising that a person with powers to do so might create an alter
to fend off the pain of abuse and the recognition that someone he or she loves is
an abuser. But it is obscure why there is so often proliferation beyond one alter.
One hypothesis is that proliferation is a complex effect of therapeutic suggestion,
involving the therapist’s belief in multiplicity and his conveying to the patient the
possibility of fitting the description (indeed, a savvy patient may well know that
multiplicity is a genuine and increasingly popular way to be damaged or express
damage).8
Since this chapter is not devoted to the phenomenon of Dissociative Identity
Disorder but to the notion of a person’s dissociation from herself qua self, I
do not examine whether the above list of possible interpretations is
exhaustive, whether DID is a container notion for various disorders, or
whether a certain interpretation may be rejected by psychologists,
psychiatrists, or neuroscientists. What I claim is this: DID patients may lack
first-person access to certain perceptions, sensations, intentions or actions,
they may have ego-alien experiences, they may have the self-image of being
a multiple, they may have developed the ability to indirectly bring about a
dissociative state of mind, for example by self-hypnosis, but the phenomenon
of DID cannot be described as a person’s dissociation from her self – at least,
if we do not speak metaphorically but mean what we literally say.
6 Owen Flanagan citing the philosopher Stephen E. Braude, see Flanagan 1996, p. 75 (italics in
original).
7 Owen Flanagan mentions the possibility that DID depends, among other things, on the
individual’s “powerful abilities to self-hypnotize”; see Flanagan 1996, p. 76. 
8 Flanagan 1996, pp. 75-76.
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Dissociation of oneself from oneself qua self (or being dissociated from
oneself qua self) is not the most extreme case of dissociation but a
conceptually impossible one. This is, however, not to say that the notion of
alters is abandoned from our further investigation of the domain of
dissociation. 
2 A wide notion of dissociation
2.1  Relevant distinctions
The notion of dissociation is ambiguous. Its meaning ranges from, firstly,
distancing yourself from someone or something, via, secondly, temporary
disintegration of your thoughts and activities, to, finally, pathological
situations of thought insertion and Dissociative Identity Disorder – to
name just some of the contexts where we apply the term dissociation. In
the next three subsections, I will investigate the domain of dissociation in
the aforementioned broad sense of the notion. 
My primary structuring criterion is the active-passive distinction; more
specifically, I distinguish people’s dissociative acts from dissociations that
happen to them. Unsurprisingly, the first category consists of phenomena
of evaluative dissociations. Later on, in the light of a robust philosophical
account of self-conception, we will be able to further subdivide that
category. The second category, that is, dissociations that happen to us, will
be subdivided into phenomena of dissociative experiences and of lack of
first-person access; the former are experienced at the time of the
dissociative state whereas the latter are not. 
Phenomena of lack of first-person access are further subdivided into,
firstly, a temporary lack of first-person access to certain perceptions,
sensations, actions, and memories; secondly, a more or less permanent lack
of first-person access to certain desires, beliefs, and intentions; and, thirdly,
in case of multiples, lack of first-person access to one’s alters. Phenomena
of dissociative experiences are subdivided into: firstly, experiences of non-
rational agency, that is, knowing what you are doing but not understanding
why you are doing what you are doing; secondly, non-agency experiences,
that is, experiencing yourself as the subject of your thoughts, feelings,
impulses for actions, or actions, without experiencing yourself as their
source; and, thirdly, experiencing oneself as a multiple. We will notice that
various non-pathological forms of dissociative experiences and lack of
first-person access are not extraordinary, but seem to be a normal human
condition.
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2.2  Dissociations that happen to us: lack of first-person access
Most people will recognize the following scenario from their own experience:
Driving on autopilot, you suddenly recognize that you do not know whether
you passed a particular point on the route. You then come to realize that you
must have had certain perceptions and must have performed adequate
actions in order to manoeuvre your car through the traffic. But you were not
reflectively aware of them; you lacked first-person access to those perceptions
and actions. We might say that you were in a dissociative state of mind, that
is to say, the set of your psychological states – for example, your perceptions
of the environment and your conscious experiences – was temporarily
disintegrated.
People are frequently and regularly in situations where they lack first-
person access to certain perceptions, sensations, actions, and memories. Just
think of the enormous number of routine actions that we perform daily: we
act purposefully, react adequately to perceptions and sensations, and adjust
the chain of activities if necessary, but we are not reflectively aware of what
we experience and which activities we perform. Hence, lack of first-person
access seems to be a normal human condition.
The phenomenon of lack of first-person access has a second variant. We
do not only temporarily lack first-person access to certain of our
psychological states (like in the auto-pilot case), we also seem to lack first-
person access to certain desires, beliefs, and intentions, more or less
permanently. A person may, for instance, sincerely deny that she holds a
particular set of beliefs or has certain desires, although these beliefs and
desires – in the view of her observers – seem to manifest themselves in her
behaviour. Presumably this happens in cases of repressed beliefs or desires.9
Although the person in question may indeed lack first-person access to those
beliefs and desires, one’s repressed beliefs and desires are (by their nature), in
principle, candidates for first-person self-knowledge. Other mental states, by
contrast, may be subconscious in ways described by Freud and by their very
nature not possible subjects of first-person self-knowledge. And if, as Freud
claimed, such subconscious mental states are a characteristic part (the ‘Es’)
of human consciousness, then a dissociated state of mind regarding some
desires, beliefs, and intentions is characteristic of human consciousness. 
In a third variant – the pathological case of Dissociative Identity Disorder –
lack of first-person access seems to be a switching condition regarding various
selves of those people. If we take the speculative interpretation that those
people actually have different selves for granted, we may characterize this
phenomenon of lack of first-person access in the following way: The person is
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9 One might label such phenomena self-deceptions. What is important in the context of this
discussion of ‘dissociations that happen to us’, however, is the fact that the person in question
indeed lacks first-person access to those beliefs or desires, and this situation might not obtain for
all kinds of self-deceptions (see also notes 23 and 31 in this chapter).
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reflectively aware of, for example, her intentions, perceptions, and actions
(during their actual occurrence and) when the same self is the dominant self,
but she is not aware of those intentions, perceptions, and actions in periods
in which another self is dominant. 
This (third) variant of lack of first-person access is similar to the second
in the sense that other selves of a person and those selves’ desires, beliefs,
intentions, perceptions, sensations, and memories might be called
subconscious with respect to the person’s current self-consciousness.
Nevertheless, the third variant differs from the second: Depending on which
self of a person is in charge, desires, beliefs, intentions, perceptions,
sensations, and memories seem to switch from sub-consciousness to
consciousness, so to speak. The third variant also differs from the first (that
is, temporary lack of first-person access to certain perceptions, sensations,
actions, and memories). After all, although a person who is a multiple might
come to realize – like the person driving on autopilot – that she qua human
being must have had certain perceptions and must have performed certain
actions, for example, in order to have arrived at her current location, she
nevertheless does not believe that she must have had those perceptions and
must have performed those actions.
The phenomena of lack of first-person access might give rise to the
following question: Can people by their own mental act bring about a state of
mind in which they are not conscious of certain of their perceptions,
sensations, actions, memories, desires, beliefs, and intentions? We might
grant that possibility. Don’t people bring about such dissociative states of
mind by their own decision, for example by taking drugs? Well, perhaps
indirectly – presuming that drugs can indeed cause dissociative states of mind
and that people sometimes take drugs by their own decision to attain a
dissociative state of mind. But those people still do not bring about the
dissociative state of mind by their own mental act; they merely take a drug –
hoping that it will cause a dissociative state of mind.10 Even if some people
were able to bring about a dissociative state of mind by their own mental act,
for example by applying meditation techniques, those mental acts, as it will
emerge in due course, cannot count as dissociative acts from aspects of
themselves.
2.3  Dissociations that happen to us: dissociative experiences
Let us now turn to a second category of dissociations, which I label
dissociative experiences. Think, for example, of yourself going to the kitchen
and coming to realize that you do not know why you are doing what you are
doing. In that situation, you experience yourself as the subject of your activity
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10 This is not to deny that people might be held responsible for the consequences of taking that
drug.
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of going to the kitchen, but you do not know the reason for your going to the
kitchen. Therefore, you do not experience yourself as a rational agent, in that
situation.11 After all, although you know what you are doing, you do not
understand what you are doing. This experience is a dissociative experience.
You experience yourself qua rational agent, who therefore has the disposition
to conceive of her actions as actions based on reasons, as dissociated from
your own activity. This kind of dissociative experience may best be described
as an experience of non-rational agency. Like the recognition of lack of first-
person access to certain perceptions, sensations, and activities, experiences of
non-rational agency are not extraordinary but our shared experience.
A non-rational agency experience is similar to the phenomenon of
temporarily lacking first-person access to one’s actions in the sense that, in
both cases, the dissociation is not a conscious mental activity of the person
but something that happens to her. However, the former differs from the latter
because a person who has a non-rational agency experience is conscious of
her action but does (temporarily) not remember the purpose of that action,
whereas in the ‘autopilot case’ the person is not conscious of her actions, but
she knows their purpose, that is to say, she knows that she acted in pursuit of
a particular goal – for example, driving to the station. 
Next to experiences of non-rational agency, we can distinguish a second
kind of dissociative experiences, which are sometimes referred to as
‘disownership’ experiences12, but which I – for reasons that shortly will
become clear – label non-agent experiences. To start with, there are pathological
cases. People may, for instance, experience certain of their thoughts as alien
or as emanating from an alien source (this phenomenon is known as ‘thought
insertion’ and is associated with schizophrenia).13 Similar phenomena are
experiences of alien feelings or of ‘made’ volitional acts. Jennifer Radden, for
example, describes a patient’s experience of ‘dissociated will’:
The patient feels that her actions result from a consciousness and will other than
her own. Not merely does she experience an irresistible and unwanted impulse
whose origin feels to be external, however. In addition, the impulses in and
movements carried out by her body feel to be another’s. Rather than being active
in bringing them about, she experiences her body as the other’s passive
instrument.14
Although patients who suffer from ‘made’ actions, ‘made’ impulses to act,
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11 Obviously, there are diverging philosophical accounts of what kinds of behavioural structures
count as rational actions. As I take it, a person conceives of what she does (or did) as a rational
action if she understands what she does (or did), that is to say, if she knows the reason for her
action. I elaborated on my account of rational agency in Chapter 2 (The relation of oneself to
one’s self). See also this chapter, Section 3.5 (Conceiving of oneself as a rational agent).
12 See Radden 1999, p. 350.
13 See Radden 1999, p. 350.
14 Radden 1999, p. 351.
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inserted feelings, or inserted thoughts experience those actions, impulses to
act, feelings, or thoughts as ego-alien, they nonetheless experience them as
theirs – at least, in a certain restricted sense: these thoughts or impulses to act
are still experienced as happening to them but they lack the quality of
‘mineness’ (as, for example, Jennifer Radden15, and G. Lynn Stephens and
George Graham16 convincingly argue). Thus, in the sense of ownership of the
experience, the patients ascribe the thoughts and impulses to themselves,
while in the sense of ownership of the mental action, they ascribe them to other
sources.17 I call this kind of dissociative experiences non-agent experiences,
since the person does not experience herself as the source of her thoughts,
feelings, impulses for actions, or actions, while still experiencing herself as
their subject. 
Not all non-agent experiences are pathological, however. There seem to be
normal (that is to say, non-pathological) non-agent experiences too. Harry
Frankfurt describes an example:
[T]here are obsessional thoughts, whose provenances may be obscure and of which
we cannot rid ourselves; thoughts that strike us unexpectedly out of the blue; and
thoughts that run willy-nilly through our heads.18 
Such experiences can indeed count as non-agent experiences, since those
thoughts seem to happen to us instead of, as Harry Frankfurt points out, being
something we think.19 But it seems to me that they are experienced as less alien
than the pathological cases in which a person, for instance, experiences
thoughts “as of their having been placed in the patient’s mind from some
outside source”20.
Our brief discussion of experiencing ego-alien experiences could lead to the
view that multiples ‘simply’ have pathological non-agent experiences.21 The
only difference would be that patients with Dissociative Identity Disorder
ascribe the experiences in question to a particular alter of themselves, instead
of ascribing them to an alien source. There is, however, an important
158 • Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations
15 See Radden 1999, especially p. 351. Radden in turn refers to writings of G. Lynn Stephens and
George Graham, who make a subject-agent distinction in a person’s self-ascription of a mental
episode; see Radden 1999, pp. 354-355.
16 See Stephens and Graham 2000, for example, pp. 152-153.
17 If this is right, then Shoemaker’s view on the self-intimation of, for example, our beliefs or
desires (see Shoemaker 1990, pp. 50-52) needs refinement. The self-intimation of beliefs or
desires would turn out to be a partial self-intimation, so to speak, namely, ‘merely’ concerning
one’s own experience of the belief or desire, not concerning that belief or desire being one’s own
mental act. 
18 Frankfurt 1976, p. 59.
19 See Frankfurt 1976, p. 59.
20 Radden 1999, p. 350.
21 I mentioned this view as one of the possible interpretations of DID in Section 1.2 (Some non-
literal interpretations of the extreme case).
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distinction between those two kinds of dissociative experiences. The patients
suffering from, for example, ego-alien impulses to act or ego-alien actions still
conceive of themselves as the subjects of those ego-alien experiences.
Multiples, by contrast, do not conceive of themselves as the subject of the
thoughts or actions of their alters – otherwise they would not be multiples.
I must admit that I believe that a multiple’s conception of herself as being a
multiple is based on, for example, ego-alien experiences or recognitions of lack
of first-person access to certain episodes, accompanied by the belief that she is
a multiple, rather than on (dissociative) experiences of being a multiple.22 In
contrast to the other two kinds of dissociative experiences, I just cannot think
of any situation whatsoever where something like experiencing oneself as a
multiple occurs to people as a normal dissociative experience. Therefore I
cannot – by extrapolation from those normal dissociative experiences –
imagine how it might be like for multiples to be different selves. This is an
important difference with other peculiar cases of dissociated minds. After all,
we know from ‘normal’ experiences, firstly, what it is like to have a dissociative
experience of non-rational agency (that is, knowing what one is doing, but not
knowing why); therefore we have a glimpse of what it might be like to have,
for example, Alzheimer’s disease. We know, secondly, what it is like to have a
dissociative experience of non-agency (that is, experiencing oneself as the
subject of, for example, certain thoughts but not as their source); and therefore
we have a glimpse of what it might be like, for instance, to experience thoughts
as inserted or to experience an irresistible impulse whose origin feels to be
external. But there is, to my knowledge, no non-pathological variant of the
dissociative experience of being different selves – if what it is like for DID
patients to be different selves can count as an experience at all.
2.4 Dissociative mental acts of a person qua person:
evaluative dissociations
Although the question may sound odd at first sight, we might ask whether
people by their own mental act can bring about a state of mind in which they
have dissociative experiences, instead of the dissociated state of mind just
happening to them. In everyday language, we say about people that they
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22 An objector might try to brush aside my speculations on the experience of being a multiple
by doubting whether a multiple ever experiences herself as a multiple. The objector might
suggest that multiples just experience one alter at a time. I share the objector’s doubt. Her
suggestion, however, that multiples experience one alter at a time describes – in the light of my
account of self-conceptions – a conceptually impossible situation. I have not yet – at least, in this
chapter – presented the conceptual apparatus to discuss that suggestion, but here is a brief
argumentation: Persons, first-personally, don’t experience this or that self; they just experience
(and conceive of) themselves as being-self – the self that has been and continues to be. I refer to
Section 3 (Self-conception), especially the discussion on multiples in Section 3.4 (Dissociation
and pre-reflective self-awareness).
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dissociate themselves from someone or something if they say or show that they
are not connected with the person or thing in question (usually in order to
avoid trouble or blame). Here the term ‘dissociation’ refers to a person’s explicit
dissociative reflective act.
All dissociative reflective acts that are reflexive by nature are relevant to our
analysis; more specifically, all kinds of reflective dissociations from ‘aspects’ of
oneself, for example, from particular desires, intentions, beliefs, actions,
decisions, adopted goals and plans, or things one cares about, are important.
Think of a person who tries to resist her desire for chocolate because of
regarding that desire as resulting from an addiction – she distances herself from
her desire to eat chocolate.23 Or think of a person who does not feel responsible
for a former action because of regarding herself as the victim of a deception and
her action as based on that deception; this person distances herself from the
action in question. I label this kind of dissociation evaluative dissociation. The
evaluative act may be retrospective or, as it is in the first example, embedded
in the context of deliberation about one’s current or a future action. 
Evaluative dissociation clearly is a dissociative act on the level of the person.
It requires reflection on one’s actions or desires. And to reflect on one’s actions
or desires in turn requires having the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself,
and of oneself as the subject of those actions and desires. This capacity is the
fundamental feature of personhood. Therefore a mental act that requires that
capacity is a mental act on the level of the person. It remains to be seen which
‘aspects’ of a person might be objects of her evaluative dissociation; after all, we
are concerned with the limits to a person’s dissociation from herself. 
3 Self-conception
Without a philosophical theory of the concept of a person in place, it is
impossible to propose a defensible set of answers to the questions that arose
during our analysis of the notion of dissociation.24 How could we ever decide
whether certain dissociative phenomena may count as dissociative mental acts
of a person qua person, in other words, as dissociative mental acts on a
personal level, if we did not presuppose a concept of a person? We need a
concept of a person in order to find out which aspects of ourselves we can
dissociate from and which aspects are such that we cannot dissociate from
them. On the other hand, attempts to provide an intelligible and coherent set
of answers to questions concerning the limits to a person’s dissociation from
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23 It is arguable that certain acts of evaluative dissociations – for example, distancing oneself
from one’s desire for chocolate because of regarding that desire as resulting from an addiction –
can count as self-deceptions. However, that qualification is not relevant for the phenomenon to
count as an act of evaluative dissociation. 
24 I must admit that my view of the concept of a person (that is, persons count as persons owing
to their capacity to conceive of themselves as themselves) has already crept into my description
of the various phenomena of dissociation.
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herself may enhance our understanding of the concept of a person and its
implications, and may help to fine-tune the concept. 
3.1  First-person and third-person self-conception
I take a person to be a creature that conceives of herself as the subject of her
current perceptions, sensations, desires, beliefs, intentions, actions,
thoughts, and memories, and that conceives of those perceptions, intentions,
actions, thoughts, etcetera as her perceptions, intentions, actions, and
thoughts. A person ascribes her current perceptions, intentions, actions,
thoughts, etcetera to herself based on her first-person access to those
perceptions, intentions, actions, and thoughts. It is characteristic of first-
person access to, for example, our perceptions or thoughts, that we have
direct knowledge of those perceptions and thoughts; that is to say, we do not
come to know that we have certain perceptions or thoughts by observing
ourselves having those perceptions or thoughts, and by identifying ourselves
as ourselves. Self-ascriptions that are based on first-person access do not
require mediation by observation of oneself (or introspection of one’s
psychological states) and identification of oneself as oneself.25 Ernst
Tugendhat calls our knowledge that these predicates apply to ourselves
“unmediated epistemic self-consciousness” (“unmittelbares epistemisches
Selbstbewußtsein”26). He characterizes these kinds of self-ascriptions in the
following way: we ascribe certain predicates to ourselves “not only by actually
25 I thus reject a perceptual model of such self-ascriptions. In a perceptual model, a person comes
to know that she has a certain thought or desire by (a kind of) perception of that thought or
desire. The problem with the perceptual model of self-conceptions is that one’s first-person self-
ascriptions – for instance, one’s conception of one’s thought as one’s thought – and, in the end,
one’s fundamental self-conception of oneself as oneself turn out to be susceptible to the error of
misidentification. After all, how could we explain – if the conceived ‘thing’ is an object of the
conceiver’s perception – that a person indeed relates to herself as herself when she conceives of
her thought as her thought? How could we know that the object = the subject? We might
misidentify ourselves. By contrast, according to the presented account of first-person self-
conceptions, which rejects a perceptual model, we do not identify ourselves at all. For detailed
argumentations against the perceptual model – also called “Reflexionsmodell” (Tugendhat’s and
Frank’s term) – or, more generally, the subject-object model of self-consciousness, I refer to
Shoemaker 1986, especially pp. 11-17, Tugendhat 1979, for example, pp. 69-62, Frank 2002, for
example, pp. 130-133, and Zahavi and Parnas 1999, especially pp. 261-263. For a denial of the
possibility of misidentification, see, for example, Baker 2000, pp. 70-71 and 136-137, Shoemaker
1986, pp. 11-12, Tugendhat 1979, especially p. 83, or Zahavi and Parnas 1999, p. 262.
26 Tugendhat 1979, p. 27: “Genauer müssen wir vom unmittelbaren epistemischen Selbst-
bewußtsein sprechen, in Abgrenzung gegen einen weiteren Begriff von epistemischem Selbst-
bewußtsein, der alles Wissen umfaßt, das sich in Sätzen der Form “ich weiß, daß ich - - -”
artikuliert. Denn es gibt natürlich Sätze dieser Form, in denen das Prädikat nicht für einen
Zustand steht, der bewußt ist, für einen Zustand, von dem der betreffende ein unmittelbares
Wissen hat. Solche Sätze können sowohl meine Person als köperliche betreffen […] als auch
meinen Charakter und meine Verhaltensweisen […].” (Italics in original) 
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saying ‘I’ but from the perspective of saying ‘I’”.27 Inspired by Tugendhat’s
explications28, I call self-conceptions that are based on first-person access first-
person self-conceptions.
Ascribing certain intentions or thoughts to oneself does not only mean that
that person conceives of herself as having those intentions or thoughts but also
that the person conceives of herself as herself. First-person self-ascriptions like
‘I am terrified’ (‘I’, in the sense of ‘I know’), ‘I hear a noise,’ ‘I am just thinking
about this sentence’, or ‘I am just drinking water’ are evidences of the person’s
(reflective) capability to conceive of herself as herself. In other words,
conceiving of oneself as oneself is implied by the more specific first-person self-
conceptions. If a person did not conceive of herself as herself, she could not
ascribe to herself anything whatsoever. 
Conceiving of oneself as oneself is what Lynne Rudder Baker calls a highly
developed form of a first-person perspective; it is the “defining characteristic of
all persons”29. The capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself is essential to
being a person, because the persistence of a person as a person depends on that
capacity. This means, for example, that a person who does not conceive of
herself as herself anymore in fact has ceased to exist qua person.30 I call the
conception of ourselves as ourselves the fundamental first-person self-conception.
Although conceiving of oneself as oneself clearly is an act of reflective self-
awareness, this kind of reflective self-awareness (like the specific first-person
self-ascriptions of, for example, having a certain thought) does not imply that
the person, in that reflective act, takes a detached stance towards herself,
identifies herself as herself, or conceptualizes and symbolizes herself qua self.
By contrast, a person’s conception of herself as a certain kind of person, for
example as someone who is sensitive to the feelings of others, requires that the
person takes a detached stance towards herself qua self, thereby
conceptualizing and symbolizing herself qua self. That kind of self-conception
requires the formation or entertainment of a certain self-image. Think, for
example, of a person’s conception of herself as pursuing a certain long-term
goal, for instance of becoming a physician; or think of a person’s conception of
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27 Tugendhat 1979, p. 87, my translation. The German original reads: “[Es gibt] nämlich
Prädikate, die ich mir nicht nur faktisch “ich”-sagend, sondern aus der Perspektive des “ich”-
Sagens zuspreche”.
28 In his book Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung, Ernst Tugendhat distinguishes between
unmediated epistemic self-consciousness (“unmittelbares epistemisches Selbstbewußtsein”) and
mediated epistemic self-consciousness (“mittelbares epistemisches Selbstbewußtsein”); see
Tugendhat 1979, especially pp. 27 and 85-87. I was inspired by his explications to draw a clear
distinction between self-ascriptions based on first-person and third-person access, respectively.
29 See Baker 2000, p. 91.
30 More specifically, ceasing to exist qua person means ceasing to exist simpliciter. Nevertheless,
the body that formerly constituted the person may still be a (human) creature that has the
capacity of being pre-reflectively aware of itself. That creature might be able to perform acts of
self-awareness without being self-conscious in the fullest sense, that is to say, without having the
capacity of being reflectively aware of itself.
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herself as having a certain biography, for instance of being the victim of slander
and malicious intent in crucial situations of her life.31 Both self-conceptions
require a self-image, however vague that may be. After all, in order to conceive
of yourself as becoming a physician or as being betrayed by others in various
situations in your life, you have to think of yourself qua self in other
circumstances in the future or in the past; and that means that you perform an
act of mediated reflective self-awareness – mediated by your conceptualization
and symbolization of yourself qua self. Self-images also presuppose mediation
by identification. And in certain cases, this mediation by identification is
especially obvious; think of my self-conception of being C.S. or of my visual
image of myself as a 2-year-old child. In short, self-images are not intrinsically
reflexive; they are mediated self-conceptions – mediated by symbolization and
identification. I label them third-person self-conceptions.
It is characteristic of all these kinds of mediated self-knowledge that it is in
principle available to others in the same way as to myself, probably even easier.
Whether I was born in Berlin is better known by my mother than by myself.
Whether I am cowardly or not is not something that I can have direct knowledge
of; it can only become evident in my actions.32 
Needless to say that in order for a creature to have third-person self-
conceptions, that creature has to conceive of herself as herself. 
To sum up: (1) first-person self-ascriptions are not mediated by
identification, or conceptualization and symbolization; (2) first-person self-
ascriptions are evidences of the person’s capacity to conceive of herself as
herself; and the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself is the fundamental
first-person self-conception, because one’s personhood depends on that
capacity; (3) third-person self-conceptions are mediated self-conceptions
(self-images) – mediated by identification, or conceptualization and
symbolization; (4) third-person self-conceptions presuppose the capacity to
conceive of oneself as oneself. 
3.2  Dissociation and first- and third-person self-conceptions
The fact that self-images are mediated by identification, or conceptualization
and symbolization makes it intelligible that we can (easily) dissociate
ourselves from former self-images by referring to external or internal
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what we want to believe about ourselves; and some people may even be massively self-deceived. 
32 Tugendhat 1979, p. 27, my translation. The German original reads: “Charakteristisch für alle
diese Weisen des nicht unmittelbaren Wissens von sich ist, daß solches Wissen einem Anderen
in prinzipiell derselben Weise und gegebenfalls sogar leichter zugänglich ist. Ob ich in Berlin
geboren bin, weiß meine Mutter besser als ich. Ob ich feige bin oder nicht, davon habe ich kein
unmittelbares Wissen, das kann sich nur in meinen Handlungen zeigen.”
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conditions that influenced our former identification, or conceptualization
and symbolization. Such dissociative acts are acts of evaluative dissociation.
A person may, for example, distance herself from her former, youngish self-
image of becoming a veterinary surgeon because of now regarding that self-
image as influenced by films and literature. Another person may distance
herself from her former self-image of being continuously betrayed by others
because of now regarding that self-image as influenced by her depressive
moods. And it is conceivable that I would distance myself from my former
self-conception of being C.S. if I now regarded that self-conception as based
on wrong information.
But could I distance myself then, in the very same moment, from that
understanding? No, because in that case I would not conceive of myself as
myself, in the current moment. My understanding of something, in the
present moment, my regarding something as such and such, in that moment,
my conceiving at all is inextricably bound up with my conceiving of myself
as myself, in that very same moment. J. David Velleman writes: 
If there is a part of your personality with which you necessarily think about things,
then it will be your mental standpoint, always presenting a reflexive aspect to your
thought. You will be able to think about this part of your personality as “it,” but
only from a perspective in which it continues to function as the thinking “I” […] A
person can never conceive of his own conceptual capacity from a purely third-
personal perspective, because he can conceive of it only with that capacity, and
hence from a perspective in which it continues to occupy first-person position […]
[H]e cannot attain a cognitive perspective from which his understanding isn’t “I”.33 
But how about dissociations from one’s first-person self-conceptions? If first-
person self-ascriptions of our current desires, intentions, thoughts, or actions
do not require mediation by identifying oneself as oneself, or by
conceptualizing and symbolizing oneself qua self, how then can we ever
dissociate ourselves from certain of those desires, intentions, thoughts, or
actions? Well, we can obviously retrospectively distance ourselves from
certain of our desires, intentions, thoughts, or actions by regarding them, for
example, as caused by excessive alcohol consumption. Retrospective
evaluative dissociation, however, cannot count as (part of) a first-person self-
conception. It is a detached reflective act of self-awareness that requires
thinking of oneself in other circumstances in the past; it is hence performed
in the context of one’s current third-person self-conceptions.
But people sometimes distance themselves from, for example, certain of
their current desires or actions, while still ascribing those desires or actions
to themselves (otherwise they could not distance themselves from those
desires or actions). Take the example of a person who has a strong desire for
chocolate, and let us imagine and examine possible cases of dissociations
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from that desire. Firstly, a person, who wants herself not to be moved by her
current desire for chocolate, might try to reject or suppress that desire. She,
in a certain sense, distances herself from her desire for chocolate by – in a
Frankfurtian sense – not identifying with that desire. But can this rejection
of her desire count as an act of dissociation from her current desire? It
depends. Assuming that the person experiences herself not only as the
subject of her desire for chocolate but also as the source of that desire (as the
one who brings that desire about, so to speak), then her rejection of her
desire for chocolate cannot count as an act of dissociation. However (and
that is the second case), the person might try to resist her desire for chocolate
by regarding that desire as, for instance, resulting from a chocolate addiction.
This person experiences herself as the subject of her desire for chocolate but
not as its source. She has a dissociative experience of non-agency and may
therefore distance herself from her desire for chocolate. This person’s
rejection of her desire for chocolate can count as a dissociative act, and it is
indeed part of a first-person self-conception – after all, the person conceives
of her desire for chocolate as her desire, at least in the sense of being the
subject of that desire. Now consider a third case. A person has a desire for
chocolate that she experiences as ego-alien, as a ‘made’ desire, so to speak;
she experiences her body as another’s passive instrument. The person might
try to resist that alien impulse to eat chocolate. Does this person dissociate
herself from her desire and impulse to eat chocolate, and, if so, is that
dissociative act part of a first-person self-conception? The answer, although
this case is pathological, does not differ from the second case. The person
distances herself from her ego-alien desire for chocolate – from an ego-alien
aspect of herself, so to speak – as part of her current first-person self-
conception. To avoid misunderstanding: not her dissociative experience
counts as a dissociative act; the dissociative act is embedded in her self-
ascription (which is a reflective act of self-awareness) of having an ego-alien
desire for chocolate. 
This leads to the following tentative conclusions. Firstly, we can dissociate
ourselves from our former third-person or first-person self-conceptions.
These dissociations are phenomena of retrospective evaluative dissociation.
They require a detached stance towards ourselves qua self and are performed
in the context of one’s current third-person self-conception. Secondly, in
special cases, dissociative acts can be embedded in people’s current first-
person self-conceptions, namely when they, based on pathological
experiences of non-agency regarding, for example, their current desire or
action, dissociate themselves from that desire or action. Thirdly, we cannot
dissociate ourselves from our own dissociative act, in that very same
moment, for we cannot dissociate ourselves from our understanding of
something, in that very same moment. After all, our understanding of
something, in the present moment, our regarding something as such and
such, in that moment, our conceiving at all is inextricably bound up with our
conceiving of ourselves as ourselves, in that very same moment.
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As we have seen, dissociative experiences of non-agency can be grounds
for dissociative acts. But how about experiences of non-rational agency and
of being a multiple, and phenomena of lack of first-person access – can they
be grounds for people’s dissociative acts too? The third question can be
answered immediately. Lack of first-person access in its three variants (firstly,
temporarily concerning certain perceptions, sensations, and actions,
secondly, more or less permanently regarding certain subconscious desires,
beliefs, and intentions, and, thirdly, as a switching condition regarding one’s
alters) can neither be part of one’s third-person nor of one’s first-person self-
conceptions. After all, lacking first-person access to certain perceptions,
subconscious desires, or alters means not being reflectively aware of them;
and not being reflectively aware of certain ‘aspects’ of oneself entails the
person’s impossibility to dissociate herself in a mental act on the personal
level (in other words, qua reflectively self-conscious being) from those
‘aspects’ of herself. 
The first and second question – whether experiences of non-rational
agency and of being a multiple, respectively, can be grounds for dissociative
acts – require elaboration on two aspects of my account of personhood:
firstly, our self-conception of being rational agents and, secondly, the notion
of pre-reflective self-awareness. Let me start with the latter. 
3.3  Pre-reflective self-awareness
The fact that people – for example, when driving their car or performing
other routine tasks – may lack first-person access to certain of their
perceptions, sensations, and actions does obviously not imply that those
perceptions and sensations are not cognitively processed, not taken into
account in one’s actions, or that the actions are inadequate. It does, moreover,
not imply that people, in those situations, lack their self-awareness (of being
the self that has been and continues to be). 
We can act purposefully and react adequately to perceptions and
sensations without being reflectively aware of those perceptions, sensations
and actions. However, non-reflectively – or rather, pre-reflectively – we have
to be aware of them and of ourselves as their subject, otherwise we could not
do things like driving on autopilot. And we are not only pre-reflectively
aware of ourselves as the subject of the various perceptions, sensations and
actions, as distinct unconnected events, we are pre-reflectively aware of
ourselves as one and the same subject of those perceptions, sensations and
actions. In short, we are pre-reflectively aware of ourselves as the self that has
been and continues to be; we have what I call a pre-reflective sense of
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(continued) selfhood.34 After all (take again the autopilot case), we perform
complex series of interconnected actions in pursuit of our overall purpose of
driving to a particular place; and that means, more specifically, that what one
is prepared to do is related to the overall purpose of driving to a particular
place and to what one is just now doing (and to certain of one’s current
perceptions and sensations), and what one is just now doing is related to
what one has just been doing (and to certain of one’s current perceptions and
sensations). Hence, although we may lack first-person access to the
perceptions, sensations and actions involved, we nevertheless experience
ourselves (pre-reflectively) as one and the same perceiving, thinking, and
acting subject, in the various acts of pre-reflective self-awareness involved –
otherwise we would not be able to perform complex structures of interrelated
and adequate actions like driving on autopilot. 
In sum: we perform various complex routine tasks without being
reflectively aware of the action structures that we perform in the pursuit of
those tasks and of various perceptions that we have during their
performance, and we even adapt our action structures in reaction to those
perceptions without being reflectively aware of those adaptations. All this
would be impossible if we were not pre-reflectively aware of ourselves as the
self that has been and continues to be.
Probably, the moments and periods in which we are reflectively aware of
ourselves, for example when deliberating about how to perform a certain
task, or when reflecting on what we have done so far and whether that was
the most effective and efficient way to actualize a particular goal, are more
seldom than we normally think. A significant part of our purposeful
behaviour does not require our reflective awareness of that behaviour, but it
would be impossible without a pre-reflective sense of (continued) selfhood.
This is not to deny that lots of complex action structures, which we perform
without being reflectively aware of them in that moment, in principle require
our reflective capabilities. For example, we could never have thought of the
purposes of those action structures if we had not been able to think of
ourselves in other circumstances in the future, and we could never have
come to perform those actions ‘automatically’ if we had not first trained
ourselves to perform those actions, thereby reflecting on what we are doing.
3.4  Dissociation and pre-reflective self-awareness
The fact that we pre-reflectively experience ourselves as a self – the self that
has been and continues to be – makes it intelligible that we are able, for
example, to drive our car while lacking first-person access to certain
perceptions, which we nevertheless take into account, and to our actions,
which we nevertheless adjust depending on those perceptions. Isn’t it
somewhat surprising that we, while performing complex action structures
without being reflectively aware of them, can perform other acts of reflective
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self-awareness? While driving on autopilot, we may, for instance, deliberate
about what to prepare for dinner, discuss with a colleague how to convince our
customer, reflect on past conversations with our parents, or evaluate our career
opportunities. 
Could this phenomenon help us to understand the pathological
phenomenon of lack of first-person access to one’s alters? Think of the
following proposal: The person driving on autopilot and, at the same time,
deliberating about how to convince her customer may in fact have two pre-
reflective senses of selfhood in that moment, and just lack first-person access
to one of them. To put the proposal in general terms: the pathological
phenomenon of lack of first-person access to one’s alters might be understood
as a phenomenon of being dissociated from non-current senses of selfhood.
Is that proposal conceivable, given my account of self-conception and pre-
reflective self-awareness? 
No, a sense of selfhood is not identifiable as being this or that sense of
selfhood; it is content-free, so to speak, and it is inextricably bound up with
the experiencing subject. A pre-reflective sense of selfhood is nothing more
than experiencing oneself as the self that has been and continues to be. Even
if we assumed, for the sake of argument, that people can have different
streams of consciousness, each of which might establish a sense of selfhood
(in a certain moment), then nonetheless a sense of selfhood is just that: pre-
reflectively experiencing oneself as the self that has been and continues to be.
There is no sense of selfhood without a creature experiencing itself as being-
self. Hence, if a creature lacks access to a certain stream of consciousness,
then talk about a sense of selfhood belonging to that stream of consciousness
does not make any sense. We might lack first-person access to other streams
of consciousness than the one which our reflective awareness is currently
connected to, more specially, we might lack first-person access to
experiences, for example perceptions of external objects or feelings that are
processed in other streams of consciousness, but we cannot lack first-person
access to other senses of selfhood. Our sense of selfhood and our fundamental
first-person self-conception of ourselves as ourselves are inextricably bound
up with ourselves as the experiencing and conceiving subject, respectively.
They are both content-free, that is to say, nothing more than experiencing,
respectively conceiving of ourselves as ourselves, the self that has been and
continues to be. Neither experiencing nor conceiving of ourselves as
ourselves requires any identification of oneself as oneself. Therefore, if a
person, driving on autopilot, suddenly recognizes that she, for example, is not
aware of having passed a particular point on the route, then she may try to
find out whether she, given her current location, must have passed that point.
But she will never doubt that she either has passed that point or not. 
Could we imagine a situation when someone has reason to think that one
of his alters must have performed certain actions or must have had certain
experiences? Take, for instance, a person who cannot remember anything of
the recent period and who cannot believe that she has done and experienced
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what others tell her to be the case and what she has every reason to believe,
given, for example, her current location and condition. Is it conceivable that
this person indeed doubts that she had those experiences and performed those
actions, and therefore thinks that one of her alters must have experienced those
things and performed the actions? Well, a person may indeed doubt whether
she indeed has experienced and done what others tell her to be the case, and
she may therefore, for example, try to find more evidence for what happened.
But wouldn’t it be very strange if the person concluded that an alter of herself
was in charge? What could be the basis for her belief that she is a multiple?
We can imagine different scenarios of people believing that they have an
alter, or even more than one. (I already gave a sketch of those scenarios when
I presented interpretations of the phenomenon of Dissociative Identity
Disorder as non-literal interpretations of the extreme case.35) Firstly, a person
may think that she has an alter if she has ego-alien experiences like ‘made’
thoughts, ‘made’ feelings, ‘made’ impulses to act, or ‘made’ actions. She may not
only distance herself, as part of her current first-person self-conception, from
those thoughts, feelings, etcetera, but she may also form the third-person self-
conception of having an alter who brings about those thoughts, feelings,
impulses to act, or actions. That person, however, despite of her self-image of
being a multiple, still experiences herself as the subject of the thoughts,
feelings, impulses to act or actions, although not as their source. We are, by
contrast, imagining a person who did not experience herself as the subject of
the perceptions and actions in question; after all, the person from our example
cannot remember anything of that period. 
Secondly, a person might have the self-image of being a multiple, for
example because her therapist told her that her pathological symptoms are
evidence of being a multiple.36 Confronted with actions that she performed
in a certain period and things that happened to her then, and given her lack
of first-person access to those actions and experiences, she might ascribe
those actions and experiences to an alter of herself. These self-ascriptions
thus happen in a detached, reflective stance, and are mediated by a
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the patient herself, at each moment, does not experience and conceive of herself as a particular
self but simply as herself. She may, however, adopt the view of the psychiatrists and neuro-
scientists in question and entertain the corresponding self-image. 
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constructed model of her self – her self-image of being a multiple. That self-
image, because of being a self-image, is a third-person self-conception like
‘I am C.S.’, ‘I am kind’, or ‘I am an artist’. It may therefore be false or a
delusion.
Thirdly, the person may experience herself as a multiple and therefore
think that an alter of herself must have been in charge when ‘she’ performed
certain actions. I must admit that it is hard for me to say anything meaningful
about that case, because, as I already mentioned during our investigation of
the notion of dissociation37, I cannot – by extrapolation from normal
dissociative experiences – imagine how it might be like for multiples to be
multiples. It seems to me highly unlikely that the something it is like for
multiples to be multiples really can count as the experience of being a
multiple, but as far as I can see we cannot exclude that possibility on
conceptual grounds. 
Let us therefore for the sake of argument assume that the experience of
being a multiple exists; and let us try to analyse the implications of that
experience for a person’s sense of selfhood. Firstly, the person in question has
a pre-reflective sense of selfhood, in the moment of her experience of being
a multiple. After all, a person who experiences herself as a multiple, in any
case conceives of herself as herself, in the moment of her reflective awareness
of the experience of being a multiple. And conceiving of herself as herself (in
other words, the reflective awareness of being-self) requires the person to
have a pre-reflective sense of selfhood, in the present moment. Secondly, the
person has first-person access to her experience of being a multiple;
otherwise the experience could not count as a person’s current experience. In
other words, the person’s reflective awareness of her experience of being a
multiple is direct – not mediated by identification, or conceptualization and
symbolization. Finally, as a consequence of the first two points, a creature
who thinks that she has an alter because of experiencing herself as a multiple
still (pre-reflectively) experiences herself as one and the same thinking,
perceiving, and feeling subject, in various acts of (pre-reflective) self-
awareness that may appear in the same moment – including her experience
of being a multiple (if such an experience exists at all).
In conclusion (and presuming that people can have different streams of
consciousness), a person may lack first-person access to experiences that are
processed in other streams of consciousness. Such a person may be said to be
in a dissociative state of mind. But the person can never be said to lack first-
person access to her other, non-current senses of selfhood, for the expression
‘her other senses of selfhood’ is just nonsense against the background of my
theory. A person cannot have different senses of selfhood. A sense of selfhood
is just that: pre-reflectively experiencing oneself as the self that has been and
continues to be. Even a person who experiences herself as a multiple, that is
to say, who has first-person access to the experience of being a multiple
170 • Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations
37 See Section 2.3 (Dissociations that happen to us: dissociative experiences).
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:17  Pagina 170
(assuming that such an experience exists), still conceives of herself as herself
whenever she is reflectively aware of herself. After all, that reflective self-
awareness requires that the person experiences herself as one and the same
perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting subject in various acts of pre-
reflective self-awareness that may appear at the same moment, including the
act of awareness of being a multiple.
3.5  Conceiving of oneself as a rational agent
One phenomenon of dissociation has not been analysed yet against the
background of my account of personhood: the experience of non-rational
agency, that is, the experience of being conscious of one’s activity but
(temporarily) not knowing the purpose of that activity. The fact that this
experience confuses us becomes understandable if knowing the purpose of
one’s actions, in a certain moment, is inextricably bound up with one’s
conception of oneself as a rational agent, in that very same moment, and if
conceiving of oneself as a rational agent belongs to our first-person self-
conception. Let me explain.
We conceive of our actions as our actions and (leaving aside ego-alien
experiences) of ourselves as the source of those actions. Conceiving of
certain behavioural structures as actions means understanding those
behavioural structures as purposeful behaviour, more specifically, as
behaviour that has a certain purpose, which we conceive of as our purpose,
as our motivating reason for the action in question.38 In other words,
understanding a behavioural structure, which we perform at a certain
moment, as our action means that we conceive of ourselves, in that moment,
as a person who acts based on reasons. Conceiving of our actions as actions
is thus tied to conceiving of those actions as based on reasons. And that is,
as I take it, what conceiving of oneself as a rational agent amounts to.
Conceiving of ourselves as rational agents does not imply that we explicitly
think ‘I am a rational agent’. Our disposition to understand our actions,
which is tied to conceiving of our actions as our actions, exhibits our self-
conception of being rational agents.39 And because conceiving of one’s action
as one’s action is a first-person self-conception, conceiving of oneself as a
rational agent is inextricably bound up with that first-person self-conception. 
It cannot be overemphasized that the self-conception of being a rational
agent – in the sense described above – is a first-person self-conception; it
does not require conceptualization and symbolization of oneself qua self.
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However, people can also entertain a third-person self-conception of being a
rational agent. Someone may, for example, have the self-image of being a
person who is not moved by unevaluated spontaneous desires, who rejects
spontaneous desires for the benefit of long-term goals, and who has coherent
short- en long-term goals. That person can obviously distance herself from
that kind of self-conception, in an act of retrospective evaluative dissociation
(or as part of her evaluative reasoning concerning her current action) and,
for example, decide to let herself slide from moment to moment, so to speak,
doing whatever she feels like in the present moment. But this clearly does not
imply that the person is no longer disposed to understand her actions as
based on reasons. Even if she does whatever she feels like, she will still
conceive of that action as her action; and by this she is disposed to
understand her action as based on reasons, since that disposition is tied to
her first-person self-ascription of her action.
We feel confused if we cannot understand our actions as based on
reasons, that is to say, if we do not know why we are doing what we are
doing. In such a situation, a person, on the one hand, knows that she is
doing what she is doing and is therefore disposed to understand that action
structure, on the other hand, she does not know the purpose of what she is
doing and can therefore not conceive of the behavioural structure in
question as an action based on reasons. This person has an experience of
non-rational agency. I label that experience a dissociative experience, for
you experience yourself qua agent – or rather, qua rational agent, because a
creature that conceives of itself as itself is disposed to understand its actions
as actions based on reasons – as dissociated from your own action. 
Could we avoid feeling confused when we do not know why we are doing
what we are doing? If I am right that for creatures like us (that is, creatures
that conceive of themselves as themselves) experiencing one’s behaviour as
an action structure entails the disposition to understand that action
structure, then ceasing to feel the confusion would imply that we could
cease conceiving of ourselves as (rational) agents. Could we perhaps bring
about a state of mind, by a mental act on the personal level, of being not
disposed to conceive of our actions as based on reasons? In that mental act,
a person would dissociate herself from her first-person self-ascription of
performing a certain action – which is impossible against the background of
my account of self-conceptions. After all, first-person self-ascriptions are
not mediated by identification, or conceptualization and symbolization. If a
person pre-reflectively experiences herself as the subject of a certain action
structure and is reflectively aware of herself as the subject of that action
structure (which is not up to her, so to speak), her conception of herself as
the subject of her action structure entails the disposition to understand that
action structure, that is to say, to know its purpose. 
It is, however, imaginable that people can indirectly bring about a state of
mind, by a mental act on the personal level, of not being disposed to
conceive of their actions as based on reasons. A person might, for example,
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decide to drug herself with alcohol in order to stop conceiving of herself as
a rational agent. She might then, due to the effect of the alcohol, drift off
into a mental state where her capability to conceive of herself of herself is
(temporarily) disturbed. This person, even if she pre-reflectively
experiences herself as the subject of her behaviour, may not conceive of
herself as the subject of her behaviour since her capability to conceive of
herself as herself might be temporarily diminished. And because her
disposition to understand her actions as actions based on reasons is tied to
her conceiving of her actions as her actions, she also (temporarily) lacks the
disposition to understand what she is doing. In short, the person has
indirectly brought about a state of mind in which her reflective capacities
are damaged to such an extent that she does not conceive of her actions as
her actions at all and in which she therefore lacks the first-person self-
conception of acting based on reasons.
I should mention that my argument that a person cannot dissociate
herself from her first-person self-conception of being a rational agent (a self-
conception that is exhibited by her disposition to understand her actions,
which in turn is tied to conceiving of her actions as her actions) differs,
despite their similarity, from J. David Velleman’s argument that “the desire
to act in accordance with reasons cannot be disowned by an agent”. He
writes: 
Note that the desire to act in accordance with reasons cannot be disowned by an
agent, although it can be disowned by the person in whom agency is embodied.
A person can perhaps suppress his desire to act in accordance with reasons […]
The only way for a person truly to suppress his concern for reasons is to stop
making rational assessments of his motives, including this one, thus suspending
the process of rational thought. And in suspending the processes of rational
thought, he will suspend the functions in virtue of which he qualifies as an agent.
Thus, the sense in which an agent cannot disown his desire to act in accordance
with reasons is that he cannot disown it while remaining an agent.40
In order to compare Velleman’s argument with mine, we have to replace
‘agent’ by ‘rational agent’, since Velleman’s agent is what I call a rational
agent; after all, Velleman’s agent has a “desire to act in accordance with
reasons”. Although I agree with Velleman’s concluding statement that a
rational agent cannot disown her desire to act in accordance with reasons
while remaining a rational agent, I disagree with his argument in two
respects. Velleman states that a person cannot suppress her desire to act in
accordance with reasons other than by suppressing the functions in virtue
of which she counts as a rational agent. In my view, if a person could
suppress the functions in virtue of which she counts as a rational agent, she
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by the same mental act would suppress the functions in virtue of which she
counts as a person; after all, our disposition to conceive of our actions as
based on reasons is tied to our personhood.41 However, a person cannot
suppress the functions in virtue of which she counts as a rational agent – at
least, if we take ‘suppress’ to be a mental act by which the person dissociates
herself from a certain aspect of herself. Suppressing the functions in virtue
of which a person counts as a rational agent would in the end imply that a
person could dissociate herself from her fundamental first-person self-
conception of herself as herself. But that dissociation is conceptually
impossible against the background of my account of self-conception. 
4 Dissociation of oneself from oneself: 
possibilities and impossibilities 
The most essential points about the account of self-conceptions presented
here are: firstly, the acknowledgement of a pre-reflective sense of (continued)
selfhood as a prerequisite for self-conceptions; secondly, the distinction
between first-person and third-person self-conceptions; thirdly, the
clarification that first-person self-ascriptions of one’s actions are bound up
with the disposition to conceive of those actions as based on reasons; and
finally, the recognition of the special position of the first-person conception
of oneself as oneself. As we have seen, this account of self-conceptions makes
it intelligible that people can dissociate themselves from certain ‘aspects of
themselves’ but not from others. I take the expression ‘aspects of oneself’ in
the broadest possible sense, meaning, for instance, desires, intentions,
beliefs, actions, decisions, adopted goals and plans, things a person cares
about, perceptions, sensations, processes of reasoning, processes of
reflection, self-related reactive attitudes, self-narratives, or a person’s alters. 
4.1 Dissociation of oneself from aspects of oneself
Dissociations of oneself are dissociative mental acts that are performed by a
person qua person; they are mental acts on the personal level, so to speak.
The qualification of that category of dissociations as dissociations of oneself
is meant to distinguish them from dissociative (mental) acts that happen on
sub-personal levels and from dissociative reactions of the human organism to
certain external or internal events. As to the former, we may think of the
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temporary uncoupling between our conscious rational guidance and the
performance of routine tasks, or we might think of mechanisms of repression
of sexual feelings or of memories of traumatic experiences. Concerning
dissociative reactions of the human organism, we might think of reactions of
the human organism to drugs or of coping mechanisms (‘freeze state’) of the
organism in extremely threatening situations. As emphasized earlier, my
concern is with people’s dissociations that can count as dissociations of
oneself qua person; I do not claim to provide an account of dissociations in
general. 
Let me organize our most important findings concerning the possibilities
of dissociations of oneself from (aspects of) oneself. I will first recall the main
lines of my account of self-conceptions and then use that account as a
framework to structure the possible dissociations of oneself from (aspects of)
oneself and those that are impossible by their very nature.
(1) Talk about dissociation of oneself implies talking about persons, that is
to say, creatures that conceive of themselves as themselves. A creature
that does not conceive of itself as itself cannot dissociate itself from
anything. 
(2) Conceiving of oneself as oneself is the fundamental first-person self-
conception. It is a self-conception, as it requires reflective capabilities;
and it is a first-person self-conception, as it does not require
identification of oneself as oneself, or conceptualization and
symbolization of oneself qua self. And it is, in two ways, the
fundamental first-person self-conception: firstly, because the capability
to conceive of oneself as oneself is fundamental for personhood,
secondly and entailed by the first, because it is a prerequisite for all
other (first- and third-person) self-conceptions. 
(3) First-person self-conceptions are self-ascriptions that are based on first-
person access and which therefore do not require identification of
oneself as oneself, or conceptualization and symbolization of oneself
qua self. Examples are self-ascriptions of one’s current perceptions,
desires, intentions, actions, or thoughts. Third-person self-conceptions,
by contrast, require mediation by identification of oneself – for
example, my self-conception of being C.S. or my visual image of myself
as a two-year old child – or by symbolization of oneself qua self – for
example, the self-conceptions of having a certain biography, of being a
certain kind of person, or of pursuing a certain long-term goal. 
(4) One self-conception – the self-conception of being a rational agent –
deserves to be mentioned separately. We have the implicit first-person
self-conception of being rational agents, that is to say, of acting based
on reasons. That self-conception is bound up with our conception of
our actions as our actions. The first-person self-conception of acting
based on reasons has to be distinguished from a self-image of being a
rational kind of person, which can have different content for different
people, or people may not have that third-person self-conception at all. 
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(5) All acts of conceiving of oneself are reflective acts of self-awareness.
They require a pre-reflective self-awareness, more specifically, a pre-
reflective sense of (continued) selfhood: pre-reflectively experiencing
oneself as the self that has been and continues to be. A sense of selfhood
is not identifiable as this or that sense of selfhood. It is content-free –
nothing more than experiencing oneself as being-self (over time). 
Dissociations of oneself are dissociative mental acts that are performed by a
person qua self-comprehending creature. This characterization forms a
constraint on possible dissociations of oneself. It implies that we can only
dissociate ourselves from something if we are reflectively aware of ourselves,
in that moment. And there is a second constraint. We can only dissociate
ourselves from something, more specifically, from aspects of ourselves if we,
in that moment, conceive of ourselves as having those aspects, whether that
self-conception is a first-person or a third-person self-conception. Needless
to say, a dissociative mental act of a person is always an act of reflective self-
awareness.
The following kinds of dissociation of oneself from aspects of oneself are
conceivable against the background of my account of self-conceptions.
(a) We can dissociate ourselves from former third-person self-conceptions.
Because of being third-person self-conceptions they were mediated by
identification, or conceptualization and symbolization; and we can
dissociate ourselves from those self-images by now regarding those
mediations as influenced by internal or external conditions. Such
evaluative dissociations can be part of explicit reflections on, for
example, our former goals, or things we cared about. They are performed
in the context of current third-person self-conceptions; after all, they
require thinking of oneself in other circumstances in the past or in the
future, and hence require conceptualization and symbolization of
oneself. 
(b) We can retrospectively distance ourselves from former first-person self-
ascriptions, for example desires, intentions, thoughts, or actions, by
regarding them as caused by, for instance, excessive alcohol
consumption. Such retrospective evaluative dissociations require that we
think of ourselves in other circumstances in the past; they are therefore
performed in the context of current third-person self-conceptions. It is
important to notice that we – although in a restricted sense – still ascribe
those desires, intentions, thoughts, or actions to ourselves, that is to say,
we still conceive of ourselves as their subjects.
(c) People can retrospectively distance themselves from, for example, certain
actions, although they may have never experienced themselves as the
subjects of those actions. Retrospectively, however, they may ascribe
those actions to themselves as part of their current comprehension of a
certain situation and, at the same time, distance themselves from those
actions, because they regard them as caused by, for example, excessive
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alcohol consumption. It should be emphasized that that distancing can
only count as dissociation of a person from aspects of herself if having
performed these actions is part of the person’s current third-person self-
conception. 
(d) People can – as part of their first-person self-ascriptions – partially
dissociate themselves from, for example, current desires or actions if they
do not experience themselves as their source. Those dissociative acts of
reflective self-awareness can only be partial, because in order to count as
a person’s dissociation from an aspect of herself, the person still has to
conceive of those desire or actions as hers – although in the restricted
sense of merely being their subject. Dissociations of this kind are based
on (pathological) experiences of non-agency. 
It should not pass unnoticed that dissociations of oneself from aspects of
oneself, because they are acts of reflective self-awareness, are performed in the
context of a person’s current conception of herself – whether that self-
conception is based on third- or first-person access. And a current act of self-
conception is, if for the sake of argument we use the terminology of a subject-
object model42, inextricably bound up with the conceiving subject; it can never
be the object of a person’s conception, in that very same moment. For example,
when we (in an act of first-person self-conception) conceive of our action as
our action, or when we (in an act of third-person self-conception) conceive of
ourselves as a certain kind of person, we cannot, in the same moment, ascribe
that act of conception to ourselves. The act of self-conception itself is not
conceived of, in the present moment. Therefore, people can never dissociate
themselves from their current act of self-conception. This brings us to the
limits regarding dissociation of oneself from (aspects of) oneself.
4.2  The limits to dissociation of oneself from oneself
Certain dissociations are by their very nature impossible against the
background of my account of self-conceptions.
(a) People cannot dissociate themselves from their fundamental first-person
self-conception of conceiving of themselves as themselves. After all,
dissociation of oneself from anything whatsoever requires conceiving of
oneself as oneself. 
(b) People cannot dissociate themselves, or rather, cannot dissociate
themselves altogether, from aspects of themselves that they currently
have first-person access to. After all, dissociation of oneself from, for
example, a thought or action that one currently has first-person access to
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requires (experiencing and) conceiving of oneself as the subject of that
thought or action. 
(c) People cannot dissociate themselves from current third-person self-
conceptions; that is to say, people cannot dissociate themselves from
third-person self-conceptions in the same moment in which they
entertain those self-conceptions. After all, the act of conceiving of
oneself as one does is inextricably bound up with the conceiving
subject. However, a person can obviously distance herself from a third-
person self-conception immediately after having formed that self-
conception; the dissociative act may even be part of the same process of
deliberation in which that third-person self-conception was formed
originally. 
(d) People cannot dissociate themselves from their current acts of
conceiving of (aspects of) themselves. After all, one’s current act of
conceiving is inextricably bound up with oneself as the comprehending
creature; it can never be on ‘the object side’ of one’s self-conception, so
to speak. A person can, for example, not dissociate herself from
regarding certain of her actions as wrong if she, in that moment, regards
them in that particular way. Retrospectively, she obviously may distance
herself from her former judgement by conceiving of that judgement as,
for example, strongly influenced by others.
(e) People cannot dissociate themselves, if they conceive of an action as
their action, from implicitly conceiving of themselves as rational
agents. In other words, people cannot distance themselves from their
disposition to conceive of themselves as acting based on reasons, at
least if they conceive of certain actions as their actions in the full sense
(that is to say, as being their subject and their source). After all,
conceiving of one’s action as an action is tied to conceiving of that
behavioural structure as purposeful behaviour and of that purpose as
one’s purpose, as one’s motivating reason for the action in question.
The listed possibilities and impossibilities of people’s dissociations from
aspects of themselves make it very clear that people cannot dissociate
themselves from themselves qua self – if we take that expression literally.
Such a dissociative state of mind would entail that the creature’s fundamental
first-person self-conception – her conception of herself as herself – were
(temporarily) broken down. In that case, however, we cannot speak of a
person anymore, in that moment. That is why the notion of being dissociated
from one’s self is paradoxical: it implies that there still is a person, a
conceiving self, so to speak, and, at the same time, that the self-self relation
of conceiving of oneself as oneself, which is fundamental for personhood, has
collapsed.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: 
Personhood, models of self-conception, 
and regions of mattering
1 About the project, objections to the proposed account, 
and the rest of the chapter
ABOUT THE PROJECT
The account of self-self relations presented in this book – that is, relations
of a person qua self-comprehending creature to herself qua self – regards
self-self relations as inextricably bound up with personhood. Persons and
only persons can think and feel about themselves qua self. The important
point here, however, is not that persons characteristically think and feel
about themselves in one way or the other, but that certain ways of thinking
and feeling about themselves qua self are characteristic of persons. Those
self-self relations are based on ‘models of self-conception’, which in turn
are bound up with properties that are constitutive of personhood (in its
fullest sense): as beings with a first-person perspective we implicitly
conceive of ourselves as rational agents, as narrative beings we implicitly
conceive of ourselves as the protagonists of our self-narratives, as beings
that apply self-regarding qualitative standards we implicitly conceive of
ourselves as having values. All three properties with their included self-
conceptions constitute separate regions of mattering with different
structures and dispositions; all three are hence the basis for mattering-
relations with ourselves qua self that we qua persons establish, entertain,
or experience. A clear or full understanding of personhood can therefore
not refrain from an analysis of self-self relations. And an analysis of self-self
relations, at the same time, contributes to a fuller understanding of
personhood. Indeed, an account of personhood that fails to confront self-
self relations – or rather, those self-self relations in which (fully developed)
persons cannot but stand to themselves qua self – is simply deficient. 
To uncover these self-self relations, I analysed pre-philosophical notions
regarding our selves qua self, pathological phenomena, and various
‘normal’ ways in which persons – in the context of action, deliberation, and
self-evaluation – think and feel about themselves. Such a project simply has
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to take the first-person perspective as the thread running through the
analysis.
ABOUT OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED ACCOUNT
My view on personhood touches upon a number of topics, all of which are
subject to continuous philosophical debate. More specifically: (1) it
touches upon the metaphysical questions about the nature of persons and
the self; (2) it confronts the issue of personal identity; (3) it includes a view
on (acts of) self-awareness; (4) it includes an account of rational agency
and rational action; (5) it proposes a view on values; (6) it takes up the
question of self-knowledge; and (7) it confronts the issue of dissociation
and multiple selves. Such an account cannot but give rise to objections by
philosophers of different conviction. My view on self-awareness, for
example, can neither count as a purely analytical nor as a phenom-
enological account; it can, hence, expect critiques from both camps. My
view on rational action may lead to objections, because the rationality of an
action is, as I take it, not a matter of compliance with certain standards. My
view on values might, for example, be challenged by moral realists. My
view on personal identity may be disputed, as my definition of a person’s
fundamental identity is, in a way, circular. Finally, my view on ‘multiples’
and my argument for the impossibility of a person’s dissociation from her
self, is sure to raise objections by those who think that more than one self
can inhabit a person’s body. Needless to say, this list of possible objections
is far from complete. 
One possible set of objections should be mentioned separately, however.
An account that is developed in a first-personal rather than a third-personal
approach is bound to be accused of relativism or solipsism. Moreover, the
cogency of the presented account might be challenged by arguing that first-
personal experiences depend on an individual person’s ‘state of mind’. Such
critiques actually attack the presented account precisely because of what is
essential to it – namely that it takes the first-person perspective seriously.
As to the first objection, I contend that taking the first-person perspective
seriously unfolds aspects of personhood that are hidden to a third-personal
approach while being essential to a full understanding of personhood. As
to the second objection, I claim that certain ways of thinking and feeling
about oneself qua self are not contingent, but inextricably bound up with
the properties that are constitutive of personhood (in its fullest sense). This
is not to say that all persons establish or entertain all those self-self
relations, because, in my view, not all properties that are characteristic of
personhood, taken in the fullest sense, are fundamental to personhood. 
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ABOUT THE REST OF THE CHAPTER
This concluding chapter is not intended to summarize the conclusions of the
foregoing chapters but to draw connections between them in the light of the
quest for ‘a person’s relation to herself qua self’. The view that is presented
here depends on findings of all foregoing chapters. First, I will briefly discuss
the main aspects and implications of the proposed account of person- and
selfhood. I will then summarize my view on self-self relations. Thirdly, I will
focus on those self-self relations that are, if I am right, inextricably bound up
with properties that are constitutive of personhood (in its fullest sense). To
conclude, I will briefly address some new questions, which evolved during
this project and quite a number of which would benefit from an
interdisplinary approach.
In what follows, I will put emphasis on those aspects of my view on
person- and selfhood that I expect to be most controversial. Table 7.1
provides a list of those claims. No doubt, some critics will also disagree with
the concept of a person that forms the basis for my account, namely Lynne
Rudder Baker’s view that the essential capability of a person is her capability
of a (highly developed) first-person perspective. Here, however, I will
concentrate on claims that are the result of my own project (this is not to
diminish the inspiration that I owe to other philosophers). 
Table 7.1:  Controversial claims
Section 2  Personhood, selfhood, and the first-person perspective
(a) Personhood and selfhood are two sides of the same coin.
(b) The first-personal view is always prior.
(c) Selfhood has a pre-reflective predecessor: namely a sense of (continued)
selfhood.
(d) Whether an action is rational solely depends on the person’s self-
conception of her action as resulting from her process of reasoning.
(e) Personhood in its fullest sense involves more than rational agency.
(f) Strong evaluative reasoning implies caring about being the kind of
person whom particular values can be justifiably attributed to.
(g) Self-narratives are not identity-constituting in a fundamental sense.
(h) The fundamental self-conception of oneself as oneself is content-free.
(i) Persons cannot but conceive of themselves as themselves.
Section 3  Self-self relations
(a) Only persons can stand in relations to themselves qua self.
(b) Self-self relations – with the exception of the fundamental self-self
relation of conceiving of oneself as oneself – do not concern one’s self
as such but aspects of oneself qua self. 
(c) Meta-reflection about oneself qua self and explicit deliberation about or
evaluation of one’s actions requires a detached stance and
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conceptualization and symbolization of oneself qua self.
(d) Reflective self-self relations do not necessarily require a detached
stance. Examples are the fundamental self-self relation of conceiving of
oneself as oneself and self-regarding thoughts and feelings that are
embedded in one’s reasoning in the context of an action.
(e) Persons are not necessarily reflectively aware of their various self-self
relations; they may also entertain pre-reflective self-self relations.
Section 4 Concealed first-person self-conceptions: the basis 
for mattering-relations to oneself qua self 
(a) Personhood includes three ‘models of self-conception’ with their own
structures, dispositions, and desires: conceiving of oneself as a rational
agent, as the protagonist of one’s self-narrative, and as having values.
(b) The fundamental conception of oneself as oneself and the ‘models of
self-conception’ are not themselves ‘objects’ of one’s direct reflective
self-awareness.
(c) The fundamental self-conception of oneself as oneself and the three
‘models of self-conception’ have to be clearly distinguished from
seemingly corresponding self-images – for example, the self-image of
being a rational kind of person, or the thought ‘I am myself’.
(d) The fact that our self-comprehension cannot but respond to our
conception of ourselves as ourselves and to the three ‘models of self-
conception’ makes intelligible that certain things concerning ourselves
qua self matter to us.
(e) We can distinguish four intrinsic self-regarding concerns: a concern
with the persistence of ourselves qua self, with the soundness of our
‘will’, with the coherence of our self-narrative, and with the integrity of
ourselves. Hence, our own irrationalities, inconsistencies, and
incoherences matter to us not only because they hinder the
accomplishment of our aims, but also much more directly than that.
2 Personhood, selfhood, and the first-person perspective 
The starting point of an adequate analysis of self-self relations – the relation
of oneself qua self-comprehending creature to oneself qua self – is the notion
of a person. After all, persons are exactly those creatures that are able to
conceive of themselves as themselves. How could a non-person ever stand in
any relation to itself qua self? It simply does not make any sense to speak
about a self if a creature is not able to conceive of itself as itself. My account
of personhood thus involves a notion of selfhood. 
Persons and selves are not different ‘things’, but the two notions are two
sides of the same coin: the third-personal notion of a person corresponds
with the first-personal notion of a self. Nevertheless, there is an important
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distinction between the notions of person and self: the first-personal view is
always prior. Selfhood – that is, one’s reflective awareness of being-self, which
means nothing else than conceiving of oneself as oneself – is prior to
personhood in two respects. Ontologically, the existence and persistence of a
person depends on the capability to conceive of oneself as oneself.
Epistemologically, it is only once we know that a creature has the capability
to conceive of itself as itself that we can ascribe personhood to it. 
And there is a further important distinction between the notions of
selfhood and personhood: selfhood, in contrast to personhood, has a pre-
reflective predecessor, namely a pre-reflective sense of (continued) selfhood.
It is only once we conceptually presuppose the ‘givenness of the self’ that it
is intelligible that we are able to conceive of ourselves as ourselves – without
identifying ourselves as ourselves. But there is evidence that a pre-reflective
sense of (continued) selfhood is not a philosophical invention. If we observe
complex purposeful behaviour in, for example, infants, certain non-human
animals, or people performing tasks on autopilot, we cannot but presuppose
a pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood. After all, complex purposeful
behaviour requires that the creature experiences itself as one and the same
subject in the various activities that it performs to actualize a particular
purpose and in the perceptions and sensations that may appear during the
corresponding period of time. However, complex purposeful behaviour,
while requiring a pre-reflective sense of continued selfhood, is no evidence
of personhood. Personhood requires a reflective sense of selfhood.
A person’s fundamental property is her capability to conceive of herself as
herself. Based on that property, she conceives of her actions as her actions and
of her motives for her actions as her motives for her actions – in short, she
conceives of herself as acting based on reasons. That is why a person is a
rational agent. Rational agents are normally able to provide rationales for
their actions. And whether an action is rational does not depend on the
‘quality’ of the reasons provided. It solely depends on the person’s self-
conception of her action as resulting from her process of reasoning, whether
her understanding of her action is a rational reconstruction or not.
Again, the first-personal view is prior to the third-personal one. It is only
once we know that the agent understands herself as (capable of) reasoning
and deciding what to do that we can talk of reasons for her actions at all. The
same holds for a concrete action. Talk about a person’s reasons to perform a
concrete action only makes sense if we think that she herself thinks there is
something to be said in favour of doing what she did, does, or plans to do. It
is only once we know how a person understands her own action – for
example, which considerations she regarded as relevant to her course of
action – that we can ascribe to her particular reasons for her action – for
instance, (the content of) certain desires, beliefs, or goals. And it is only then
that we might judge whether the person’s reason was a good reason to
perform the action in question – ‘good’ in whatever sense. 
Personhood in the fullest sense involves more than rational agency, in
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other words, more than understanding oneself as (capable of) reasoning and
deciding. Persons characteristically, though not necessarily, have the
capability to apply self-regarding qualitative standards in their reasoning
concerning their actions. When a person applies this type of evaluative
reasoning – that is, strong evaluative reasoning – she does not only make
reference to her goals and purposes but also – or rather, primarily and most
importantly – to her values. This is not to say that evaluative reasoning – in
the weak sense of weighing alternatives – is not normative. Facts about a
certain action alternative – for example, that a person, by performing that
action, can effortlessly actualize a certain purpose, fulfil more than one of her
current desires, or fulfil the strongest one – are not relevant unless we
suppose that such facts, at that moment, are important to the person in
question (in the sense of, for that person, arguing in favour of a certain action
alternative) so as to constitute reasons for her to perform a particular action.
However, performing a certain action because it, say, fulfils two of one’s
current desires does (leaving aside pathological cases) not imply that one
cares about being a multiple-desire-fulfiller. By contrast, if a person applies
self-regarding qualitative standards in her evaluative reasoning concerning
her actions, she implicitly cares about being the kind of person whom
particular values can be justifiably attributed to.
Personhood in the fullest sense also involves the property of having a
narrative self-conception. Persons characteristically, though again not
necessarily, (try to) connect their intentions, actions, experiences, practical
beliefs, plans, goals, character traits, values, and etcetera. They interpret and
re-interpret what they do, feel, think, and experience, and position those
elements in a self-narrative. Self-narratives may be constructed in processes
of meta-reflection; often, however, they are provided as part of action
explanations. It is important to notice that self-narratives, because of
consisting of interpretations, are mediated self-conceptions. They require that
the person takes a detached stance and symbolizes herself qua self.
Therefore, self-narratives cannot be identity-constituting in a more
fundamental sense. 
A self-narrative is a ‘super self-image’, containing numerous mediated self-
conceptions, for example, one’s belief of being sensitive to others, one’s belief
of being C.S., one’s belief of being a rational kind of person, or one’s belief
that money is not important to oneself. A person may someday, say, dismiss
her earlier belief regarding money, because her ideals have changed. She may
revise her belief that she is C.S., because she finds her original birth
certificate that states otherwise. Or she may come to realize that she is not
the kind of person that is sensitive to others, and that she is not rational
either (‘rational’ in a qualitative sense). But despite the change in her ‘super
self-image’, she never did not conceive of herself as herself. It is this
fundamental conception of oneself as oneself that constitutes one’s identity
in the most basic sense. It is simply impossible that we – in our fundamental
conception of ourselves as ourselves – could misidentify ourselves or could
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be mistaken regarding the ‘content of our self’. When conceiving of ourselves
as ourselves, we do not conceive of ourselves as such and such or as a certain
kind of person, in other words, we neither identify ourselves as ourselves nor
symbolize ourselves qua self. 
Personal identity, in this fundamental sense, is sometimes criticized as
being empty. And indeed, our fundamental self-conception as ourselves is
content-free, so to speak. However, its being content-free is precisely one of
the two reasons why we cannot be mistaken concerning our identity and why
this kind of identity is our most fundamental one. We can distance ourselves
from a former autobiographical narrative and hence from a former ‘super
self-image’, but we cannot distance ourselves from ourselves qua self, or from
our self-understanding of ourselves as ourselves. Neither can we deliberately
stop conceiving of ourselves as ourselves. As long as we are someone, that is,
a being with a first-person perspective, we cannot but conceive of ourselves
as ourselves (at least, in circumstances when we are reflectively aware of
anything at all). That fundamental self-self relation can never collapse – not
without damaging or destroying the features by virtue of which we count as
a person, in other words, not without us ceasing to exist. 
3 Self-self relations 
The fact that we are persons involves that we entertain, establish, and
experience kinds of self-relations that are peculiar to persons. Only persons
can stand in relations towards themselves qua self. With the exception of the
fundamental self-self relation of conceiving of oneself as oneself, all other
self-self relations concern aspects of one’s self. That is to say, the self-
regarding thoughts or feelings do not relate to one’s self ‘as such’, but to
‘things’ that we attribute to ourselves qua person, in contrast to ‘things’ that
we attribute to ourselves qua body. Examples of such aspects of oneself are
one’s beliefs, intentions, desires, moods, actions, purposes, goals, plans,
ideals, values, character traits, personality, or biography. 
Obviously, persons can think or feel in various ways about aspects of
themselves qua self. Such thoughts or feelings need not be highly reflective,
in the sense that the person engages in meta-reflection about her character,
her values, or the kind of person she would like to be. The self-regarding
attitudes need not even be part of an explicit deliberation about or evaluation
of certain of one’s actions. Self-regarding thoughts and feelings are often
simply embedded in the evaluative reasoning that takes place in the context
of one’s current action. A person may, for instance, reject a certain
spontaneous desire, without explicit deliberation – possibly, because acting
based on that desire would hinder the realization of one of her adopted goals,
or because she may not want to be moved by that kind of desire. 
Whether one’s self-regarding attitudes are part of an act of meta-reflection,
explicit reflection or embedded reflection, the act itself is a reflective act of
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self-awareness. And the accompanying self-regarding thoughts or feelings –
like feeling regret or remorse about one’s behaviour, regarding one’s action as
irrational or wrong, or feeling satisfied or dissatisfied with one’s way of life –
are therefore reflective self-self relations, that is, relations that a person qua
self-comprehending creature establishes, entertains, or experiences regarding
aspects of herself qua self. This is not to say that persons (in circumstances
when they are reflectively aware of anything at all) are always, or even
necessarily, reflectively aware of their various self-self relations. Persons may
entertain pre-reflective self-self relations; they may, for instance, have
repressed (sub-conscious) self-regarding feelings or beliefs. 
Reflective self-self relations, because of being reflective, may seem to
presuppose a detached stance towards oneself. Thorough analysis, however,
refutes that presupposition. First of all, a person’s fundamental reflective self-
self relation of conceiving of herself as herself does not require
conceptualization and symbolization of herself qua self. Neither do one’s self-
regarding thoughts and feelings that are embedded in one’s reasoning in the
context of one’s current action. Embedded self-reflection, although the
person takes a position regarding her motives for action (for example,
regarding her spontaneous desires), does not mean that she conceptualizes
and symbolizes herself qua self. Obviously, it is only once the person
provides an account of herself as a rational agent in the context of a concrete
action, that we can ascribe to her an act of embedded reflection and certain
accompanying self-regarding feelings or thoughts. The first-personal view is
thus again prior to the third-personal. In practice, the distinction between
embedded and explicit reflection may sometimes be difficult (or even
impossible) to make; nevertheless, there is a clear conceptual distinction. 
4 Concealed first-person self-conceptions: 
the basis for mattering-relations to oneself qua self
Although persons can think and feel in various ways about themselves qua self,
not all reflective self-self relations are contingent. Personhood does not only –
by definition, so to speak – include the fundamental reflective self-self relation
of conceiving of oneself as oneself, but it moreover includes ‘models of self-
conception’: firstly, conceiving of oneself as a rational agent, secondly,
conceiving of oneself as the protagonist of one’s self-narrative, and, thirdly,
conceiving of oneself as having values. These ‘models of self-conception’ have
their own structures, dispositions and desires, which exhibit themselves in
various self-regarding thoughts and feelings, and constitute separate regions of
mattering. The first of those ‘models of self-conception’ is bound up with the
fundamental property of having a first-person perspective, the second with the
property of having a narrative self-conception, and the third with the property
of applying self-regarding qualitative standards. 
The fundamental reflective self-conception of oneself as oneself and the
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three mentioned ‘models of self-conception’ (all of which obviously form
reflective self-self relations) can best be thought of as concealed first-person self-
conceptions. They are concealed, so to speak, because they are never themselves
‘object’ of our direct reflective self-awareness – although they are at the heart
of our self-comprehension. They are first-person self-conceptions, because they
do (in contrast to self-images, which are therefore third-person self-
conceptions) not require a detached stance towards oneself, and
conceptualization and symbolization of oneself qua self. Thoughts like “I am a
rational agent” or “I have values” are hence not instantiations of the seemingly
corresponding ‘models of self-conception’, but constructed self-images, which
require conceptualization and symbolization of oneself qua self. Our concealed
first-person self-conceptions do, however, not require conceptualization and
symbolization of oneself qua self; they simply exhibit themselves in various
ways in which we comprehend ourselves and in various self-regarding reactive
attitudes. To avoid misunderstanding, concealed first-person self-conceptions
should not be thought of as pre-reflective self-self relations; they should thus
not be confused with, for example, repressed self-regarding feelings or beliefs. 
The fact that our self-comprehension cannot but respond to our
fundamental conception of ourselves as ourselves and to three ‘models of self-
conception’1 makes understandable that certain things concerning ourselves
qua self (deeply) matter to us. First of all, owing to our self-conception of
ourselves as ourselves, it matters to us whether we ourselves will have
sensations, perceptions, and experiences in the future. In other words, based
on our (highly developed) first-person perspective, we are concerned with the
persistence of ourselves qua self. This concern is, I believe, well enough
understood in the literature, in contrast to the three concerns that belong to
our three ‘models of self-conception’ and which major parts of this book are
devoted to: the concern with one’s rational agency, one’s self-narrative and one’s
values. 
Before turning to these three self-regarding concerns, let me give some
thought to our concealed first-person self-conception of ourselves as ourselves,
and – as an example of the three aforementioned ‘models of self-conception’ –
to our concealed first-person self-conception of being a rational agent.
4.1 The fundamental first-person self-conception                   
of oneself as oneself 
The self-conception of oneself as oneself is, first of all, not contingent but
necessary, because we cannot but entertain that reflective self-self relation –
at least if we are, at that moment, reflectively aware of anything at all.
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Moreover, our fundamental self-self relation is concealed. It exhibits itself in
all self-ascriptions of desires, beliefs, feelings, perceptions or sensations, in all
self-images, like being such and such or a certain kind of person, and in
various other acts of reflective self-awareness, like self-evaluation, self-
criticism, reflection on (one’s motives for) one’s actions, evaluative
dissociation from certain aspects of oneself, or dissociative experiences.
However, our fundamental self-conception of ourselves as ourselves is as
such never itself ‘object’ of our direct reflective self-awareness. All attempts
to come to grips with that self-conception result in thoughts in which we
take a detached stance and conceptualize, symbolize, and identify ourselves
qua self, for example “I am I” or “I am myself”. Such thoughts (because of
requiring conceptualization, symbolization, and identification of oneself qua
self) are third-personal self-conceptions, which obviously – as they are acts
of reflective self-awareness – exhibit the concealed self-conception of oneself
as oneself. It follows naturally that even thoughts that seem to deny one’s
fundamental self-self relation – like “I am not identical with myself”, “I am
not myself”, or “I am (or have) more than one self” – exhibit that person’s
fundamental self-self relation of conceiving of herself as herself. 
4.2 The first-person self-conception of being a rational agent   
– an example of a ‘model of self-conception’
The concealed conception of ourselves as rational agents becomes evident
from the fact that we, generally, can provide rationales for our actions, that
is, sets of reasons on which our actions are based. This is not to say that we
always, or even normally, comprehend our actions (before, during, or after
their performance) as based on particular reasons. But as soon as we are
asked why we are doing what we are doing, why we did what we did, or why
we plan to do what we say we plan to do, we are generally able to provide an
account of our actions in terms of reasons. It does not matter whether that
account is a rational reconstruction or whether the provided reasons actually
are the reasons that moved us to act – at least not for being testimony to our
concealed self-conception of being rational agents. That ‘model of self-
conception’ becomes evident from our disposition to comprehend our
actions as based on reasons; it is as such not a subject of our direct reflective
self-awareness. 
The concealed self-conception of being a rational agent is inextricably
bound up with one’s property of having a first-person perspective, which
implies that a person generally conceives of herself as the subject of her
actions, of her actions as her actions, of her actions as based on motives, and
of those motives as her motives. This concealed self-conception of being a
rational agent has to be clearly distinguished from the contingent self-image
of being or striving to be a rational kind of person. A person can easily
retrospectively distance herself from her former self-image of being or
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striving to be a rational kind of person (whatever image of being rational she
may have in mind), but she cannot dissociate herself from her ‘former’
concealed self-conception of being a rational agent. It just makes no sense to
speak of a concealed self-conception in terms of former and current, exactly
because of its being concealed. 
To avoid misunderstanding, people can obviously dissociate themselves
from particular reasons for their current or former actions – for example,
from certain desires that move or moved them to act – but only owing to
their disposition to conceive of their actions as based on (their) reasons.
Even a person who experiences a certain desire that moves her to act as ego-
alien (that is to say, she conceives of herself as the subject of that desire, but
not as its source) and who therefore does not conceive of herself as the source
of her action, exhibits the disposition to conceive of her actions as based on
(her) reasons. Her concealed self-conception of being a rational agent
exhibits itself precisely by her experiencing herself as an agent who does not
herself decide what she is doing.
4.3  Three regions of mattering                                            
based on the three ‘models of self-conception’
The three ‘models of self-conception’ – that is, conceiving of oneself as a
rational agent, as the protagonist of one’s self-narrative, and as having values
– constitute separate regions of mattering: one’s rational agency, one’s self-
narrative and one’s values. Whether we engage in self-evaluation and self-
criticism or not, whether we thematize the fact that these things matter to us
or not, even if we deny that they matter to us, as long as we have the
properties which these concerns are bound up with, we simply stand in those
mattering-relations to ourselves. 
First, the fact that we comprehend ourselves as rational agents – in other
words, that we cannot but entertain that ‘model of self-conception’ – includes
a concern with our rational agency. This concern exhibits itself in various
self-regarding feelings and thoughts. For example, we generally feel confused
if we find ourselves doing something without knowing why we are doing
what we are doing. We distance ourselves from those actions which we, while
still conceiving of ourselves as the subject of those actions, do not experience
as originating from ourselves qua self. And we, more or less frequently,
conceive of certain of our actions as irrational (sometimes accompanied by
feelings of regret or dissatisfaction with ourselves), namely when we, while
conceiving of those actions as resulting from our own reasoning, regard them
as hindering or obstructing the achievement of our adopted purposes.
The claim is that those situations bother us not only because they, for
example, reveal our forgetfulness, addiction or failure to achieve our adopted
goals, but also much more directly than that. They do not fit in with our
(concealed first-person) self-comprehension of being a rational agent. If I am
Conclusion: Personhood, models of self-conception, and regions of mattering  • 189
Proefschrift Seidel BW def  30-12-2005  13:17  Pagina 189
right, it is the situation where we regard our actions as irrational that is
especially threatening to our self-conception of being a rational agent. In the
first two cases, we may experience those actions as not under our control, in
the last case, however, we conceive of our irrational action as resulting from
our own reasoning. We are confronted with a divergence in our ‘will’, so to
speak. On the one hand, we do (or did) what we ourselves decide(d) to do;
but on the other hand, we do (or did) not do what we ‘really’ want(ed) to do
– namely (generally speaking) to avoid actions that hinder or obstruct our
adopted purposes and to perform actions that are conducive to the
realization of those purposes. According to my account, the experience of
what I label a divergence in our ‘will’ frustrates a desire which is included in
our concealed first-person self-conception of being a rational agent and
which can best be thought of as a desire to justifiably conceive of ourselves
as rational agents. The normative criterion concerning ourselves qua self,
which obtains in this desire, is consistency.
A second ‘model of self-conception’ is our comprehension of ourselves as
the protagonist of our self-narrative. It includes a concern with (the
coherence of) that narrative. For example, when engaged in explaining our
actions (to others or to ourselves), we generally feel the need to account for
apparent changes in our goals. This inclination to make these changes
intelligible exhibits one’s concern with one’s self-narrative. Even if someone
claims that the coherence of her self-narrative does not matter to her, she, by
providing a narrative explanation, is concerned with a certain level of
coherence; after all, she could otherwise not conceive of herself as the
protagonist of that explanatory narrative at all. And moreover: Why should
she, if she did not have a narrative self-conception, entertain beliefs about the
required level of coherence of her self-narrative anyway?
The fact that (the coherence of) our self-narrative matters to us does not
only express itself in our inclination to provide an account of ourselves qua
self (that is, of our actions, goals, professional career, experiences, things we
care about, etcetera) in terms of a self-narrative, but also in certain positive
and negative self-regarding thoughts and feelings. A person may, for example,
conceive of herself qua self as irrational when her ‘evaluative agenda’ is
characterized by incoherences, that is to say, when her adopted long-term
goals and purposes typically conflict with one another. An incoherent
evaluative agenda entails a fragmented self-narrative – at least, a self-
narrative with a lot of twists and turns. And my claim is that such
fragmentations and incoherences bother us not only because we probably
will (or have) achieve(d) less than we can (could have done), but also more
directly than that. Experiencing fragmentation of one’s self and feeling the
need for reconciliation is often accompanied by emotions like sadness about
oneself or dissatisfaction with oneself. Significant fragmentation and
incoherence, after all, does not fit in with our (concealed first-person) self-
comprehension of being the (well-defined) protagonist of our
autobiographical narrative. That ‘model of self-conception’, if I am right,
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includes the desire to be able (‘able’ owing to one’s way of living a life) to
conceive of ourselves as the well-defined protagonist of our self-narrative.
The normative criterion concerning ourselves qua self, which obtains in this
desire, is coherence.
Finally, the self-comprehension of having values, which belongs to the
property of applying self-regarding qualitative standards, forms a third
‘model of self-conception’. It includes a concern with one’s values and
typically exhibits itself in (often particularly strong) negative self-regarding
feelings or thoughts – like conceiving of one’s action as blameworthy,
objectionable, or wrong, and/or experiencing feelings of regret, remorse, or
contrition, or even of not being worthy of self-esteem. Explicitly regarding
some of our actions as right happens less frequently than regarding certain of
our actions as wrong. Also, the feelings accompanying our regarding our
actions as right are less vivid, and they do not typically lead to further
reflections on our motivations for action and on the qualitative standards we
apply to ourselves. It is the deviation from our own self-regarding qualitative
standards that provokes the more salient self-regarding reactive attitudes or
reflexive emotions. The claim is that our wrongdoings typically bother us
(deeply), and that that characteristically leads to further reflection on our
motives for action, to self-evaluation and/or self-criticism. 
According to my account, persons who apply self-regarding qualitative
standards implicitly care about being the kind of person who has particular
values. They are concerned with their values, and that concern, if I am right,
is a desire to justifiably conceive of oneself as a person who cares about
particular values. This is obviously not to say that we explicitly entertain
thoughts like “I care about being the kind of person who has (such and such)
values”, or “I want to justifiably conceive of myself as a person who cares
about (such and such) values”, or – when disqualifying our actions – “I do
not want to be such kind of person”. However, our salient self-regarding
reactive attitudes and reflexive emotions show that we experience the
integrity of ourselves qua self to be at stake when we regard our actions as
wrong. 
4.4  Intrinsic concerns with ourselves qua self
To conclude, I should again emphasize that the concerns with ourselves qua
self are inextricably bound up with the properties that constitute personhood
(in its fullest sense). The fact that our rational agency, our self-narrative, and
our values – or to put it more abstractly, the consistency, coherence, and
integrity of ourselves qua self – matter to us, does not imply that we entertain
the corresponding self-regarding beliefs. We do not characteristically think “I
am concerned with my rational agency”, “I desire to be able to conceive of
myself qua self as the well-defined protagonist of my autobiographical
narrative”, “I care about being a person who has particular values”, or “I care
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about the consistency, coherence, and integrity of myself qua self”. These
kinds of thoughts are typically results of acts of meta-reflection on oneself
qua self; they are detached from the structures, dispositions and desires that
lie at the heart of our self-comprehension. That self-comprehension with its
included concerns simply exhibits itself in our ‘active engagement’ with
ourselves qua self – most vividly in certain negative feelings concerning our
decisions, actions, or our life. 
To recapitulate, my claim is that our own irrationalities, our wrongdoings
and incoherences matter to us not only because they hinder the
accomplishment of our aims, but also much more directly than that. The
strength of people’s concerns with the consistency, coherence, and integrity of
themselves qua self can, however, vary from one person to another, since the
properties that constitute personhood – or rather, the ‘models of self-
conception’ with their different structures, dispositions, and desires – can,
even in mature stages of personhood, be developed to different degrees. 
5 New questions
This book is nearing its end. My quest for our relation to ourselves qua self
is, however, not completed. I touched upon a variety of questions concerning
personhood, selfhood, self-conceptions, and self-relations, and I dug
extensively into quite a number of them – yet, still new questions keep
arising. Here is a selection.
5.1  Regarding selfhood
THE QUESTION OF SELF-ALIENATION
When we reflect on our actions, our plans and goals, our character traits, or
the things we care about, our attention is directed at aspects of ourselves qua
self. We cannot reflect on our self ‘as such’ or ‘in its entirety’. As soon as we
try to focus on our self ‘as such’, our self seems to slip away and we again and
again find ourselves thinking about particular aspects of our self, for
example, about our typical self-regarding moods and feelings. We simply
cannot reflect on our self ‘as such’, for one’s self is unidentifiable (and it is
content-free). This implies that we, in a certain sense, do not coincide with
ourselves qua self, as soon as we perform acts of self-reflection. We might
therefore say that we frequently and regularly – after all, we frequently and
regularly perform acts of self-reflection – are in a state of self-alienation. We
might even say that a person becomes the more alienated from herself qua
self, the more she is engaged in reflection about herself qua self, since such
meta-reflection about one’s self requires a highly detached stance towards
oneself. 
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Doesn’t this conclusion conflict with the ancient dictum “know thyself”;
in other words, doesn’t explicit reflection on oneself qua self enhance one’s
self-knowledge? Well, one could dispose of the problem, simply by arguing
that we now confuse two different notions of the self: the ancient dictum
“know thyself” presupposes a rich notion of the self, whereas the thoughts
concerning self-alienation presuppose a ‘neutral’ (that is, unidentifiable and
content-free) self. The question of the connections between self-knowledge
and self-alienation deserves more attention than that, however. I am
convinced it would give us new insights if we analysed the notions of self-
knowledge and self-alienation and their connections in the light of my
account of personhood and selfhood. And such a project would obviously
benefit from cooperation with psychologists and psychiatrists who are
confronted with pathological cases of both self-knowledge and self-
alienation.
THE QUESTION OF SELF-COINCIDENCE
Based on my account of selfhood, it is impossible that a person, when she
performs an act of reflective self-awareness, coincides with herself qua self.
One might think that our fundamental first-person self-conception of oneself
as oneself is an exception to that impossibility. After all, that reflective act of
self-awareness is nothing else than the reflective awareness of being-self. In a
certain way, our conception of ourselves as ourselves is an exception to the
impossibility of self-coincidence in reflective acts of self-awareness. That self-
conception, however, is never a ‘stand-alone’ reflective act of self-awareness;
it is always concealed in other acts of reflective self-awareness. 
Although it is impossible to coincide with oneself qua self in acts of self-
ascription or when one is engaged in explicit self-reflection, there are
nevertheless degrees of detachment from oneself qua self, depending on the
kind of act of self-awareness. Reflecting on one’s life or personality, for
example, requires a more detached stance towards oneself than do certain
embedded acts of self-reflection, which take place in the context of a concrete
action, for instance, one’s rejection of a particular motivation to act in a
certain way. So the question might arise which kind of reflective self-self
relations (with the exception of the concealed self-conception of oneself as
oneself) are as close as possible to self-coincidence. 
Some philosophers believe that a person can experience pure self-
consciousness; and those philosophers presumably think that a person, in
that experience, coincides with herself qua self. One could also speculate that
experiencing self-regarding moods or vague reflexive feelings like “es ist
einem langweilig” or “es ist einem Angst” (German expressions that lose
their specific meaning if translated) comes as close as possible to self-
coincidence. 
Anyway, I wonder whether my distinction between three kinds of acts of
reflective self-awareness – embedded self-reflection, explicit self-reflection
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and meta-reflection – and/or my distinction between first-person and third-
person self-conceptions could be fine-tuned in such a way that we could
propose an answer to the question which kinds of reflective acts of self-
awareness approach self-coincidence as close as possible, in other words,
which acts imply a minimum of self-alienation.
5.2  Regarding ‘the three properties’
THE QUESTION OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE THREE PROPERTIES
THAT ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PERSONHOOD IN ITS FULLEST SENSE
Cognitive and practical abilities like imagining oneself in this or that situation,
taking a position towards one’s motives (to act in a certain way), postponing
the satisfaction of certain of one’s desires, or knowing that one is going to die
eventually require a first-person perspective. It is, however, conceivable that
some of those abilities require a more mature stage of the capability of a first-
person perspective than others. Compare, for example, the cognitive ability of
knowing that one is going to die eventually and the practical ability of
postponing the satisfaction of certain of one’s desires. I am tempted to think
that the former requires a more mature stage of the capability of a first-person
perspective than the latter.
Assuming that we can identify maturity stages in the capability of a first-
person perspective, the question may arise whether certain stages of the
capability of a first-person perspective are dependent on one or both of the two
non-fundamental properties, that is to say, whether these stages require the
non-fundamental properties of a narrative self-conception and/or of applying
self-regarding qualitative standards to be developed to a certain degree.
Two similar questions might arise concerning connections between the two
non-fundamental properties: Do certain developmental degrees of the
property of a narrative self-conception require the property of applying self-
regarding qualitative standards to be developed to a certain degree too? And
the same question can obviously be raised the other way round. To avoid
misunderstanding, the question is not whether there are connections between
a person’s values and her autobiographical narrative, but whether there are
connections on the structural level of the self, that is, on the level of the two
properties in question.
THE QUESTION OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN ONE’S PURPOSES AND ONE’S VALUES
According to my account, adopting a purpose and having values requires
different properties of the domain of personhood. Both require the property of
a first-person perspective, but having values requires more than that, namely
the property of making qualitative distinctions and applying them as standards
to oneself. The situation is even more complex, because to adopt purposes that
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in fact are life-goals requires a narrative self-conception, on top of a first-
person perspective. 
In this book, I spent some time discussing the question of conflicts between
our purposes and our values and I argued for the overriding nature of our
values.2 I nevertheless believe that the question about the conflicts between
our purposes and our values deserves more research than is devoted to it in
the context of this project.
5.3  Regarding cultural and historical dimensions of personhood 
According to my account, personhood – or rather personhood in its
fundamental sense – is definitely independent of cultural or historical
dimensions; it is solely dependent on the capability of a first-person
perspective. A creature counts as a person if it has the capability of a first-
person perspective, that is, the capability to conceive of itself as itself. Period.
Therefore, certain questions concerning the possible historical and cultural
dimensions of personhood can simply not intelligibly be raised, given my
account of person- and selfhood. 
Someone might, for instance, speculate that prehistorical persons may
have lacked a sense of self or that a sense of self is the product or invention
of Western culture. That position is not tenable, however. Firstly, we have to
assume that such questions concern a reflective sense of selfhood, since a pre-
reflective sense of selfhood is required for all (complex) purposeful behaviour
and not restricted to personhood. Secondly, a reflective sense of selfhood
simply arises from a person’s fundamental capability of a first-person
perspective. It exhibits itself, for instance, in our first-person self-
conceptions of our actions as our actions or our thoughts as our thoughts. It
is neither reserved to people that engage in hyper-reflection about their ‘self’
nor part of an elitist self-image or the result of self-absorption. Thirdly,
creatures that lack a reflective sense of selfhood cannot but lack the
capability of a first-person perspective (after all, the former arises from the
latter) and thereby lack the features by virtue of which they would count as
persons. Hence, a reflective sense of selfhood can neither be the product of a
certain culture or an invention of certain philosophers, nor is it possible that
prehistorical people lacked a reflective sense of selfhood. 
Nevertheless, there are lots of questions regarding the historical and
cultural dimensions of personhood that might, in the light of my account of
person- and selfhood, legitimately be raised and which deserve investigation.
Such questions may, for example, concern the possible historical dimensions
of certain cognitive or practical abilities that are based on the capability of a
first-person perspective. Think of our abilities to perform hyper-reflective
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acts of self-evaluation or to play various roles, or of our highly developed
planning and even contingency planning abilities. Questions regarding the
historical dimensions of personhood may also concern the two non-
fundamental but characteristic properties of persons – the properties of a
narrative self-conception and of applying self-regarding qualitative
standards. One might ask whether these capabilities developed
simultaneously or whether one developed earlier than the other. One might
also speculate about the circumstances that might have favoured the
development of those properties and, for example, raise the question whether
these properties might disappear if those circumstances did not obtain
anymore.
Speculations regarding the cultural dimensions of personhood might even
seem to be more obvious. To avoid wrong-headed questions and ideas, I
should first call to mind that the questions which are relevant here have to
concern the structural aspects of personhood, not people’s ideas of, say, a
good life. The latter, undoubtedly, show (sub)cultural variations – think of
the difference between a focus on self-fulfilment or on one’s duties to others;
but this kind of difference does not imply differences in the structural aspects
of personhood. Relevant are those questions that relate to the possible
cultural dimensions of the properties constitutive of personhood or the
cognitive and practical abilities that are based on those properties. Do
contemporary ‘normal’ and mature persons generally have the properties of a
narrative self-conception and of applying qualitative self-regarding standards
developed to (approximately) the same degree, or is that degree – or even the
development of the property in question – culture-dependent? 
As to the property of applying qualitative self-regarding standards, it is a
widespread common-sense belief in contemporary Western societies that
these societies suffer from the fact that a significant number of people do not
have values anymore. One might therefore be tempted to conclude that
contemporary Western culture suffers from a lack of people’s property of
applying self-regarding qualitative standards. Analysis in the light of my
account, however, may lead to the conclusion that the people in question do
not lack values, but that other things function as values in their evaluative
reasoning. In that case, what seemed to be a lack of values turns out to be a
different ethical orientation; and that orientation is assessed negatively, as a
lack of the ‘right’ values. A second example of the possible cultural
dimensions of personhood concerns the property of a narrative self-
conception. Certain literature on the Buddhist view on personhood seems to
imply that that property is culture-dependent. I wonder whether an analysis
of literature on the Buddhist view on personhood, when performed against
the background of my account, would lead to the conclusion that Buddhists
– or rather, Buddhists in the true sense – do not have a narrative self-
conception. To be honest, I doubt it. 
To sum up, my account of personhood does not exclude the possibility
that certain dimensions of personhood (in its fullest sense) may be
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historically or culturally dependent. The question remains whether
personhood indeed has cultural and historical dimensions and what those
dimensions are – a question that definitely merits investigation.
5.4  Regarding the concept of a good life
According to my account of personhood (in its fullest sense), persons
entertain three ‘models of self-conception’: conceiving of oneself as a rational
agent, as the protagonist of one’s self-narrative, and as having values.
Although the three ‘models of self-conception’ are not ‘objects’ of our direct
reflective self-awareness, we may become aware of them through explicit
reflection on our self-regarding reactive attitudes. They thereby can become
part of our self-images, more specifically, of third-personal self-conceptions
of being (or striving to be) a certain kind of person.
Some people entertain pronounced self-images around the three concerns.
Think of people who believe that they are or should be immune to
spontaneous desires, because such desires hinder the realization of adopted
aims. Or take, by contrast, people who proclaim that they value irrationality.
Or think of people who explicitly care about the coherence of their
autobiographical narrative, or who, by contrast, proclaim that they
deliberately strive for fragmentation. 
Such observations might lead us to the ethical question how the three
regions of mattering – one’s rational agency, one’s autobiographical narrative,
and one’s values – figure in our (contemporary) concept of a good life. 
5.5  Regarding the need for unity of ourselves qua self
THE QUESTION CONCERNING A DEEPER FOUNDATION
OF OUR SUFFERING FROM DISUNITY
If I am right, persons typically suffer from divergence in their ‘will’,
fragmentation of their self-narratives, and non-integrity of themselves. In
other words, they suffer from inconsistency, incoherence, and non-integrity
of themselves qua self. In my view, these phenomena exhibit a need for unity
of oneself qua self. I argued – and I based that argumentation solely on
conceptual analysis – that our need for unity can only be grounded in our
pre-reflective sense of identity over time. Nevertheless, I believe that this
subject calls for other kinds of investigation too: it needs cross-fertilization
with research in the areas of developmental psychology, psychopathology
and the neurosciences.
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THE QUESTION HOW MUCH (DIS)UNITY A PERSON CAN STAND
I emphasized that people typically suffer from disunity, that is to say, from
divergence in their ‘will’, fragmentation of their self-narratives, and non-
integrity of themselves. This is however not to claim that people always and
deeply suffer from each and every bit of disunity, so to speak. People
generally accept that they, for instance, sometimes have a ‘weak will’ and that
their lives are not straight-lined, and even that certain twists in their lives are
difficult to be conceived of as personal developments, and that they
sometimes, in their actions, are insensitive to the fact that certain of their
values are at stake. My question is how much disunity a person can stand,
given her desire for consistency, coherence and integrity.
Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly – after all, I argued that persons
have a need for unity – the opposite question can also be raised, namely, how
much unity a person can stand. I think that we have reason to believe that
people not only typically suffer from disunity but that they can also suffer
from too much unity, more specifically, from an excessive concern with the
soundness of their will, the coherence of their self-narrative and the integrity
of their self. To put it differently, I am tempted to think that these concerns
with ourselves qua self can become obsessive. 
Both questions, how much unity a person can stand as well as how much
disunity a person can stand, obviously bear on the domain of psychiatry and
psychology; and to address those questions hence requires an inter-
disciplinary approach.
A LAST WORD CONCERNING THE VARIOUS NEW QUESTIONS
It will not have passed unnoticed that the various new questions are less
concerned with the three properties that are constitutive of personhood (in
its fullest sense) and their included self-conceptions, structures and
dispositions than with their connections, with developmental and cultural
aspects of personhood, and with issues of normativity and normality. And, in
my view, most of these new questions require an interdisciplinary approach. 
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Samenvatting
Wij kunnen gevoelens hebben ten aanzien van onszelf en denken over
onszelf, omdat wij het soort wezens zijn die wij zijn – namelijk personen.
Met andere woorden, dankzij ons persoon-zijn kunnen wij ons denkend en
voelend tot onszelf verhouden. Ik zal dit aan de hand van drie karakteristieke
gevallen illustreren. 
Ten eerste leidt het in het algemeen tot negatieve gevoelens en gedachten
over onszelf als we in ons handelen door motieven worden geleid waardoor
we ‘eigenlijk’ – althans zo denken en voelen we op dat moment – niet willen
worden geleid. Zo kunnen we bijvoorbeeld teleurgesteld zijn over onszelf,
ontevreden zijn met onszelf of kwaad zijn op onszelf, als we, door te doen
waar we op dat moment zin in hadden, willens en wetens de realisering van
een voorgenomen doel in gevaar hebben gebracht. Wij kunnen, ten tweede,
op een manier hebben gehandeld die we tegenover onszelf niet kunnen
verantwoorden. We hebben bijvoorbeeld het vertrouwen van anderen
geschaad of geen mededogen of verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel getoond. In een
dergelijke situatie kunnen we ons vertwijfeld of wanhopig voelen en ons
realiseren dat we ons, op basis van ons handelen, niet als de persoon kunnen
zien die we (nog steeds) zouden willen zijn: meelevend met anderen,
verantwoordelijk en betrouwbaar. Als derde voorbeeld kunnen we denken
aan iemand, die zijn leven in brokstukken voor zich ziet liggen en het op
geen enkele manier meer als een samenhangend geheel kan begrijpen. Die
persoon lijdt onder deze situatie, immers hij wil zijn leven als samenhangend
en zichzelf als de protagonist van zijn levensverhaal kunnen begrijpen.
Kortom, hij heeft negatieve gedachten en gevoelens over zichzelf. 
Hoewel de genoemde voorbeelden zonder uitzondering negatieve
zelfgerelateerde gedachten en gevoelens illustreren, kunnen wij uiteraard ook
positieve zelfgerelateerde gedachten en gevoelens hebben, zoals tevreden zijn
met ons handelen of met de manier waarop we ons leven leiden. Positieve
zelfgerelateerde gedachten zijn vaak echter minder ‘krachtig’ en zij leiden,
anders dan negatieve zelfgerelateerde gedachten en gevoelens, niet typisch
tot verdere reflectie over ons handelen en over onszelf. Het zijn de
afwijkingen van de ons eigen normen die tot soms hevige zelfgerelateerde
emoties kunnen leiden en die ons zelfbegrip aan het wankelen kunnen
brengen. Met ‘de ons eigen normen’ bedoel ik hier niet de doelen die wij
onszelf hebben gesteld, de plannen die we voor onszelf hebben gemaakt of
de gedragsregels die we voor onszelf hebben aanvaard. De normen die hier
een rol spelen, zijn als het ware dieper verankerd; zij zijn onlosmakelijk
verbonden met bepaalde eigenschappen die kenmerkend zijn voor personen.
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Personen hebben als fundamentele eigenschap een hoogontwikkeld
eerste-persoons-perspectief, dat wil zeggen, zij begrijpen zichzelf als zichzelf.
Ik noem die eigenschap fundamenteel, omdat er zonder het vermogen om
zichzelf als zichzelf te begrijpen geen sprake is van persoon-zijn; het is de
basis voor iedere vorm van zelfbegrip. Daarenboven (en wel letterlijk en
figuurlijk) hebben personen twee kenmerkende, hoewel niet-fundamentele,
eigenschappen: ten eerste een narratief zelfbegrip en ten tweede het op
zichzelf toepassen van kwalitatieve normen. Alle drie voor persoon-zijn
kenmerkende eigenschappen bevatten modellen van zelfbegrip: als wezens
met een eerste-persoons-perspectief begrijpen we onszelf impliciet als
rationele actoren; als wezens met een narratief zelfbegrip begrijpen we
onszelf impliciet als de protagonist van ons eigen levensverhaal; als wezens
die op zichzelf kwalitatieve standaarden toepassen, begrijpen we onszelf
impliciet als wezens die waarden hebben.
De genoemde drie eigenschappen met hun eigen modellen van zelfbegrip
liggen ten grondslag aan het feit dat het er voor onszelf toe doet op basis van
die motieven te handelen waardoor we gemotiveerd willen worden, dat het
er voor onszelf toe doet ons leven als een min of meer samenhangend geheel
te kunnen begrijpen, en dat het er voor onszelf toe doet onszelf als een
persoon te kunnen zien die bepaalde waarden heeft. De drie eigenschappen
constitueren daarmee domeinen die er voor onszelf met betrekking tot
onszelf qua zelf toe doen. Anders gezegd, op basis van de drie voor persoon-
zijn kenmerkende eigenschappen zijn wij qua zelf op een karakteristieke
manier voor onszelf van belang. Dit is de centrale these die in dit proefschrift
wordt beargumenteerd.
HET ONDERZOEK VAN ZELF-ZELF-RELATIES
In het inleidende hoofdstuk worden allereerst zelfrelaties gecategoriseerd.
Dit om die zelfrelaties, waar het in dit onderzoek hoofdzakelijk om gaat, van
andersoortige zelfrelaties te onderscheiden en er niet mee te verwarren. De
volgende indeling wordt gemaakt: (1) reflectieve zelf-zelf-relaties; (2)
reflectieve zelf-lichaam-relaties; (3) prereflectieve zelf-zelf- of zelf-lichaam-
relaties; (4) lichaam-lichaam-relaties. 
Reflectieve zelf-zelf-relaties zijn relaties van een persoon qua persoon –
dat wil zeggen, qua zichzelf als zichzelf begrijpend wezen – tot (aspecten
van) zichzelf qua zelf. Tot deze categorie behoren de aan het begin van deze
samenvatting beschreven voorbeelden, en om dit soort zelfrelaties gaat het
in dit onderzoek. De tweede categorie, de reflectieve zelf-lichaam-relaties,
betreft relaties van een persoon qua persoon tot (aspecten van) zichzelf qua
lichaam. Iemand kan bijvoorbeeld ongelukkig zijn met zijn postuur of
zichzelf attractief vinden, of blij zijn of juist ontevreden met haar gekrulde
haar. Dit soort zelfrelaties ligt buiten het bestek van dit onderzoek. De derde
categorie zijn prereflectieve zelf-zelf- of zelf-lichaam-relaties. Te denken valt
bijvoorbeeld aan onderdrukte zelfgerelateerde gevoelens, die in bepaalde
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situaties in iemands reacties tot uiting lijken te komen. Deze zelfrelaties zijn
prereflectief in de zin dat de persoon in kwestie zich (op dat moment) niet
van de bewuste reflexieve houdingen en gevoelens bewust is, maar niet in
de zin dat zij aanwezig zouden kunnen zijn bij wezens zonder het vermogen
tot een eerste-persoons-perspectief. Prereflectieve zelf-zelf- of zelf-lichaam-
relaties veronderstellen wel degelijk persoon-zijn. Zij komen in dit
onderzoek (in de hoofdstukken 5 en 6) zijdelings aan bod. De vierde en
laatste categorie betreft lichaam-lichaam-relaties: relaties van een persoon
qua levend menselijk organisme tot zichzelf. Dit soort zelfrelaties vereist
niet het vermogen om zich als zichzelf te begrijpen. Voorbeelden zijn ons
natuurlijke instinct om te overleven of de compenserende bewegingen van
ons lichaam als we dreigen ons evenwicht te verliezen. Deze categorie
zelfrelaties speelt in dit onderzoek geen rol en komt daarom slechts
zijdelings aan de orde, namelijk in het kader van speculaties over het
fenomeen ‘meervoudige persoonlijkheidsstoornis’.
Zoals reeds gezegd, dit proefschrift is primair gewijd aan reflectieve zelf-
zelf-relaties. Het is een poging om greep te krijgen op het feit dat wij qua
zelf er op karakteristieke manieren voor onszelf toe doen. Er wordt niet
gevraagd hoe wij als individuen of als soort ertoe zijn gekomen dat wij op
deze karakteristieke manieren voor onszelf van belang zijn. Ook de ethische
vraag in welke zelf-zelf-relaties wij zouden moeten staan is niet aan de orde.
Het gaat erom de structuren van bepaalde zelf-zelf-relaties en de disposities
die daarin een rol spelen te begrijpen. De benadering is analytisch en
structureel, niet historisch. Bij de behandeling van de diverse
deelproblemen wordt in de regel begonnen bij alledaagse prefilosofische
noties of algemeen bekende fenomenen die blijk geven van een reflectieve
zelf-zelf-relatie, zoals onszelf qua zelf voor veranderlijk houden, onszelf qua
zelf als iets constants beschouwen, onszelf in bepaalde situaties voor
irrationeel houden of onszelf distantiëren van sommige van onze verlangens
of handelingen. Dit soort fenomenen en prefilosofische noties wordt
geanalyseerd tegen de achtergrond van een bepaald concept van persoon-
zijn. De verkenningen zijn vaak descriptief, hoewel niet empirisch. Het punt
waar het om gaat is conceptueel: dankzij de vermogens op basis waarvan
personen als personen gelden (in de volste zin van persoon-zijn), staan zij
in kenmerkende relaties tot zichzelf qua zelf.
Een adequate theorie van persoon-zijn, zo wordt gesteld, mag zich niet
beperken tot het laten zien welke vermogens het persoon-zijn vereist, maar
dient de zelfgerelateerde disposities, neigingen en behoeften te verklaren die
kenmerkend zijn voor personen. De in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde
analyse van zelf-zelf-relaties neemt derhalve het eerste-persoons-perspectief
serieus. Door verschillende manieren te analyseren waarop wij onze
handelingen, doelen, motieven, overtuigingen, waarden, karaktertrekken of
ons leven begrijpen, worden structuren en disposities blootgelegd die
inherent zijn aan bepaalde kenmerkende zelf-zelf-relaties. De manieren
waarop we denken en voelen ten aanzien van onszelf, zijn, zo wordt
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betoogd, niet slechts contingent, dat wil zeggen onze zelfgerelateerde
gedachten en gevoelens zijn niet alleen afhankelijk van bijvoorbeeld onze
handelingen en ervaringen, ons karakter en onze biografie of de reactie van
anderen op ons gedrag, maar zij hebben ook bepaalde apriorische structuren
en omvatten bepaalde disposities, neigingen en behoeften. We kunnen
bijvoorbeeld niet anders dan onszelf als de bron van onze handelingen
(willen) begrijpen. Immers, als wij denken en voelen dat niet wij, maar
krachten in ons bepalen wat wij doen, distantiëren wij ons van die
handelingen. En het zou ons, voorzichtig gezegd, ongerust maken als wij
regelmatig precies die handelingen zouden uitvoeren die wij op dat moment
niet willen uitvoeren, als wij, als het ware, tegen onze eigen wil zouden
handelen. Beide gevallen – dat personen zich onder bepaalde omstan-
digheden van hun handelingen distantiëren en dat het beangstigend zou zijn
als ‘een vreemde wil zich van ons meester zou maken’ – maken duidelijk dat
personen zich in principe als de bron van hun handelingen voelen en
begrijpen, en dat het er voor hen toe doet zich als de bron van hun
handelingen te kunnen voelen en begrijpen.
Reeds deze twee voorbeelden laten zien dat dit onderzoek van zelf-zelf-
relaties diverse onderwerpen en gebieden van de filosofie raakt. Een
prominente rol spelen de onderwerpen persoon-zijn, het zelf, persoonlijke
identiteit en praktische rationaliteit, en daarbij worden de domeinen van de
handelingsfilosofie, de wijsgerige antropologie, de ‘philosophy of mind’, de
filosofie van de psychiatrie en de ethiek geraakt. De gekozen benadering –
het serieus nemen van het eerste-persoon-perspectief en het analyseren van
diverse zelf-zelf-relaties tegen de achtergrond van een concept van persoon-
zijn – verheldert verbindingen tussen deze domeinen die anders
onderbelicht zijn. Het fenomeen van dissociatie, bijvoorbeeld, is typisch een
onderwerp uit de filosofie van de psychiatrie. In dit onderzoek wordt
‘dissociatie’ echter niet beperkt tot pathologische gevallen, maar in een
bredere context geplaatst. Daardoor komen vragen naar voren als ‘Van welke
aspecten van zichzelf kan een persoon zich distantiëren en wat zijn de
grenzen van dissociatie?’, ‘Welke dissociatieve fenomenen kunnen als
mentale akten van de persoon qua persoon gelden?’, ‘Kan een persoon zich
van zichzelf qua zelf dissociëren?’.
De analyse van allerlei fenomenen van zelf-zelf-relaties heeft in dit
onderzoek steeds hetzelfde uitgangspunt, namelijk een bepaald concept van
persoon-zijn: personen zijn wezens met het vermogen van een eerste-
persoons-perspectief, dat wil zeggen, het vermogen zichzelf als zichzelf te
begrijpen. Hoewel een bepaald persoonsconcept wordt verondersteld, is dit
onderzoek toch een zoektocht naar een bevredigende theorie van persoon-
zijn. De circulariteit die in de gekozen benadering aanwezig is, is niet
problematisch, omdat het gepresenteerde persoonsconcept steeds rijker en
verfijnder wordt. Zo wordt bijvoorbeeld in de loop van het onderzoek
duidelijk, dat het genoemde concept van persoon-zijn (personen zijn
wezens die zichzelf als zichzelf begrijpen) tekort schiet als het er om gaat
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begrijpelijk te maken dat wijzelf qua zelf voor onszelf ‘gegeven zijn’, dat
personen zich niet hoeven te identificeren als zij zichzelf als zichzelf
begrijpen. Zichzelf als zichzelf begrijpen veronderstelt, zo wordt
geargumenteerd, een prereflectief gevoel van zelf-zijn. Ons prereflectieve
gevoel van zelf-zijn zou – hier wordt het betoog enigszins speculatief – de
basis kunnen zijn voor ons verlangen naar eenheid van onszelf qua zelf, een
verlangen dat zich – als behoefte aan consistentie, coherentie en integriteit
– in verschillende van de geanalyseerde zelf-zelf-relaties toont. 
DE CENTRALE CLAIMS EN AANNAMES VAN DE HOOFDSTUKKEN
De in deze samenvatting opgenomen tabel geeft een overzicht van de claims
en aannames van de verschillende hoofdstukken. Hierbij is het inleidende
hoofdstuk niet meer vermeld, omdat de inhoud ervan reeds ruimschoots aan
bod is gekomen.
Tabel:  Overzicht van de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 7
Hoofdstuk 2: De relatie van onszelf tot ons ‘zelf’
(originele titel: The relation of oneself to one’s self)
Het tweede hoofdstuk presenteert een structurele theorie van ‘het zelf’ en
bespreekt een bijzondere relatie waarin personen dankzij hun persoon-zijn
tot zichzelf staan: de relatie van er-voor-zich-zelf-qua-zelf-toe-doen. De
theorie onderscheidt drie componenten van deze relatie, die ieder een eigen
domein vormen van het er-voor-zich-zelf-qua-zelf-toe-doen en die hun eigen
structuren hebben.
Het hoofdstuk steunt op de volgende centrale aanname: het (volwassen) zelf
wordt gezamenlijk geconstitueerd door drie eigenschappen: de eigen-
schappen van een eerste-persoons-perspectief (dit is de fundamentele
eigenschap), een narratief zelfbegrip en het maken van kwalitatieve
verschillen.
Hoofdstuk 3: Praktische irrationaliteit vanuit een zelfgerelateerd perspectief 
(originele titel: Practical irrationality from a self-related perspective)
In dit hoofdstuk worden twee fenomenen van het er-voor-zich-zelf-qua-zelf-
toe-doen onderzocht: zijn handelingen irrationeel vinden en zichzelf
irrationeel vinden. De stelling is dat onze eigen irrationaliteiten niet alleen
daarom er voor onszelf toe doen omdat zij belemmeren dat wij onze doelen
bereiken, maar ook op een veel directere manier. 
Het hoofdstuk steunt op de volgende centrale aanname: of wij onze
handeling als rationeel, irrationeel, rationeel-en-irrationeel, onrationeel, als
gebaseerd op een vergissing, of als fout, slecht of onjuist begrijpen, hangt
ervan af hoe die handeling in verband staat met een mogelijk proces van
evaluatief redeneren. 
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Hoofdstuk 4: Fout handelen en fout zijn 
vanuit een zelfgerelateerd perspectief 
(originele titel: Wrongness from a self-related perspective)
In dit hoofdstuk worden twee fenomenen van het er-voor-zich-zelf-qua-zelf-
toe-doen onderzocht: zijn handelingen fout, slecht of onjuist vinden en
zichzelf fout of slecht vinden. De stelling is: als we onze handeling fout,
slecht of onjuist vinden, dan is deze beoordeling overheersend ten aanzien
van andere mogelijke beoordelingen van onze handeling.
Het hoofdstuk steunt op de volgende centrale aanname: doelen en waarden
spelen een essentieel verschillende rol in ons evaluatieve redeneren, en wel
omdat zij betrekking hebben op twee verschillende manieren van reflectie
over ons handelen.
Hoofdstuk 5: Zelf-zijn: Eenheid in veranderlijkheid 
(originele titel: Selfhood: Unity in changeability)
In dit hoofdstuk wordt de (schijnbare) tegenstrijdigheid besproken tussen het
feit dat wij onszelf qua zelf als één en hetzelfde begrijpen (door de tijd heen)
en het feit dat wij ons bewust zijn van onze veranderlijkheid. De stelling is dat
bepaalde kenmerkende manieren om over onszelf te denken en voelen er blijk
van geven dat wij een verlangen hebben naar eenheid van ons zelf.
Het hoofdstuk steunt op de volgende centrale aanname: persoon-zijn –
omdat het reflectief zelfbewustzijn vereist – veronderstelt een prereflectief
gevoel van zelf-zijn.
Hoofdstuk 6: Zelfbegrip en de grenzen van dissociatie 
(originele titel: Self-conception and the limits to dissociation)
In dit hoofdstuk worden verschillende fenomenen van dissociatie tegen de
achtergrond van een theorie van zelfbegrip geanalyseerd. De stelling is dat
het om conceptuele redenen onmogelijk is dat een persoon zich van zichzelf
qua zelf zou kunnen dissociëren. 
Het hoofdstuk steunt op de volgende centrale aanname: men dient tussen
een eerste-persoons-zelfbegrip en een derde-persoons-zelfbegrip te
onderscheiden. In tegenstelling tot een eerste-persoons-zelfbegrip vereist een
derde-persoons-zelfbegrip dat wij onszelf qua zelf conceptualiseren en
symboliseren.
Hoofdstuk 7: Conclusie: Persoon-zijn, modellen van zelfbegrip 
en wat er voor onszelf qua zelf toe doet 
(originele titel: Conclusion: Personhood, models of self-conception, 
and regions of mattering)
In dit hoofdstuk worden verbanden gelegd tussen de voorafgaande
hoofdstukken. Daarbij worden juist die aspecten van de gepresenteerde
theorie van persoon- en zelf-zijn benadrukt waarvan te verwachten is dat zij
bestreden zullen worden.
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DE MEEST CONTROVERSIËLE CONCLUSIES
Dit onderzoek naar zelf-zelf-relaties leidt tot een aantal controversiële
stellingen. Hier is een selectie daarvan:
1. Persoon-zijn en zelf-zijn zijn twee kanten van dezelfde medaille.
2. Zelf-zijn heeft een prereflectieve voorganger, namelijk een gevoel van
zelf-zijn.
3. Of een handeling rationeel is hangt er alleen van af of de persoon zijn
handeling beschouwt als voortkomend uit zijn eigen redeneren. 
4. Autobiografische levensverhalen zijn niet identiteitsconstituerend in
een fundamentele zin.
5. Het fundamentele zelfbegrip van zichzelf als zichzelf is inhoudsloos.
6. Personen kunnen niet anders dan zichzelf als zichzelf begrijpen.
7. Zelf-zelf-relaties hebben, met uitzondering van de fundamentele
zelfzelf-relatie van zichzelf als zichzelf begrijpen, altijd betrekking op
aspecten van zichzelf qua zelf.
8. Reflectieve zelf-zelf-relaties vereisen niet noodzakelijkerwijs een
afstandelijke houding ten aanzien van zichzelf.
9. Persoon-zijn houdt drie modellen van zelfbegrip in, ieder met eigen
structuren en disposities: het zelfbegrip als een rationele actor, als de
protagonist van het eigen levensverhaal en als een wezen dat waarden
heeft. 
10. Het fundamentele zelfbegrip van zichzelf als zichzelf en de drie
modellen van zelfbegrip moeten worden onderscheiden van daarmee
schijnbaar corresponderende zelfbeelden, zoals de gedachte ‘ik ben
mijzelf’ of het zelfbeeld een rationele persoon te zijn. 
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